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ABSTRACT 
A KNIFE HIDDEN IN ROSES: DEVELOPMENT AND GENDER VIOLENCE 
IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  
SEPTEMBER 2013 
CRUZ CARIDAD BUENO, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor James K. Boyce 
 
On September 30, 2012, Jonathan Torres stabbed his wife, Miguelina Martinez, 
fifty-two times in a beauty salon in Santiago, Dominican Republic. Ms. Martinez, 33 
years-old, went to the district attorney’s office eighteen times in the two weeks prior to 
her murder to report that because of her husband’s violent threats she left her home. He 
killed her because she no longer wanted to be with him; the knife he used was hidden in a 
bouquet of roses.  
This dissertation interrogates the state of development and gender violence in the 
Dominican Republic. The first chapter examines the implications of racial, gender, and 
class stratification on the economic and social opportunities of low-income women, 
predominantly of African descent, working in the export processing zones and as 
domestic workers.  
The second chapter explores the correlation between women’s economic, 
political, and social characteristics and the incidence domestic violence using data from 
the Demographic and Health Survey. Further, I test which model—the household 
bargaining model (HBM) or the male backlash model (MBM)—best explains gender 
 xiii
violence. I find that the HBM better predicts physical violence, while the MBM better 
predicts sexual violence. However, when I disaggregate asset-poor women and asset-rich 
women, I find that the HBM is more adept at explaining gender violence for asset-rich 
women and the MBM for asset-poor women 
The third chapter explores the role of women’s and men’s endogenous 
preferences on the justifications of gender violence. In both the female and male 
specifications, there is a positive correlation between men making more decisions and the 
justification of gender violence. Women that support gender equity are less likely to 
justify gender violence; while husbands that are less gender progressive are more likely 
to justify gender violence.  
Based on my findings, I conclude that the Dominican government’s economic 
policies of the last thirty years are the knife hidden in the government’s roses or rhetoric 
of human development and women’s rights.  To promote human development and foster 
women’s rights, the Dominican government must embark on a new trajectory focused on 
human capital formation and a more equitable distribution of income, wealth, and power.  
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CHAPTER 1  
STRATIFICATION ECONOMICS, BLACK LATIN AMERICAN FEMINIST 
THOUGHT, AND GRASSROOTS DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF LOW–
INCOME BLACK WOMEN WORKERS 
1.1 Introduction 
There is a saying in the Dominican Republic, “ser blanco es profession” or “to be 
a white man is a profession.”1 This euphemism, frequently said in jest but grounded in 
reality, highlights the common knowledge that labor markets place a premium on men 
with white skin, or lighter skin—regardless of education, skill, or experience—and that 
light-skinned or white men are at the top of the gendered and racial hierarchy. The truth 
of this common knowledge has been verified by the work of Dominican feminist scholars 
(Albert Batista 1993, Safa 1995, Valdez 2005, Curiel 2009, Curiel 2007) who have 
theorized and documented the fashion in which labor markets consistently segregate 
visibly black women workers into low-wage and low-productivity sectors. 
The principal aims of this chapter are threefold. First, I provide an analysis of how 
Dominican ideology supports and reproduces a social hierarchy that places dark-skinned 
women at the bottom. Second, I demonstrate how this racial and gendered hierarchy in 
turn creates negative externalities that are borne by low-income black women workers. 
Third, I analyze women’s individual and collective responses to these negative 
                                                 
1In the Spanish language, adjectives are gendered. In this case blanco refers to a 
white man, blanca refers to a white women.  
 2 
externalities, based on fieldwork conducted with black women working in the export 
processing zones (EPZs)2 and as domestic workers. Despite a rich literature on 
Dominican gendered and racial ideology, Black Latin American feminist thought 
(BLAFT), and the unequal burden neoliberal restructuring has placed on women workers, 
there is little discussion in the literature on precisely how the intersection of gender and 
race—rooted in the experience of colonialism and slavery—continues to stratify black 
women workers into the most precarious sectors of the economy, the negative outcomes 
they experience as a result, and how they respond to economic and social challenges at 
the grassroots level in the Dominican Republic. This chapter addresses this lacuna. 
Neoclassical economic theory predicts that market-driven economies will erode 
labor market discrimination, because employers or sectors of the market that display a 
“taste for discrimination” will be driven out of business as discriminatory practices put 
firms at a disadvantage for obtaining the best and brightest workers, lowering levels of 
productivity (Becker 1957). In this study, I find evidence that contradicts this prediction. 
My ethnographic data shows that black women workers serve as a means for wealth, 
capital, and human capital accumulation for others (firms and the private homes that 
employ them), but are limited in their ability to accumulate wealth and human capital for 
themselves, because employers take advantage of racial, gender, and class discrimination 
to devalue their work contributions. 
                                                 
2
 Export processing zones are distinct geographical regions, typically near airports 
and seaports that facilitate the operation of domestic and transnational corporations in 
developing countries. The Dominican government offers many incentives for firms to 
locate in these regions: minimal foreign exchange controls, free repatriation of profits, 
rapid investment licensing procedures, income tax incentives, access to cheap credit, duty 
free import of raw materials and capital goods, modern facilities, and most importantly a 
large supply of low-wage labor. 
 3 
In contrast to the neoclassical position, stratification economics advances the 
theory that market economies are constituted by contextual and structural factors that can 
severely limit the opportunities and well-being of subaltern groups (Darity et al. 2010, 
Darity 2005, Saunders and Darity 2003). This study finds support for stratification 
economics in the case of black women workers in the Dominican Republic. 
BLAFT provides a rich body of on individual and collective responses to sexism, 
racism, and classism—that is, the structural, institutional, and contextual factors serving 
as mechanisms of exclusion—by women of African descent in Latin America.  
Black Latin American feminists, such as Ochy Curiel, Sergia Galvan, Sueli 
Carneiro, Matilde Ribiero, Wendy Mateo, Lélia Gonzáles, Luiza Bairros, and Epsy 
Campbell Barr, have provided a critique of early Latin American feminism’s failure to 
incorporate race, class, and sexuality into the matrix of women’s subordination in Latin 
America. BLAFT also pushed Latin American feminist thought forward by 
contextualizing women’s current oppression in Latin America in the history of 
colonialism, slavery, white femininity, racial hierarchy, power structures and heterosexist 
normative practices.  
In the women’s leadership development classes, during women’s organization 
meetings, and in their homes, visibly Black Dominican women voiced the challenges 
they experienced as workers, mothers, and community members in the context of gender 
and racial hierarchy and the country’s neoliberal economic trajectory. As I listened and 
learned, women’s stories coalesced into reoccurring themes and challenges: inability to 
pursue or complete their education, rising costs for foodstuffs and transportation, limited 
access to information about their rights as workers and women, physical and emotional 
 4 
abuse, degrading working situations, and lack of leisure time, as well as low wages. In 
the language of neoclassical economics these challenges can be characterized as negative 
externalities, or social costs of inequality, exclusion and segregation, that fell onto the 
women themselves as they entered in labor market relationships of exchange. 
In the economics literature, a negative externality is defined as a situation in 
which the private costs entering into a transaction between two parties differ from the 
total social costs associated with the transaction. The difference is the external cost, or the 
negative externality, borne by third parties. In this study, I document not only the private 
costs the working women experienced, but also the social costs they experienced due to 
processes much larger than their individual transactions, arising from neoliberalism, a 
gendered and racial hierarchy, and an unequal distribution of income, wealth, and power. 
Because these externals costs are borne by the women, employers will overproduce and 
underprice (compared to the social optimum) the product or service the women provide, 
which is their labor in this case study.  
1.2 BLAFT and Stratification Economics: A Reprise of Dominican Racial 
Formations  
The literature on Dominican racial formations is extensive and spans the fields of 
history, political science, sociology, anthropology, race, ethnic/cultural and gender 
studies (Sidanius, Peña, and Sawyer 2001, Gregory 2007, Howard 2001, Valdez 2005, 
Candelario 2001, Candelario 2007, Torres-Salliant 1995, Torres-Salliant 2000, Duany 
1998, Albert Batista 1993, Simmons 2012). Many scholars report an aversion to 
blackness (Sidanius, Peña, and Sawyer 2001), up to and including strong negrophobia 
 5 
and antihaitianism (Howard 2001, Gregory 2007). Others offer more ‘apologetic’ 
arguments, such as Torres-Salliant (1995), who maintains that since over 90 percent of 
the Dominican population is of mixed African ancestry, it is not convincing to speak of 
racial discrimination or racial marginalization, and that social hardships such as erratic 
electricity and water supply, high unemployment, underemployment, and below living 
wages are common to most Dominicans.  
The Dominican Republic has a complex racial ideology that many scholars cite as 
distinct racial formation from other countries in the Americas in the sense that the racial 
category black does not exist and people of African descent do not refer to themselves as 
black (Inter-American Dialogue 2003). Moreover, the hegemonic elite project is to 
promote the country as a white Western Christian nation, and insist that “blacks” do not 
exist in the DR so as maintain a favorable racial climate under the guise of a racial 
democracy. It also is the country in the Americas with the highest levels of racial mixing 
(Peña, Sidanius, Sawyer 2006). However, it is also the case in Dominican Republic that 
the dominant wealthy elites are predominantly of European ancestry, and that people with 
dark skin and predominantly African features face structural barriers to obtain 
employment and even citizenship recognition (Howard 2001, Gregory 2007).  
In her prize-winning book, Black Behind the Ears, scholar Ginnetta E.B. 
Candelario (2007) situates Dominican racial identity in the context of the Haitian 
Revolution and U.S. imperialism. She argues that Dominican independence from Haiti in 
1844 came about under the influence of international and imperialist forces that caused 
the fledging nation to disassociate from Haiti—the first Black Republic and second free 
nation in the Americas—to escape the same fate of economic and trade sanctions in the 
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world arena. She writes that the currently used racial category of indio was adopted by 
Dominicans of African descent to mean that they were indigenous to the Spanish-
speaking side of the island, in efforts to avoid being taken to the Creole and French-
speaking side, which had much harsher and more brutal working conditions for enslaved 
people. The erasure of the terms “black” and “mulatto” from the Dominican Census and 
government-issued identity cards, and use of the terms indio, indio oscuro, and indio 
claro (indian, dark-skinned indian, and light-skinned indian) happened much later, during 
the Trujillo dictatorship, which lasted from 1930 to 1961.3 Candelario describes this as an 
elite political maneuver to construct the Dominican Republic as Catholic, Western, and 
white or at least more white than Haiti.  
In addition to documenting the historicity of Dominican racial terms and 
formations, Candelario conducted fieldwork in Dominican beauty salons, where she 
asked participants to aesthetically rank men, women, and children from different races 
and with a range of hairstyles. In her study she finds that the women consistently ranked 
most beautiful are olive-complexioned women with long wavy hair, women who look 
Mediterranean or of Spanish descent. Hence, she argues that Dominican racial preference 
is not for whiteness—blond and blue-eyed women were not ranked the most beautiful—
but for that which is Hispanic or Iberian. This preference is still, in the Dominican racial 
                                                 
3
 Although overt legal mechanisms to socially exclude Afro-descendents in Latin 
America do not exist presently, state governments have promoted emblanquecimiento, 
immigration policies and incentives offered to white Europeans in order to “whiten” the 
population. In the Dominican Republic, the Trujillo dictatorship, which lasted from 1930 
to 1961, was the first administration to overtly promote emblanqucimiento and 
antihaitianismso. Antihaitianismso is state-sponsored rhetoric that declares Haitians as 
black and inferior, “the strategic Other.” The most violent and vicious act of Trujillo 
administration was the massacre of twenty thousand Haitian men, women, and children 
living and working along the disputed Haitian-Dominican border in 1937. 
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imaginary, a rejection of the African cultural, economic, and social elements of 
Dominican culture. Participants consistently ranked visibly dark-skinned black women, 
especially those with “black hairstyles”, as the least attractive when ranking women. 
Black men and black children, especially those that did not have “black hairstyles”, 
however, did not receive the same penalties and low rankings given to black women. 
Candelario’s findings on beauty rankings corroborate other academic research on 
racial and gender discrimination in the Dominican Republic. In her book, Mujer Y 
Esclavitud, Professor Celsa Albert Batiste (1993) recounts the story of two black women 
who were hired as news anchors on a prominent television channel to illustrate the 
intersection of racial and gender discrimination in the Dominican Republic. The day after 
the anchors presented for the first time, the television channel was flooded with viewer 
complaints that the anchors were “too black and ugly” to be on television. A rival 
television station began to call the station with the two black female anchors “el canal de 
los feos,” or the channel of ugly people.4 The two black female anchors were 
subsequently fired (Albert Batista 1993).  
In her study, Género, discriminación racial y ciudadanía: Un estudio en la 
escuela dominicana, Dominican feminist scholar Claudina Valdez (2005) asked children, 
ages 9 to 13, to place Dominican women and men using pictures—ranging from white in 
the Dominican context, mulattas and mulattos with straight or straightened hair, to dark-
skinned women and men with pelo crespo, or natural hair—into the jobs or tasks that 
they are most suited for. Thirty-eight percent of the children assigned white women to 
executive positions, while only 4.8 percent assigned black women with straightened hair, 
                                                 
4
 Both of these channels had at least one black, or dark-skinned, male anchor.  
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and only 2.8 percent assigned black women with natural hairstyles to executive positions. 
Sixty-four percent of the children assigned black women to the street sweeper position, 
whereas only 2.8 percent assigned white women to the position of street sweeper. More 
children consistently assigned black women to positions such as office cleaners, domestic 
workers, street sweepers, informal vendors, and friturera (a woman who sells fried food 
from a street cart). Moreover, girls assigned black women to low-level positions in higher 
percentages than boys. Based on her findings, Valdez argues that children are socialized 
by official discourse and society to assume that black women lack the intellect and 
responsibility to have well remunerated jobs with high social standing, based solely what 
Alcoff (2006) calls their visible identities, or the markers of race, class, and gender. 
Valdez (2005, p.256) concludes: 
Black people in the Dominican Republic are born, raised, multiply, and die 
in spaces where being afro-descendent is not accepted, where everything 
associated with being black is negatively charged, and where the dominant 
model is opposed to their characteristics, phenotype, social and cultural 
being (my translation).  
 
Both Albert Batiste’s (1993) and Valdez’s (2005) work suggest that black 
women’s visible identities adversely affect their position in labor markets, regardless of 
their skills and qualifications for high social standing positions. In turn, the social 
devaluation of black women in labor markets affects their material well-being as they are 
segmented into the low-paying and low-status positions that, according to the racial and 
gender ideology, they are adept for. Both scholars situate the current devaluation of 
visibly black women within the Dominican Republic’s historical context of slavery and 
colonialism (Albert Batiste 1993, Valdez 2005).  
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Slavery and colonialism in the Dominican Republic as elsewhere in the Caribbean 
and Latin America, created conditions that exploited the reproductive capabilities of 
African women and their productive capabilities as market vendors and artisans. From 
their arrival to Santo Domingo, enslaved African women became not only caretakers of 
their own families, also of their slave-owner family, as well as working as producers and 
sellers of agricultural and artisanal goods in markets. Enslaved African women and their 
female descents hence were always in la casa y en la calle, in the house and in the street. 
That is to say that the private/public (or reproductive/productive) divide never applied to 
them as it did to white women (Curiel 2009, Albert Batiste 1993). Their role in making 
and selling goods for sale in markets, as well as building human capital by providing care 
services to both families, distinguishes enslaved black women in the Caribbean from their 
counterparts in the United States (Curiel 2009, Albert Batiste 1993). Although enslaved 
black women were able to generate small amounts of income for themselves and fund to 
maroons, independent settlements of escaped enslaved peoples, by secretly selling goods 
in the market, they were unable to generate significant wealth or acquire property, and 
hence unable to transfer wealth or land to their descendants. 
The inability of enslaved Africans to transfer wealth, property, or land is 
important for understanding the current conditions of Afro descendents—particularly 
black women—in the Caribbean and Latin America. Stratification economics proposes 
the lateral mobility hypothesis to understand the current social status and material well-
being of an immigrant population or ethnic group, in a society. The lateral mobility 
hypothesis holds that “the highest social status attained by the adult generation that 
constitutes the bulk of migrants will play a critical role in the social status achieved by 
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their children and grandchildren in the receiving country” (Darity, Dietrich, and Guilkey 
2001, pp.439-440). If so, the low relative social standing of Afro descendents currently in 
Latin America can be traced, at least in part, to the inability of their ancestors to 
accumulate wealth, property, and land when they arrived in the Americas as an enslaved 
population and to restrictions that existed even after the abolition of slavery.  
Intergenerational transmission effects— including the ability to transfer wealth 
and property across generations—on the relative social standing of different immigrant 
groups has been widely observed. For example, the relative success of Jewish-Americans, 
Japanese-Americans, Chinese-Americans, and Korean-Americans in the United States 
rests on many factors, such as advanced degree attainment by immigrants and above-
average levels of wealth when compared to the home population (Suzuki 2002, Suzuki 
1995). Darity et al. (2001) report that during the period from1899 to 1914, 75 percent of 
Jewish immigrants were professionals or business owners, whereas 80 to 90 percent of 
Italian and Polish immigrants were farmers, laborers, and domestic servants, and 
conclude that this contributed to the material success of future Jewish-Americans. In 
sharp contrast, Afro descendents in the Americas were unable to acquire wealth and 
property for themselves not only during slavery but also afterwards due to legal 
restrictions. The counterpart of Jim Crow laws in the United States was El Código Negro 
Carolina in the case of the Dominican Republic, which codified segregation, placed 
restrictions on slaves’ and free blacks’ property ownership and market activity .5 The 
                                                 
5
 The compilation of laws, which governed slaves during the colonial period, was 
El Código Negro Carolino, translated here as the “Black Caroline Codes”. The Black 
Caroline Codes was in response to the insurrections, slave revolts, maroon societies, and 
the increasing number of free blacks (Albert Batista 1993, Liriano 1992). Although most 
 11
importance of wealth and land to marginalized peoples remains evident in popular land 
struggles in Latin America, such as black women’s struggles for land rights in Brazil and 
in Colombia (Perry 2013, Vergara-Figueroa 2013).  
In addition to examining intergenerational transmission effects on the relative 
social standing of Afro descendents today, however, it is equally important to address the 
discriminatory practices that dominant groups set in place to maintain their power and 
privilege today (Darity et al. 2010, Darity 2005, Saunders and Darity 2003). In the case 
of the Dominican Republic, it is protocol to submit a color photo with a resume. Job 
advertisements specifying “un mujer de buena aparencia” (which is code for white 
women or white-looking mulatta, despite meaning literally “a good-looking woman”) are 
still commonplace in the classifieds section of Dominican newspapers. These 
discriminatory labor market practices illustrate the preference for whiteness amongst 
Dominicans, Latin Americans, and Latinos that has been documented elsewhere in the 
literature (Darity et al. 2008). The structural and contextual practices that the State and 
                                                                                                                                                 
laws generally applied to all blacks, certain ones applied only to enslaved black women. 
Chapter 26, Laws 2 and 3, specifically detail the proper nourishment, treatment, and work 
conditions for enslaved black women to promote fertility and healthy pregnancies. This 
law served many functions. First, it sought to increase slave labor supply to ensure the 
economic success of the island. Second, it accomplished this by placing enslaved black 
women under the complete control and, ironically, care of white men and women whom 
ultimately gained from their loss of freedom and humanity. 
The Black Caroline Codes served the economic and social interests of the ruling 
white elite. They also sought to enforce segregation, economic inequalities, and white 
supremacy. By promoting white supremacy, they fomented the social devaluation of 
blacks in society, creating preferences for whiteness and the ability for blacks to “whiten” 
by intermarrying with whites, creoles, and mestizos. This decreased the agency and 
ability of blacks to form coalitions built on group identity. In other words, the rising 
importance of national identity, the construction of Haiti as the Black Other, the ability to 
whiten, the inherent costs of being black, and the notions of a mythical “racial 
democracy” where class was more important than race, provided strong disincentives for 
socially-identified blacks to even self-identify as such much less form coalitions.  
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elite use to subordinate visibly black people are extensive and insidious, permeating the 
educational system, institutions, and societal norms. Hence, even when individuals 
manage to accumulate wealth and high levels of education, they face discrimination as 
the case of the black female television anchors demonstrates. As Valdez (2005) argues, 
all that is associated with blackness is degraded. An example of this is that the Dominican 
State and the Catholic Church officially decree that Afro-descendent religious practices 
such as Gaga, Palos, and Dominican Voodoo are demonic.  
The concerted effort on the part of the State and elite, internalized and reproduced 
by the people, to cosign black women to a relatively low social standing serves as a 
mechanism to extract higher economic gains from black women in labor markets. Curiel 
(2007) argues that both the EPZs, which generate foreign exchange and improve trade 
relations for the State and create wealth for domestic and foreign factory owners, and 
domestic work, which contributes to the high living standards and human capital 
formation of upper middle class and wealthy families, are modern versions of the work 
relations that black women experienced during the colonial period. The human rights 
abuses that women experience in both sectors include forced AIDS/HIV testing; sexual, 
physical, and psychological abuse and harassment; unsafe working conditions; pay below 
legal minimum wage; forced overtime; and refusal to pay legally mandated maternity, 
worker, healthcare and social security benefits (Bueno 2004, Safa 1995, Mollmann 2004, 
McClenaghan 1997, Pantaleon 2003, Dunn 1991). Despite the documentation (Sagás 
2000, Albert Batista 1993, Valdez 2005, Gregory 2007, Howard 2001) of racial 
discrimination in labor markets, the last Dominican census to collect data on skin color or 
race is the census of 1960, which leads to missing statistical data on skin color or race 
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and employment outcomes. In the 1960 census, the person administering the survey 
identified the respondent as white, black, mulatto, or yellow referring to Dominicans of 
Asian descent. Although the recent census, ENHOGAR 2007, collects data on whether 
the respondent has a national identity card, the census survey does not collect data on 
skin color, race, or ethnicity. Currently, there are studies that discuss the importance and 
need for data on skin color, race, and ethnicity to document racial discrimination in labor 
markets and other institutions in the Dominican Republic (Oficina Nacional de 
Estadística 2013, Estevez 2013).  
In my study, I found cases of legal and human rights abuses. My participants 
spoke of employers treating them with contempt, accusing them of theft, of being stupid 
and lazy, whilst they worked twelve hours or more per day in factories and in private 
homes, usually six days a week, and earning a wage that kept them and their families 
firmly in poverty. These strenuous, tedious, demanding and sometimes abusive working 
conditions illustrate Sueli Carneiro’s (2005, p. 22) insight that black women “nunca 
fueron tratadadas como frágiles…Ayer, al servicio de frágiles señoritas y de nobles 
señores tarados. Hoy, empleadas de las Mujeres liberadas” (“Black women were never 
treated as if they were fragile…yesterday at the service of fragile ladies and noble men. 
Today the workers of liberated women”). Although the women were not afforded the 
luxury of fragility their precarious employment conditions and the larger socioeconomic 
context often placed them in delicate and difficult life situations.  
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1.3 Leadership Program and Participants Description 
1.3.1 Program Description 
When I arrived in Santo Domingo, I became involved, as a participant-observer, 
in two distinct but simultaneously run workshops for women on leadership training, 
human rights and women’s rights, gender discrimination, and labor law for domestic 
workers and export processing zones employees. These workshops run by the Centro de 
Estudios de Genero at INTEC (which served as my affiliation in Santo Domingo), 
CUDEM (a grassroots umbrella organization for women’s groups), and Dominican 
Ministry of Labor’s program Cumple y Gane.6 Both of these sectors—export processing 
zones and domestic service—provide low-incoming generating activities for women, but 
are vital to the Dominican economy, by producing exports and generating foreign 
exchange, and by providing care services and building human capital, respectively. A 
large percentage of women of visible African descent work in these sectors.  
The leadership workshops took place on Sundays at local public schools in the 
area where the women lived, and ran from 1pm to 5pm. The women were not paid for 
their participation, but lunch, snacks, and childcare were provided for each session. In 
addition at the end of each class the facilitator raffled off various food items, such as a 
loaf of sweetbread, salami stick, cheese block, or juice.  
                                                 
6
 Proyecto Cumple y Gane is a project of the Dominican Labor Department, which is a result of 
the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). Proyecto Cumple y 
Gane’s purpose to provide training to workers in “precarious” sectors of the labor market in lieu of formal 
labor market regulations. DR-CAFTA, implemented on August 5, 2004, is a free trade agreement between 
the United States and the Dominican Republic, and five Central American countries. 
(http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-
fta accessed 7/7/2013.  
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The workshops were structured around certain themes such as neoliberalism, the 
sexual division of labor, the specific labor laws that applied to the women, and the 
history/current state of human and women’s rights. Both of the instructors were both 
feminists (one from the academy and the other a grassroots activist), and they constantly 
stressed the importance of women’s rights in the household and in the workplace, the 
right to live free from violence and exploitation at all times, the need to voice opinions, 
and feelings, and the importance of one’s own well-being and not just the well-being of 
employers, children, partners, or other dependents. As a participant-observer in the 
workshops, I began to see that many of the women understood, in their own words, how 
the social construction of gender, class, and sometimes race was at the root of the 
common exploitation they experienced in the workplace, at home, and in the polity. In 
both workshops, which lasted 4 months, the women engaged in what Alvarez et al. 
(2003) term dynamic projects: they performed skits, did poster board presentations, and 
made individual and group presentations based on the knowledge they learned in class, 
from their course materials, and from their lived experiences. The main objectives were 
the application of workshop information to the women’s lives, and the creation for a 
space for women to talk about experiences, feelings, and frustrations they experienced in 
the home, workplace, and their communities. 
1.3.2 Participants 
One group that I observed was a workshop for domestic workers, which was in 
Los Alcarrizos—a low-income and high-crime district in the capital city of Santo 
Domingo. The majority of the women in the group knew each other not only as neighbors 
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or kin, but also as members of el grupo Mama Tingo, the local women’s organization in 
their neighborhood. The members of Mama Tingo held regular meetings, and the 
organization served as a contact point for NGOs and other organizations that gave the 
women presentations on topics such as micro-loans, candle-making and flower 
arrangement and connected the women to other women’s organizations and feminist 
issues and struggles in Santo Domingo.  
The domestic workers’ workshop had about twenty participants each week. The 
women ranged in age from 18 to their 60s. The only requirement was that the participant 
must have worked at some point as a domestic worker. A survey conducted in class 
revealed that most of the women were receiving the legal minimum wage for domestic 
workers, which was 4,900 pesos per month (equivalent to US $144.12 per month). One 
woman, Fermina was being paid below the minimum wage (4,000 pesos per month); the 
highest paid domestic worker receiving 6,500 pesos per month. Many of the women were 
living on $2 or less per person per day when their dependants (such as elderly parents or 
children) were taken into account. All of the women worked 12 to 15 hour days, Monday 
to Friday, and Saturdays until noon, performing strenuous household labor for their 
employers. Assuming that they worked 176 hours per month (a low estimate), they 
typically received 27 pesos (88 US cents) per hour. 
The other workshop was for EPZ workers. There were about ten to twelve women 
participants on average. It was held in San Luis, once a rural sugar-producing town. The 
requirement to join this group was that women had to have worked in an EPZ factory at 
one point in their lives. The women, ranged in age from 17 to their 50s. San Luis did not 
have a local women’s organization, and the participants were in the midst of creating one 
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to address their specific needs in the community. The average daily pay in the EPZ was 
about 200 pesos a day (US $5.88), but if they missed a day of work their paychecks were 
debited 300 pesos (US $8.82).  
1.4 Women’s Responses to Private Costs & Negative Externalities  
1.4.1 Precarious Employment Conditions  
One module of the leadership training classes focused on labor law. The course 
instructor provided each participant with a labor law booklet and reviewed the specific 
laws that applied to the women. Throughout the duration of the course, the women 
identified, and denounced, many labor violations they experienced personally. In the case 
of domestic workers, many of the participants were unaware that is was within their 
rights to request a work contract, review the contract at the Ministry of Labor, and file it 
there for future grievances. Additionally, many were unaware that domestic workers did 
have a legal minimum wage, and that by law they were entitled to breaks including an 
hour for lunch and rest. They were also entitled to schedule their work around any 
academic schedules and healthcare appointments. After having taken the labor law 
module, the workers came back to class with stories to share about how their employers 
responded when they demanded their rights.  
Doña Susana was a bright and lively woman in her early forties. Even though she 
had been working at her current job for more than three years, her employers refused to 
provide her with two weeks paid vacation which was long overdue (according to law, 
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domestic workers are entitled to two weeks paid vacation after one year of service).7 
Doña Susana said that whenever she would speak to la ama de casa (lady of the house) to 
request her vacation, la ama de casa would direct her to el jefe de la casa (head of 
household, usually referring to the man of the house ). In response to Doña Susana’s 
request for her legal right el jefe responded, “I don’t even get two weeks paid vacation. 
Why should I give you that, when I don’t get it?”  
The dialogue between Doña Susana and her employers illustrates two facets of the 
intersectional discrimination that black women experience in the Dominican Republic. 
First, her female employer completely dismissed her claim to a worker benefit she had 
earned and to which she was entitled by law. This is indicative of the class divide that 
places wealthier women in positions where they contribute to the oppression of other 
woman (Alvarez 2000, Curiel 2007, Curiel 2009, Carneiro 2005). Second, the male 
employer’s response highlights how Dominicans use invoke social standing, based on 
race, gender, and class position, and not merit or even the law, to determine what people 
deserve. By his racist, sexist, and classist logic—reflecting that of society—Doña Susana 
was not entitled to her right to two weeks paid vacation. Because it was a benefit that 
wealthier man did not have, neither should she. This example is also indicative of 
theoretical argument underpinnings of stratification economics and the mechanism by 
which racial prejudice or discrimination is contextualized by group positioning. Blumer 
(1958) argues that the dominant racial group (in this case the employers belong to the 
dominant racial group and Doña Susana to the subordinate racial group) feels a sense of 
                                                 
7
 In the Dominican Labor Code, Law 103-99, article 263 states “domestic workers have the right 
to two weeks paid vacation each time they complete one year of service” (my translation) 
(www.comisionadodejusticia.gob.do/phocadownload/Biblioteca_Virtual/Trabajo/Ley%20103-
99,%20sobre%20Trabajo%20Domestico%20en%20Republica%20Dominicana.pdf accessed 7/7/2013). 
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proprietary claim to “exclusive or prior rights in many important areas of life”. By 
initially ignoring and dismissing her claim, her employers were reserving the right of paid 
vacation for others but not her based on her social positioning.  
 With sparkling eyes, Doña Susana, announced to the class, “a mi jefe yo le di un 
clase de derechos laborales, cuando el vio mi librito de derechos laborales se les 
abrieron los ojos, y por fin el mes que viene voy a tener mis vacaciones!” (“I gave my 
boss a class on labor rights, when he saw my little labor law book his eyes got really big, 
and finally next month I am going to have my vacation!”). Upon hearing Doña Susana’s 
story, the women engaged in high fives and lively discussion. Magda, in her early 
twenties, summed up the sentiments of the conversation when she said “ya yo quiero 
reclamar mis derechos” (“now I also want to reclaim my rights”). Hence, the classes 
served not only as a vehicle for information, empowering the women to act individually, 
but also as spaces of mutual reinforcement and support.  
On other occasions, the workers preformed skits about their experiences working 
in private homes. Four women—Magalis, Jessica, Sarita, and Rossy—provided a telling 
and entertaining performance. Magalis played the domestic worker, Jessica was la ama 
de casa, and Sarita and Rossy were friends visiting Jessica, la ama de casa. Magalis put a 
baby—from the classroom—on her hip, and with her free hand began to wash windows 
(using the chalkboard as the windows). Jessica, Sarita, and Rossy were sitting in the 
skit’s living room (constructed with desks and chairs) at the front of the classroom. Their 
whole demeanors changed to embody wealthy women. They sat rather stiffly, chests 
puffed out, chins high, flipping their (imaginary) long hair, and laughing shallowly. 
Jessica directing herself to Magalis began, “por Dios Magalis, es que tu no sabes hacer 
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nada” (“for God’s sake Magalis, don’t you know how to do anything”). Then turning to 
her friends, she complained, “ella llego aqui y no sabía nada…yo le tuve que enseñar 
todo!” (“when she got here she didn’t know how to do anything…I had to teach her 
everything!”). To that Rossy responded, “si, las trabajadoras ahora no saben trabajar ni 
limpiar, quieren que tu le page sin hacer nada (“yes, domestic workers nowadays don’t 
know how to work or clean, they want you to pay them for not doing anything”). 
Meanwhile, as Magalis continued to clean the windows, Jessica began to bellow out 
commands, “Magalis el telefono esta sonado recojelo! Asegurate que la comida este lista 
para las doce! La planta esta dañada, calienta agua y sube las escaleras para que mi 
esposo tenga agua tibia para bañarse despues de sus siesta! Y todavia es la hora que no 
sacas la basura (“Magalis, the phone is ringing, pick it up! Make sure that the food is 
ready by noon! The generator isn’t working, heat up water and carry it up the stairs so my 
husband has warm water to shower after his nap! And you still haven’t taken out the 
trash”). Magalis, baby on hip, phone nestled in her shoulder, and holding a washing rag—
a domestic worker acting as a domestic worker—scrambled frantically to accomplish all 
these tasks. But then abruptly she stopped.  
She dropped the washrag, put down the phone, and kept the baby on her hip. 
Turning to Jessica she said “Doña Jessica, ya basta de sus insultos, yo se hacer mi 
trabajo, y no es posible hacer todas estas cosas a la misma vez y atender el niño…y ya es 
hora de yo tomar mi descanso que me toca por ley” (“Doña Jessica, I have had enough of 
your insults, I know how to do my job, and it’s not possible to do everything at the same 
time and take care of the baby…and now it’s time for my break that I am entitled to by 
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law”). With that statement, Magalis turned around, and walked out of the classroom with 
her head high. The classroom erupted into cheers.  
The skit spoke to the class divide among women. It illustrated how wealthier and 
less black women treated their poorer and blacker domestic workers with contempt, 
placed unreasonable demands on them, and characterized them as lazy and stupid—
cultural tropes associated with blackness in the Dominican Republic. These cultural 
tropes also provide a concrete example of Blumer’s (1958) characterization of group 
positioning and racial prejudice. The dominant group assigns characteristics, based on 
definitions constructed in the public arena, to the subaltern group in abstract and precedes 
to assign these characteristics to individuals in the group to place them in the social 
hierarchy. My participant observation suggests that by defining the women workers as 
lazy and incompetent, employers devalued their work and the women themselves. This 
brilliant skit also spoke to the invisibility and alienation domestic workers experience 
working in private homes, and to the role of agency. In discussion afterwards, a 
participant named Mayra said “ya no me dejo pisiotar por mi esposo, niños, ni jefes” (“I 
don’t let my husband, kids, or employers walk all over me anymore”), which perfectly 
described Magalis’s dramatic finale, which put a stop to the abusive work situation and 
unfair treatment.  
The women in the class related their own experiences of psychological abuse, 
insults, and the accusations that “they wanted to get paid for doing nothing.” The latter 
phrase, defined the strenuous and demanding work the women performed as “nothing”, 
was tied to the personal and social devaluation of the women themselves.  
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Although the workshops for the domestic workers provided the women with 
information, which they used in efforts to empower themselves, many of the younger 
women in the class spoke about the need to find better jobs and better opportunities 
through investing in their education, a form of human capital. The experience of the EPZ 
workers, however, demonstrated that even when black women attain higher levels of 
education, economic and social advancement is still a formidable challenge.  
1.4.2 Human Capital Formation 
In the group of women who worked in the EPZs, all had high school degrees, and 
four of the twelve were in the midst of obtaining college degrees. Jeanie, a bright twenty-
year old, was a medical student at La Universidad Autonoma de Santo Domingo 
(UASD). Jeanie had previously worked in the EPZ, but quit because, as she explained to 
me, it was impossible to work the six days and on average sixty hours required of EPZ 
workers and go to school. Jeanie was able to quit her job because she had a cousin living 
and working in Sweden who was supporting her educational pursuits. Remittances from 
abroad are the largest generator of foreign exchange in the Dominican Republic, and 
contribute to a higher standard of living for many Dominicans. However, the vast 
majority of remittances accrue to families in the top forty percent of the country’s income 
distribution (Dominican Republic Poverty Assessment 2006).8 Of all the participants, 
Jeanie was the only one who received support from abroad to pursue her education.  
                                                 
8
 According to the Dominican Republic Poverty Assessment 2006, compiled by the World Bank, 
the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Government of the Dominican Republic 80 % of 
remittances go to urban areas and 40 % to the richest families, hence remittances have a direct but modest 
effect on poverty reduction and have not affected poverty trends. The report states despite impressive 
economic growth from the period of 1997-2002, income and poverty levels the poor “saw virtually no 
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Gabriela, a twenty-four year old mother of two sets of twins, currently worked in 
the local EPZ. Gabriela had been studying accounting and only had two semesters left to 
finish her degree. She explained to me that she had to stop studying when she had her 
second set of twins, boys, because she had to support her four-year old daughters whom 
she left with her mother in the countryside. Her husband, Yuniol, also worked full-time in 
the EPZ, but two full-time incomes from the EPZ were barely enough to cover the 
family’s expenses, including her daughters. In our conversations, I learned that Gabriela 
had previously worked as a bookkeeper while pursuing her studies. Transactions costs 
played a role in decision to quit. San Luis, once a sugar-producing town, was a rural part 
of Santo Domingo Este, far from her job and the university. Increases in the cost of oil, 
following an IMF agreement, and subsequently in the cost public transportation made it 
impossible for her to travel to Santo Domingo for work and pay tuition at the university. 
The EPZ firm, on the other hand, provided transport to and from work. 
 Gabriela frequently said to me, “ay Cruz, yo tengo que salir de aqui…aqui no 
hay nada para mi (“Oh Cruz, I have to get out of here…there is nothing here for me”). 
Her environment—disconnected from educational and work opportunities—was 
thwarting her progress. Gabriela’s case speaks to the spatial as well as economic 
marginalization that predominantly Afro descendent communities experience in the 
Dominican Republic. Her example, unable to secure a position as a book keeper at the 
local EPZ and being far from educational work opportunities highlights the way that de 
facto segregation (as it also exists in the United States) limits the ability of people in 
                                                                                                                                                 
improvement”. The economics crisis of 2003-2004 resulted in a deterioration of real income and increase in 
poverty levels, where 16 % of the population became poor and 7 % fell into extreme poverty. Despite 
economic growth, the Gini coefficient of 0.52, has remained the same in the Dominican Republic and in 
2004, 42 % of Dominicans were poor.  
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subaltern groups to attain employment, or better employment, and pursue other 
opportunities. Maroons and ingenios, sugar-producing towns, like San Luis are 
predominantly populated by Afro descendents as a legacy of slavery and colonialism. 
During the macroeconomic structural adjustment of the 1980s, the country’s development 
trajectory shifted towards labor-intensive manufacturing and tourism for production for 
external markets to generate foreign exchange, and sugar production lost importance as 
an economic activity. The once vibrant sugar mill, where many women had worked as 
bookkeepers, closed in the 1980’s, leaving many residents unemployed as a result of both 
direct and multiplier effects. The government’s failure to invest in public education and 
to subsidize public transportation was coupled with deliberate policies prioritizing needs 
of capital in the form of “cheap labor”. More generally, low-income women workers 
stand to benefit from activist government policies that invest in education, healthcare, 
transportation and food subsidies. As a result of neoliberalism these public goods, once 
provided by the state, increasingly became private goods to be sold in markets. This 
provides an example of how Afro descendants, lacking private wealth and property, are 
blocked from avenues to attain social mobility. Although they may be willing, in 
principle, to pay for goods and services that will build human capital, they are unable to 
do so in practice by virtue of their private economic standing and lack of socially-
provisioned opportunities.  
1.4.3 Racialized Gendered Expectations  
When I asked Doña Inez, forty years old and the EPZ group’s designated leader, 
what was the most abundant or lucrative job in the area, she replied without skipping a 
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beat, “drogas…muchacha ven pa’ca una noche pa’ que tu vea todas las jipetas y 
Mercedes que vienen aqui pa’ comprar drogas” (“Drugs…girl, come here at night so you 
can see all the SUVs and Mercedes-Benz lined up to buy drugs.”). Doña Inez had been a 
psychology student, but she too was currently unenrolled. As single mother with three 
children—a son in college, a pregnant fifteen-year old daughter, and a nine-year old 
daughter—Doña Inez explained that she had to make difficult choices, and ultimately she 
had to think of her children first. Doña Inez was the only member of the group working in 
her field of study, though she had worked previously worked in an EPZ factory. She was 
a social worker for COPRESIDA (the national governmental organization to treat and 
combat aids in the DR), distributing medication and monitoring patient adherence to 
prescriptions. That job was not enough to cover living expenses for her family of four, so 
Doña Inez also ran the local pre-K for a small fee, served as the loan collector for a 
microcredit program operating in the community, and was the organizer of the women’s 
san (informal savings and loans program). In addition, she was the unofficial godmother 
of all the children in the community, which meant that many families in the 
neighborhood came to her for guidance and help with their problems.  
Doña Inez was a vital part of the women’s community, although her many roles 
and hard choices meant that many of her own desires and dreams would go unfulfilled. 
Doña Inez’s situation symbolized to me a distinct form of gendered expectations, or 
racialized gendered expectations, relating to the unfragile state of black women vis-à-vis 
the fragility of white women (Carneiro 2005). Doña Inez sacrificed her own dreams and 
work literally around the clock to provide for her family and help her neighbors. Lacking 
income and material resources, she had to provide her time and labor to make ends meet. 
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However, the participants in both workshops spoke of hardships, sacrifices, 
disappointments, and others’ unrealistic expectations that were shaped by their 
intersectional identities.  
Milagros, a woman in her late thirties, with beautifully toned arms from the 
heaving lifting required of her as a domestic worker, stood up in class one day and said 
“ya se acabaron los dias que yo trabajo trece horas cuidando los niños de otra gente, 
concinarle a otra gente, limpiar la casa de otra gente, para llegar a mi casa a limpiar, 
planchar, cocinar, y acostarme con mi esposo si estoy muy cansada…y las cosas no son 
asi”( “The days are done when I would come home from a twelve hour work day, 
cooking, cleaning, and watching other people’s children, to my own home to carry water, 
cook, clean, iron for my husband, and also be pressured into having relations with him 
husband if I am too tired”). She followed that with the statement that her children and 
husband needed to help her in the house. Her awareness had been changed by the 
workshops; realizing that the demands placed on her were unrealistic and harmful to her 
well-being, she stopped feeling bad about herself as a worker, mother, and partner when 
she could not meet them. The demands and expectations she faced resulting from her 
social position as a low-income black worker, mother, and wife were qualitatively and 
quantitatively different from the expectations and demands place on wealthier and whiter 
women. Precisely because wealthier and whiter women could afford to hire and displace 
unrealistic expectations onto domestic workers, meant that this awareness was even more 
important for her to safeguard her well-being.  
The role of group positioning and stratification is central to the racialized 
gendered expectations the participants experienced. Blumer (1958) contends that the 
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dominant group promotes its own self-interest to establish or extend the group privileges 
they enjoy and wish to maintain. In this study, employers’ the expectations and demands 
of the women workers, served to accumulate wealth for factory owners and higher living 
standards in private homes to maintain or improve their relative positions, by exerting the 
participants meet unrealistic work demands. In the domestic workers’ group, some 
women discussed how they would stay in the employer’s home past the required time in 
order to “finish all their work”, despite not getting paid overtime because they were 
expected to finish certain tasks everyday. However, reproductive work or caring labor—
the tasks of cleaning, cooking, and providing for others in a domestic capacity—are never 
truly finished. Some of the women said they were made to feel, by employers, that these 
tasks must be done and internalized these unrealistic expectations to the benefit of the 
employers. By placing unrealistic demands on the participants employers were able to 
extract more services from the women workers for their own benefit. 
1.5 “Aqui No Hay Desarollo” 
When I asked the women what desarollo or development meant for them or their 
communities, the most frequent response I received was “ay Cruz…aqui no hay 
desarollo…aqui no ahi progreso” (“Oh Cruz…there is no development here…there is no 
progress”). Beyond the leadership training program, the women in both classes attended 
women’s organization meetings with hopes of personal development and progress. When 
I asked the women why a women’s organization was important, and why they attended 
the leadership class, I elicited a variety of answers that spoke to the women’s 
development goals. Miosotis, a 23-year-old mother and EPZ worker with one child, said 
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she liked going to the class and meetings because it was important for her to get out of 
the house, be away from her husband, and talk with the other women. In her study of 
women’s groups in “popular”, or low-income, neighborhoods, Dominican anthropologist 
Tahira Vargas (2005) finds that women from the popular classes frequently give the same 
response, that it is important to leave the home and housework, and be in a women-only 
space to discuss personal and community affairs. Walkiria, a young woman in the EPZ 
group, said that the women’s group was important because the women in the community 
needed access to information and opportunities; she said that she knew that there were 
government and international programs to help women, but that they needed to be 
organized to participate in programs. Yamel, a senior attending high school at night and 
working in the EPZ during the day, said that the most important reason for a women’s 
group was to address issues that were important to women in the community, and that the 
neighborhood association—dominated by men—did not care about women’s issues. The 
women’s leadership program and organizations thus served as spaces for women to share 
their lived experiences, determine their own agenda, and work together to access 
information and better opportunities. The impetus for a women’s organization and the 
women’s answers also symbolized the need for the participants to define themselves and 
their aspirations independent of the way in which their employers (a dominant group in 
relation to the women), their partners, dependents, and community defined them. Hence, 
the women’s group served as a mechanism for the participants to define themselves and 
challenge what Blumer (1958) refers to as “collective image” assigned to subaltern 
groups by the dominant, elite, and public discourse.  
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Both groups held a graduation ceremony. For some women, especially those in 
the domestic workers’ group, this was their first graduation. In the domestic workers’ 
group, Amanda, a svelte and elegant woman in her early twenties, was the graduation 
speaker. Amanda first addressed the need to place demands on the State, the local 
government, and the neighborhood association to provide women with opportunities and 
resources to promote development in their communities. She also encouraged her 
compañeras to continue challenging discrimination in their homes and at work, and to 
demand that the State to protect their rights as workers and women. Amanda told her 
compañeras, “nuestro bienestar y el bienestar de nuestros niños no va venir trabajando 
en casas de familia…tenemos que buscar otros espacios para trabajar con dignidad” 
(“Our well-being and our children’s well-being isn’t going to come from us working in 
private homes…we need to find other spaces to work with dignity”). Lastly, Amanda 
thanked the course teachers, CEG, CUDEM, and Proyeto Cumple y Gana for funding the 
leadership course and her compañeras for participating, saying “este curso ha sido mas 
important que cualquiere curso de hacer velas, carteras, o programa de microcredito 
porque este programa nos hay abierto las mentes con informacion y nueva posibilidades 
para nosotras”(“This course has been more important than any class we had on purse or 
candle-making, or microcredit program, because this class has opened our minds with 
information and new possibilities for us”). Amanda’s speech was indicative of the 
transformative power of knowledge and role of agency in promoting one’s own well-
being at the grassroots level. Indeed what is missing from some micro development 
programs is the information—on topics such as neoliberalism, labor laws, human rights, 
women’s rights and an antiracist feminist critique of the sexual division of labor—that 
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women can use to empower themselves in addition to having income and accumulating 
wealth. Her statements suggest that grassroots development strategies should include 
women’s stories, experiences, and aspirations in addition to providing opportunities for 
financial advancement. Lastly, Amanda’s speech spoke to the myriad ways that 
discrimination and the group position of the participants limited their opportunities. 
1.6 Conclusions  
Amanda’s graduation speech reflected the main tenets of BLAFT and 
stratification economics. As BLAFT proposes, she took women’s intersectional identity 
as a dynamic and a political point of departure to challenge discrimination and be active 
in the struggle to improve the collective well-being of all Afro descendants. And as 
stratification economics proposes, because dominant groups seek to maintain the status 
quo, the State must intervene to set policies in motion to remedy the private and social 
costs that subaltern groups experience (Darity 2005). 
 As this study suggests the current status quo—absent state interventionist policies 
and grassroots demands on the state—relegates low-income black women to the bottom 
of the social hierarchy and devalues their work and contributions to the market. As a 
legacy of colonialism, which impeded Afro descendents from accumulating wealth and 
property to bequest to future generations, current Afro descendents are consistently 
overrepresented in lowest wealth and income quintiles. In the case of the Dominican 
Republic, Gabino Severino, the director of Cumple y Gana, described the relationship 
between poverty and race by saying, “menos negros, menos pobres”: individuals and 
families that were less black, tended to be less poor.  
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The participants in the leadership program were not a part of the “menos negros, 
menos probres” stratum of society. As a result of their “visible identities” as low-income 
working-class black women, they faced both private costs and negative externalities. 
Despite exerting their agency and using information to demand their rights in the 
workplace and at home, they faced resource constraints and an unequal distribution of 
power. They absorbed the costs of these negative externalities—low wages by design 
under the neoliberal political and economic project, some of the lowest levels of 
government spending in healthcare and education in Latin America, lack of opportunities 
for advancement in their communities, and racial/gender/class discrimination.9  
Designated “una economista de los probres10,” by Doña Inez during my 
fieldwork, I realized that although the leadership courses did not provide women with 
direct material gains, the information they gained from the course and from each other 
contributed to their well-being. However, the current racial and gender hierarchy and the 
neoliberal development trajectory severely limit their material well-being and 
opportunities. Although the DR is one of the fastest growing economies in the Caribbean, 
it has also seen stubbornly high levels of poverty, state level corruption, social exclusion, 
low levels of state investment in health and education, and very low returns to 
                                                 
9
 See Appendix A for health and education spending amongst Latin America countries.  
10
 One day when I was talking to Doña Inez about her education, she asked me what I studied. I 
responded, “economia.” And Doña Inez said, “I thought you studied sociology.” And I responded, “no, yo 
estudio economia.” And then Doña Inez asked, “not anthropology?” I shook my head no to which she said 
aloud to the sky and very curiously, “una economista de los pobres…” (an economist for poor people), and 
walked away thinking. I took that to mean that when people from the “popular classes” thought about 
economists they thought about white men and women on the television talking about austerity, IMF 
agreements, rising prices, economic crisis, and the feel good rhetoric of progress, economic development, 
and human development that never seemed to make it to the pobres. 
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education.11 On my flight back to the USA, a businessman told me that the most 
important things for getting a good job in the Dominican Republic were having the right 
connections and having light or white skin.  
My participants did not have light or white skin, and many of them spoke of not 
having the right connections or social circles to access good jobs. The businessman’s 
comments and the experience of the women in this study illustrate that the Dominican 
Republic is not promoting human development, but promoting a political and economic 
project that maintains a racist, sexist, and classist social hierarchy. 12 This hierarchy 
benefits capital, markets, and the wealthy at the expense of people’s wellbeing, both 
material and personal. My participants’ hopes—work with dignity, fair pay, vacation, 
leisure time with friends and family, a dwelling for themselves and the children, 
healthcare, and education—are the hopes of many Dominicans. If the Dominican 
development rhetoric is to be more than empty words, the government must begin to 
remedy racial and gender bias, promote pro-poor people growth strategies, and prioritize 
human development over the demands of capital and markets that thrive on racial, 
gender, and class bias.  
In the chapters that follow, I address another aspect of women’s oppression in the 
DR: gender violence. This is a reality that many of the participants in the women’s group 
experienced, with serious and grave effects on women’s well-being.  
                                                 
11
 According to statistical data from the Economic Commission on Latin America and the 
Caribbean, in 2007 the Dominican Republic spent 2.2 % of GDP on public education and 5.7% of GDP on 
health expenditures. Also see Appendix A for comparisons of spending on health and education among 
selected Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
(http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/Portada.asp?idioma=i Accessed 5/5/2013) 
12
 The Dominican Republic Poverty Assessment 2006 states, “the Dominican Republic is also an 
underperformer in its fiscal policies to the accumulation of human and physical capital and provide short-
term income support (p. iii).” Furthermore, the assessment concludes that social assistance programs are 
regressive in absolute terms, “reinforcing patterns of private distribution” (p. iii).  
 33
 
CHAPTER 2  
 THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF GENDER 
VIOLENCE 
2.1 Introduction 
Violence against women and girls is one of the most persistent human rights 
violations in the world (Krug et al. 2002, García-Moreno et al. 2005, Engle Merry 2006, 
Hindin et al. 2008). An emerging literature in development studies argues that domestic 
violence is an obstruction to women’s well-being, human development, and economic 
growth (Panda and Agarwal 2005, Agarwal and Panda 2007), as well as a violation of 
human rights. Although this type of violence has long been studied as a residue of 
persistent strains of traditionalism and/or religious intolerance, it is increasingly viewed 
as having roots beyond its cultural determinants in the broader social, political, and 
economic contexts in which it occurs.  
Much of the emerging literature is bifurcated between a focus on advanced 
industrialized nations—and on poor, agriculturally-based nations (Finnoff 2010, 
González-Brenes 2004, Aizer 2010, Koenig et al. 2003, Macmillian and Gartner 1999). 
Systematically examining women’s experience in so-called intermediate societies, those 
that are neither rich nor poor, may yield insights into the persistence of violence against 
women. On the one hand, such intermediate states may have relatively developed 
institutions of civil society, which provide prevention and intervention services for 
domestic abuse victims as well as a modicum of economic development. These resources 
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may provide women with better exit options in cases of gender violence. On the other 
hand, intermediate societies may share characteristics with poor countries, such as the 
prevalence of low wages for women’s work, relatively weak institutions of gender equity, 
and overt expressions of gender bias.  
 Among these intermediate states, Caribbean countries, including the Dominican 
Republic, share characteristics of both richer and poorer societies.13 As can be seen in 
Table 2.1, the Dominican Republic has a faster economic growth rate than the average of 
Latin American countries and middle-income developing countries and similar socio-
economic development indicators. The Dominican Republic is of particular interest, since 
it has the highest rate of reported feminicide, in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well 
as the sixth highest rate in the entire world (Esplugues et. al. 2010).14 According to the 
Dominican Republic Demographic and Health Survey administered in 2007, 20 to 50 
percent of Dominican women have experienced physical, sexual, or emotional violence at 
the hands of their partner. Table 2.1 shows that in 2007, the absolute number and the rate 
of women killed by their partners was highest in Latin America and the Caribbean. The 
                                                 
13
 During the years 2006-2011 the Dominican Republic averaged a 5.7 % 
economic growth rate (Abdullaev and Estevão 2013). In 2012, GDP expanded by 4.5 % 
(Economic Commision for Latin American and the Carribbean, 
http://interwp.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_cepalstat/Perfil_nacional_economico.asp?Pais=D
OM&idioma=i, accessed Febuary 11, 2013). 
14
 Amnesty International’s Dominican Republic Submission to the UN Human 
Rights Commission”, states that “according to a report issued by the Spanish Center of 
Studies Reina Sofia in 2006 the Dominican Republic ranked first in a list of forty 
European and American countries for the prevalence of women killed by family members 
as measure by number of victims per million of women (p. 11).” See also, “Dominican 
Republic, Femicide Leader in the Caribbean”, Dominican Today, April 20, 2010, 
http://dominicantoday.com/dr/local/2010/4/30/35566/Dominican-Republic-femicide-
leader-in-the-Caribbean and “Dominican Republic Has World’s Sixth Highest Femicide 
Rate” Dominican Today, November 25, 2007, http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/ 
people/2007/11/25/26188/Dominican-Republic-has-worlds-sixth-highest-femicide-rate 
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Dominican Republic thus provides an excellent case study for the analysis of the myriad 
economic, political, and social factors that give rise to violence against women.  
Table 2.1: Comparative Socio-Economic Indicators 2007 
  
Dominican 
Republic 
 
Latin America 
& the Caribbean 
 
Middle Income 
Countries 
GINI  0.56   
GDP/Capita 4,233.00 5,314.00 5,245.39 
GDP Growth Rate  8.5 % 5.6 % 8.7% 
Human Development 
Index  
0.683 0.722 0.609 
Poverty  44.5% 34.0% 38% 
Life expectancy at 
birth, male 
69.8 70.3 66.29 
Life expectancy at 
birth, female 
75.3 76.6 70.38 
Unemployment Rate 15.6 % 7.9 % -- 
Labor force 
participation rate, 
female  
54.2 % 55.9% 39.5% 
Labor force 
participation rate, 
male 
 
83.9 % 
 
83.7% 
 
58.6% 
Literacy Rate*** 88.2 % 91.4 % 80.9* 
Net enrollment 
Primary Education 
 
86.8% 
 
94.2% 
 
89.0% 
Net enrollment 
Secondary Education 
 
60.9 % 
 
72.8 % 
 
60.6% 
Source: World Bank Indicators 2008 and ECLAC/CEPALSTAT 
http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/Portada.asp?idioma=i 
 
GDP/Capita: total annual gross domestic product per capita in constant 2005 
prices in dollars (dollars per inhabitant) 
 
Poverty: percentage of population living below the poverty and extreme poverty 
lines, by urban and rural areas at the national level 
 
Literacy Rate: literacy rate of people ages 15 years and over/literacy rate for 
middle income countries 2008 from econstats.com/wdi 
 
Labor force participation rate, female: as % of female population 15-64 
 
Labor force participation rate, male: as % of male population 15-64 
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HDI from: http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/DOM.html and HDI in 
middle income countries is actual the HDI for medium HDI countries  
 
*poverty for all middle income countries from Poverty Calculator, year 2008 
 
Table 2.2: Feminicide Rates from the Caribbean, Latin America, and Spain 
in 2007 
 
  
Rate 
Absolute 
Numbers 
Dominican Republic 0.94 89 
Chile 0.32 53 
Colombia 0.27 118 
Costa Rica 0.29 13 
El Salvador 0.31 19 
Spain 0.11 47 
Nicaragua 0.34 19 
Paraguay 0.36 22 
Puerto Rico 0.41 16 
St. Vincent and Grenadines 3.67 4 
Surinam 0.40 2 
Trinidad & Tobago 0.38 5 
Source: ECLAC, 
http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/Portada.asp?idioma=i  
 
*Women ages 15 or over killed by their intimate or former partner 
Method for calculating rate: 
V1= number of women killed by intimate or former partner  
V2= total number of inhabitants  
Rate = (V1*100)/V2 
 
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between domestic violence and 
women’s economic activity, political engagement, and social/demographic 
characteristics. Specifically, I test the extent to which two rival hypotheses account for 
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the incidence of domestic violence against women in the Dominican Republic: the 
household bargaining model (HBM) and the male backlash model (MBM).  
 The HBM postulates that when women have more resources, actual or potential 
opportunities or income-income generating activities, they can bargain for better 
outcomes in the household and hence, they experience less violence. Therefore, when the 
household bargaining model is used to understand gender violence, increased economic 
opportunities for women are expected to be associated with a decreased likelihood of 
domestic violence. It follows that domestic violence is more likely to occur when women 
have fewer economic resources. In contrast, the MBM argues that men use violence when 
they feel disempowered or when they sense that the gender hierarchy is being 
destabilized in the household, for instance in a situation where the wife is employed 
while the husband is unemployed.  
 Using logistic regression analysis, I find support for the household bargaining 
model when the dependent variable is aggregate violence (both sexual and physical 
violence) and when the dependent variable is physical violence alone. However, in the 
case of women experiencing sexual violence, I find support for the male backlash model. 
Further, I run all specifications for asset-poor women and asset-rich women. In the 
regressions for asset-poor women, the male backlash model best explains asset-poor 
women’s experience of domestic violence. The household bargaining model, however, 
better predicts gender violence for wealthier women.  
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2.1.1 Country Setting: The Dominican Republic 
The Dominican Republic presents a distinct social, cultural, and economic setting 
for testing these two theoretical perspectives. As noted above, the Dominican Republic 
has the sixth highest reported incidence of feminicide in the world and the highest 
reported rate in Latin America. Not surprisingly, gender hierarchies are entrenched in the 
social norms, institutions, and people of the place. But the Dominican Republic also is a 
country of expanded economic opportunities for women. During the “Lost Decade” of 
the 1980s and the shift to a neoliberal growth strategy, employment opportunities for 
women became numerous in the key sectors of tourism and manufacturing; women 
flocked to the labor market to provide for their households as the male unemployment 
rate skyrocketed and the number of poor and near-poor households increased 
dramatically (Espinal 1995, Elson 1991, Deere et al. 1990). Currently, the female labor 
force participation rate is 44 percent.15 
In addition, Dominican women are considered highly mobile, independent, and 
are educated at higher rates than men; they are also are key economic actors as both 
consumers and workers (Lambert 2009).16 Since the greatest purveyor of wealth cross-
generationally is inheritance, it is important to note that in the Dominican Republic (DR) 
inheritance is split equally among children, regardless of gender or of marital status of 
birth parents (Deere and Leon 2001). Nevertheless, in this relatively fluid and seemingly 
                                                 
15 See Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana www.bancentral.gov.do/ 
estadisticas.asp?a=Mercado_de_Trabajo (last accessed 7/10/2012) 
 
16
 See USAID GENDER ASSESSMENT/Dominican Republic 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADQ847.pdf (last accessed 7/10/2012) 
 39
egalitarian system, men are still perceived to be the final decision makers in the 
household even when they are not the primary financial providers (Safa 1995). As Safa 
(1995) argues, the myth of the male breadwinner holds throughout the Caribbean and 
Latin American cultures despite the notion that women are ultimately responsible for 
providing for the household regardless of the male partner’s economic contribution or 
lack of contribution.  
To put it simply, it is the responsibility of the woman/girlfriend/mother/wife to 
put food on the table, and to maintain and provide care for the household (Chant and 
Craske 2003). The myth of the male breadwinner compounds women’s burden of being 
ultimately responsible for household provisions, because it justifies and sustains the 
notion that working women are only supplemental wage earners, which in turn helps to 
suppress women’s wages, hence their ability to provide for themselves and their 
dependents. Concurrently, there is a culture of machismo—which suggests that men feel 
their masculinity challenged when women disrupt the public/private divide. In addition, a 
culture of marianismo exists, with women socialized to believe that they—like the Virgin 
Mary—must endure all hardships and sacrifices to support and maintain a cohesive 
household (Chant and Craske 2003). 
The Dominican Republic—which is one of the fastest growing economies in the 
Caribbean—provides an excellent case with which to test if these expanded economic 
opportunities in the public sphere have provided women with gains that extend to their 
physical well-being or if, in fact, we see what Agarwal and Panda (2007) call the 
“perverse effects” of development, where an expansion of economic opportunities in a 
gender-biased society may lead to detrimental outcomes for women. For example, Panda 
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and Agarwal (2005) argue that women who experience marital violence have lower levels 
of self-confidence and are at greater risk for injuries. Either or both of these factors may 
reduce a woman’s earning potential, her productive capacity, her contributions to the 
household income, her contributions to market activity, and also her ability to help 
herself both as a person and as an economic actor. Scholars, activists, and analysts seek to 
ascertain the variables associated with domestic violence in order to provide policies that 
promote women’s freedom from violence in the household both for instrumental reasons, 
reasons that promote economic development to foster economic growth, reduce 
healthcare costs associated with domestic violence, and avert productivity and wage loss, 
as well as for intrinsic reasons, reasons that promote women’s wellbeing because it is 
right and good, and denounce gender violence and feminicide as morally wrong (Krug et 
al. 2002, González-Brenes 2004, García-Moreno et al. 2005, Panda and Agarwal 2005, 
Hindin et al. 2008, Finnoff 2010, Aizer 2010).  
This chapter aims to provide an analysis of violence against women and to 
provide possible policy prescriptions that might serve as deterrents to gender violence in 
the Dominican Republic. I examine to what extent male backlash—the perverse effects of 
development—or instead the household bargaining model accounts for the incidence of 
domestic violence in the Dominican Republic. In evaluating the ability of these models to 
explicate the processes we observe in the Dominican Republic, I examine the incidence 
of domestic violence against women across economic, political, and social dimensions. 
The remainder of this essay proceeds in several sections. First, I more fully 
discuss the feminist economics household bargaining model, as well as the sociological-
cultural proposition of male backlash. Second, I provide some descriptive statistics on 
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gender violence in the Dominican Republic, derive testable propositions from competing 
models, and outline the research design used to test those propositions. Third, I discuss 
the findings from the statistical analysis. Fourth, I discuss the research and policy 
implications of the findings. Finally, I summarize the main points of the essay.  
2.2 Contending Perspectives on Gender Violence 
The household is an important site of critical theory and research for feminist 
scholars. Feminist scholarship problematized the public/private divide based on the 
sexual division of labor and reversed the lens to study the implications of women’s 
market participation on household dynamics. Conventional economic theory posits the 
household as a site of pure altruism, where the father (breadwinner) is a rational, 
individualistic, utility-maximizing agent in the public sphere, but a benevolent actor 
maximizing the well-being of the whole family in the private one, where efficiency reigns 
supreme as the woman dedicates herself to reproductive labor, where she maintains a 
“comparative advantage” (Becker 1981). Feminist scholars argue instead that the 
household is a site of cooperation, compromise, and discord, where relative power and 
available outside opportunities determine people’s well-being, conflict or cooperation. 
Two prominent models that focus on the economic determinants of domestic 
violence suggest several testable propositions regarding the factors likely to be associated 
with the incidence of domestic violence. In the simplified version of the household 
bargaining model (HBM), feminist economists argue that a woman’s wellbeing in the 
household is not dependent on the altruism of her husband but on her own ability to 
bargain—based on her actual and potential outside economic opportunities and 
 42
resources—with her husband for her wellbeing in the household. According to the HBM, 
the more real and potential resources, education, capital, and income 
generating/economic opportunities the woman has, the better the exit option, and the 
greater her ability to leave the household if she is thinks she would be better off alone 
than she would be as a household member.  
The woman’s exit option serves a twofold purpose. First, it allows her to use 
outside opportunities as leverage in the household to bargain with her husband for better 
welfare in the home. Feminist economists have shown empirically that when women 
have more real and potential opportunities, their outcomes generally are better: less time 
spent on housework, more freedom of movement, more household decision-making 
ability, decreased fertility rates. Second, because in this simple game both wife and 
husband are well aware of each other’s exit options, the husband will be more willing to 
negotiate, compromise, and cooperate with his wife if she has the resources to leave. The 
more real and present that ability of the wife to take care of herself financially, the better 
the behavior of the husband toward his wife. Hence, a women’s exit option—if she is 
able to provide for herself and any dependents—serves as a deterrent to the husband’s 
misbehavior (England 2003).  
For instance, in their groundbreaking study on the impact of women’s property 
ownership on domestic violence, Panda and Agarwal (2005) find that women who own 
land or a house have a significantly lower odds ratio of marital violence (emotional and 
physical) than women who do not own any property. As a result, the authors advocate the 
importance of “right to housing” and “right to land” campaigns as a means of improving 
women’s lives by providing them a viable exit option from violent husbands thereby 
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reducing their risk of domestic violence. The authors also find that women who reported 
having regular employment have a lower odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence. 
Their study relies on household surveys administered in Kerala, India, which has 
matrilineal property rights; it provides empirical evidence for Deere and Doss’s argument 
that “assets improve the lives of women who own and control them” (2006, 34). In “The 
Gender Wage Gap and Domestic Violence,” Aizer found that as the gender wage gap 
declined in California and labor demand increased in female-dominant sectors, the 
number of women admitted to hospitals for physical assaults decreased. This finding 
lends strong support to the HBM since Aizer was able to control for reporting bias and 
endogeneity concerns (Aizer 2010). Hence the HBM suggests the following proposition 
in the case of domestic violence:  
Proposition 1: The more resources, and the more potential and 
actual income-generating opportunities a woman has, the less 
likely she is to experience violence in the household.  
 
However, sociologists and anthropologists have proffered the male backlash 
model, which argues that as a woman’s economic position or economic prospects 
improve relative to those of her husband, so does her likelihood of experiencing domestic 
violence. The causal assumption in the backlash model is that the woman’s greater 
economic potential is viewed by the husband as challenging the masculinist norms that 
reinforce male dominance in the household (Engle Merry 2009). As a result, when a 
woman acquires greater economic potential or resources, the male partner/spouse is more 
likely to use force and violence to (re)assert power/control over his partner; this 
retribution is the “backlash” of the model (Macmillan and Gartner 1999). Finnoff finds 
that in post-civil war Rwanda, “women who are employed but whose husbands are not 
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experienced more sexual violence” (2010). Finnoff also finds that the relationship 
between employment and gender violence is context-dependent; regions in Rwanda that 
had higher levels of violence prior to the genocide also experienced greater male 
backlash and a higher incidence of sexual violence after the genocide.  
MBM, then, illustrates what Agarwal and Panda call the unintended and perverse 
effects of development strategies. For example, economic restructuring and liberalization 
in many developing countries provide women with opportunities to work for pay, which 
has potential to provided women with economic autonomy. However, firmly entrenched 
cultural and social gender norms in an ever-changing economic context may trigger a 
husband to beat his wife as a way to assert power and show others that he controls his 
partner (Engle Merry 2009). Hence from MBM, I derive the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: The greater the economic resources of a wife relative to her 
husband, the greater the likelihood that she will experience domestic 
violence from her husband. 
 
Within the context of these two contrasting views on gender violence, the 
Dominican Republic provides an interesting locale to study violence against women and 
its economic, political, and social correlates. Dominican women are key economic actors 
in the labor market, accounting for over 40 percent of labor force participation. In 1997 
the Dominican Republic government issued Law 24-97, in which the Dominican 
government, decrees that domestic violence is punishable by law; nonetheless, feminicide 
and gender violence remain grave matters in the Dominican Republic.  
The Dominican Republic as an intermediate state, with characteristics of both rich 
and poor countries, may also present a useful case to test if the HBM and MBM are 
context dependent on the relative economic position of the respondent. Despite economic 
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growth during the last two decades, the Dominican Republic has a high level of income 
inequality where the bottom or poorest quintile receives 1.3 percent of GDP, the next 
(poorest) receives 7.5 percent, the middle receives 12.8 percent, the next richer quintile 
receives 19.8 percent of income, and the top (or richest) quintile receives 58.6 percent of 
total income (Hammill 2005). In the case of such extreme inequality, and considering that 
very few shelters exist for women who experience violence, is it possible for a woman in 
the lowest quintile who experiences gender violence to leave the home and provide for 
herself and her possible dependents? It seems much more feasible for a woman in the 
richer or richest quintiles, with more opportunities and access to resources, to have viable 
exit options when confronted with a violent spouse. This contrast leads to a third 
proposition I test in this paper:  
Proposition 3: The HBM, which highlights the role of women’s outside 
opportunities and resources, will better predict the correlation between 
economic determinants and gender violence for women in the upper 
wealth quintiles as opposed to women in the lower wealth quintiles.  
 
The Dominican Republic Demographic and Health Survey 2007 provides data on 
women’s economic positions, by creating a wealth index based on household assets and 
placing respondents into five wealth quintiles. I use this data to assess if the HBM and the 
MBM are context-dependent on a women’s wealth status by running regressions on a 
subsample of only the two bottom wealth (poorest and poorer) quintiles and then running 
the same regressions on the two top (richer and richest) quintiles.  
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2.3 Data and Method 
 2.3.1 Description of the Data 
In order to test these propositions and assess the correlates of domestic violence, 
this study utilizes data from the 2007 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) for the 
Dominican Republic. The DHS is a household-level survey administered by Macro 
International in many developing nations including the Dominican Republic, where it is 
conducted in conjunction with the Dominican government, USAID, the World Bank, and 
the Global Fund. It provides data on women’s health, fertility, household decision- 
making ability, financial autonomy, employment, and their experiences with domestic 
violence at the hands of their partners. These data are particularly useful in evaluating the 
propositions from the two models not only because of the breadth of variables that they 
examine (e.g. economic, political, and demographic factors), but also because they allow 
us to tap the multiple ways that gender violence is experienced by women. On the latter 
point, it may be important to distinguish between physical and sexual violence, and these 
data allow us to make such a differentiation.  
 This study employs a subsample of 1,820 women—ages 15-49, currently married 
or cohabitating—who were randomly selected to participate in the domestic violence 
module of the survey administered by the DHS in 2007. Of the 1,820 respondents, 626 
women are from rural areas and 1,194 are from urban areas. I only include cases that 
without missing data, and women who are married or partnered, including married 
women, women in consensual unions, or women who have partners but currently are not 
living with them.  
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 Due to the sensitive nature of the issue of domestic violence, the interviewer 
followed specific protocols to ensure the privacy of the female respondents. First, only 
one woman per household was selected to participate in the domestic violence module of 
the survey, so as to provide a degree of anonymity vis-a-vis other household members. 
Second, the interviewer obtained an additional informed consent from the female 
respondent in order to proceed with the domestic violence module. Third, the domestic 
violence module was administered only in private. Where privacy could not be ensured, 
interviews were not held. Fourth, interviewers provided informational pamphlets on 
assistance for concerns with domestic violence for those women who expressed interest 
in receiving such information.  
 The domestic violence module is an addition to the DHS survey, which collects 
household- and individual-level data from both women and a subsample of their male 
partners. The majority of the questions focus on women’s social and demographic 
characteristics such as age, employment and income status, educational attainment, social 
networks and support, household decision-making abilities, fertility rates, child or 
children’s education and mortality rates, access to healthcare, and data on HIV/AIDS. 
The DHS domestic violence module collects data on three forms of violence against 
women: physical, psychological, and sexual. Using the Conflict Tactics Scale (Straus 
1990), women were asked the following questions to determine experiences with physical 
and sexual violence in the household. 
Has your (last) husband/partner ever: 
 
a) Pushed, shaken, or thrown something at you? 
b) Hit you? 
c) Twisted your arm or pulled your hair? 
d) Punched you with his fist or with something that could hurt you? 
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e) Kicked or dragged you across the floor? 
f) Tried to strangle or burn you? 
g) Threatened or hurt you with a knife, gun, or other weapon? 
h) Used physical force to have sexual relations although you did not want to 
engage in sexual intercourse? 
i) Forced you to engage in sexual acts that you do not approve of? 
 
The instances of violence were measured as discrete variables, and women were 
asked both if they had experienced any of these forms of violence in their lives and if 
they had experienced any of these forms of violence in the last twelve months. The 
distribution of values on economic, political, and social/demogrpahic variables and 
gender violence (the dependent variable in this model) is reported in Table 2.3: Cross-
Tabulations of Economic, Political, and Social Determinants of Domestic and 
Cohabitating Couples in the Dominican Republic 2007.  
Table 2.3: Cross Tabulations of Economic, Political, and Social Determinants of 
Domestic Violence Married and Cohabiting Women in the Dominican Republic in 
2007 
(N=1820, in percentages, number of responses in parenthesis) 
CHARACTERISTICS  Physical Violence  Sexual Violence 
Economic Determinants n   
Respondent has money for 
own use 
   
 
No 
 
(956) 
20.5 
(196) 
6.6 
(63) 
 
Yes 
 
(864) 
13.3 
(115) 
4.8 
(41) 
    
Employment Status    
 
Employed 
 
1492 
15.5 
(231) 
7.6 
(25) 
 
Unemployed 
 
328 
24.4 
(80) 
5.3 
(79) 
    
Earnings relative to partner    
 
Respondent makes less 
 
1296 
16.5 
(214) 
5.4 
(70) 
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Respondent makes the same 
 
215 
13.9 
(30) 
3.7 
(8) 
 
Respondent makes more 
 
299 
22.1 
(66) 
8.7 
(26) 
    
Women’s Home Ownership    
 
No 
 
1032 
18.0 
(186) 
4.5 
(46) 
 
Yes 
 
788 
15.9 
(125) 
7.4 
(58) 
    
Women’s Land Ownership    
 
No 
 
1608 
16.9 
(271) 
5.5 
(88) 
 
Yes 
 
212 
18.8 
(40) 
7.6 
(16) 
    
Wealth Quintiles    
 
Poorest 
 
324 
25 
(81) 
8.9 
(75) 
 
Poorest 
 
437 
21.3 
(93) 
7.6 
(33) 
 
Middle 
 
405 
17.0 
(69) 
5.4 
(22) 
 
Richer 
 
367 
10.1 
(37) 
3.3 
(12) 
 
Richest 
 
287 
10.8 
(31) 
2.8 
(8) 
Political Determinants    
Member of a Women’s 
Organization  
   
 
No 
 
1715 
16.9 
(290) 
5.9 
(101) 
 
Yes 
 
105 
21.0 
(21) 
2.9 
(3) 
    
Member of a Political 
Organization 
   
 
No 
 
1779 
16.9 
(302) 
5.7 
(101) 
 
Yes 
 
41 
21.9 
(9) 
7.3 
(3) 
    
Social Determinants    
Education     
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No education 
 
50 
28.0 
(14) 
6.0 
(3) 
 
Primary 
 
736 
22.2 
(163) 
7.6 
(56) 
 
Secondary 
 
612 
15.4 
(94) 
5.9 
(36) 
 
Higher  
 
422 
9.5 
(40) 
2.1 
(9) 
    
Location    
 
Urban 
 
1194 
19.8 
(124) 
9.5 
(59) 
 
Rural 
 
626 
15.7 
(187) 
3.8 
(45) 
    
Head of Household    
 
Partner  
 
1427 
17.5 
(250) 
6.2 
(88) 
 
Women 
 
393 
15.5 
(61) 
4.1 
(16) 
    
Spousal Age Difference    
 
SPAD1 
 
747 
18.5 
(198) 
5.7 
(61) 
 
SPAD2 
 
301 
15.6 
(47) 
6.3 
(19) 
 
SPAD3 
 
446 
14.8 
(66) 
5.4 
(24) 
    
Husband Drinks Alcohol 
Often 
   
 
No 
 
1675 
13.5 
(226) 
4.0 
(68) 
 
Yes 
 
145 
58.6 
(85) 
24.8 
(36) 
    
Women who witnessed father 
beating mother in childhood  
   
 
No  
 
1536 
15.1 
(232) 
5.5 
(84) 
 
Yes  
 
284 
27.8 
(79) 
7.0 
(20) 
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 Although the DR DHS 2007 is a carefully constructed survey instrument 
administered throughout the developing world, it has limitations that are worth noting. 
First and foremost, the DHS does not collect data on race, ethnicity, or, what would be 
better yet in the Dominican context, the skin color of respondents. Although the elite and 
the national discourse purport that the Dominican Republic is a racial democracy, studies 
have shown that Afro-descendants—especially those that are visibly, or phenotypically, 
black—experience intense racial discrimination and prejudice in society (Sidanius, Peña, 
and Sawyer 2001, Gregory 2007, Howard 2001, Valdez 2005). However, not only is 
market discrimination racial in the Dominican Republic, as in most cases it is also 
gendered. Dark-skinned Dominicans are overrepresented in the lower income categories 
and dark-skinned women of African descent and their dependents are arguably more 
vulnerable because of the double burden based on the gendered norm that the ultimate 
responsibility of women is to provide care and food to their dependents (Albert Batista 
1993, Safa 1995, Valdez 2005, Gregory 2007, Howard 2001). The intersection of 
Dominican racist and sexist cultural norms that limit women’s, especially dark-skinned 
women’s, economic opportunities (Safa 1995, Valdez 2005).  
 Not only are dark-skinned Dominican women overrepresented in lower income 
categories, they are also overrepresented in the lowest paying and most precarious 
segments of the labor market, particularly the informal sector, the service sector, and the 
care sector (domestic workers, cooks, childcare, teachers, janitorial services). The 
intersectional race, class, and gender discrimination that women experience in the labor 
market is so institutionalized that workers must submit color photos with their resumes. 
Being dark skinned or visibly black in turn affects women’s exit options, income 
 52
generating ability, and their ability to bargain for better outcomes in the household (Safa 
1995, McClenaghan 1997, Gregory 2007, Albert Batista 1993). Because the DHS does 
not collect data on skin color or race in the Dominican Republic, I will not be able to 
examine here the ways that violence may also have a racial dimension, as has been 
documented in the literature (Johnson and Ferraro 2000, Rasche 1988, Kasturirangan et 
al. 2004, West 2004).  
The second limitation is that women may be underreporting domestic violence in 
DHS surveys. A study by Ellsberg et al. (2003) found systematic and significant 
underreporting of domestic violence when they replicated and readministrated the DHS 
domestic violence module in two regional studies in Nicaragua. They provide several 
reasons for underreporting, such as the lack of preparation that interviewers need in order 
to administer such a difficult set of questions, and the inability of the interviewer to 
establish privacy and confidentiality when the interview takes place in the home of the 
respondent. In addition to these concerns, there may be underreporting in the DHS 
domestic violence because interviews ask respondents questions about domestic violence 
after a long list of survey questions on family planning, employment, reproductive 
history, health, children’s welfare, nutritional and educational status. Hence, women may 
just answer no to the initial question on domestic violence to be done with the survey 
(Ellsberg et. al. 2003). Although these concerns cannot be corroborated for the 
Dominican Republic, they may lead to underreporting.  
Despite these limitations, due to the prevalence of domestic violence and 
feminicide, useful information can be gleaned from using the data in the DR DHS 2007. 
The DR DHS 2007 is random, representative at the national level, and collects data at 
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household level. In TABLE 2.3, some interesting descriptive findings emerge. First, 
women who are employed and have money for their own use are less likely than women 
who do not to experience domestic violence, both physical and sexual, as the HBM 
suggests. However, women who make more money than their partners experience 
physical and sexual abuse at rates higher than their counterparts who make the same or 
less than their husbands. The functional form that the literature predicts for the impact of 
class on domestic violence also holds; that is to say, a higher percentage of women in the 
lower classes report experiencing domestic violence than women in the higher economic 
classes. As a corollary to poverty as a form of economic violence, studies also find that 
the higher incidence of domestic violence in the poorer income classes than in the 
wealthier income classes is due to the immediate psychological and real stresses of 
poverty (Panda and Argawal 2005, Heise 1998). Women who are members of political 
organizations have a higher percentage of reporting the incidence of gender violence, 
both physical and sexual.  
 More highly educated women report less domestic violence, as do women who 
live in urban areas, and women whose husbands are five or more years older than they 
are. Women whose husbands drink alcohol often are more likely to report gender 
violence, as are women who witnessed their fathers beat their mothers in childhood.  
2.3.2 Research Design 
Table 2.4: Variables and Definitions 
Variable Type Definition 
 
ALLVIO 
 
binary; dependent 
Life time experience of both sexual and 
physical violence with current partner 
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SEXVIO  
binary; dependent 
Life-time experience sex violence with 
current partner 
 
PHYVIO 
 
binary; dependent 
Life-time experience physical violence 
with current partner 
WIFEWORKS binary; independent Woman has worked in the past year 
WIFEMONEY binary; independent Woman has money for her own use 
 
 
WIFEMAKESMORE 
 
 
binary; independent 
Woman makes more than her partner 
(reference category: wife makes the same 
or less than husband) 
LAND binary; independent Woman owns land alone 
HOME  
binary; independent 
Woman owns dwelling where family lives 
alone 
POOR binary; independent The combined bottom 40 % of wealth 
quintiles  
MIDDLE  
binary; independent 
The middle 20% of the wealth quintiles 
(reference catergory) 
RICH binary; independent The combined top 40 % of wealth quintiles 
WOMORG binary; independent Woman belongs to a woman’s 
organization 
POLORG binary; independent Woman belongs to a political organization 
 
EDUYRS 
continuous; 
independent 
 
Woman’s years of education 
HEADHOUSE binary; independent Woman as head of household 
URBAN binary; independent Urban residence  
SPAD1 binary; independent Less than 5 years age difference between 
partners 
SPAD2 binary; independent Man is 5 to 8 years older than wife 
SPAD3 binary; independent Man is 9 years or more older than wife 
 
ALCOFTEN 
 
binary; independent 
Woman reports that husband drinks 
alcohol often 
 
INTERGENVIO 
 
binary; independent 
Woman reports seeing father physically 
abuse mother 
   
Acronyms   
HBM  Household bargaining model 
MBM  Male backlash model 
 
 2.3.2.1 Dependent Variable 
In the study, I use the binary variable of experiencing gender violence to ascertain 
the relationship between certain predictors and gender violence. I specify three models. 
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First, I look at the predictors of all gender violence, both sexual and physical, (ALLVIO) 
in the household. Second, I disaggregate ALLVIO into sexual and physical violence to 
examine the possible differences between these two types of violence. Sexual violence 
[SEXVIO] tells us whether a women has experienced any forced sexual acts, and 
[PHYSVIO] tells whether a women has experienced any sort of physical violence—if she 
has been punched, kicked, pushed, slapped, or hit with a weapon or some other 
instrument. Each of these variables takes the value of 1 if the event occurred, 0 otherwise. 
 2.3.2.2 Independent Variables: Economic, Political, and 
Social/Demographic Determinants 
 The variable WIFEWORKS takes the value 1 if the wife is working, 0 otherwise. 
WIFEMONEY is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the woman reports having 
money for her own use, 0 otherwise. WIFEMAKESMORE is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the woman respondent earns more money than her husband, 0 
otherwise; this might be a salient variable with which to test the MBM, as it addresses the 
relative power of each partner in the couple. HOME takes the value of 1 if the wife has 
sole ownership of the home in which the couple resides, 0 otherwise. LAND takes the 
value 1 if the wife owns land alone, 0 otherwise. POOR is a variable created from the 
wealth quintiles (based on asset ownership) that the DHS reports; POOR consists of the 
two bottom quintiles. MIDDLE is the middle category of the wealth quintiles and it is 
omitted from the logistic analysis as the reference category. RICH is the two top quintiles 
in the wealth/asset distribution.  
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POLORG—whether a woman belongs to a political organization—takes the value 
1 if the woman belongs to a political organization, 0 otherwise. WOMORG, membership 
in a women’s organization, takes the value of 1 if the woman is in a women’s 
organization, 0 otherwise. EDUYRS is education in years, the minimum being 0 years of 
education, the maximum 19 years. The mean years of education for the sample is 9.3. 
HEADHOUSE takes the value of 1 is the female respondent is the head of household, 0 
otherwise. URBAN is 1 if the female respondent lives in an urban area, 0 if she lives in a 
rural area. SPAD1 is the spousal age difference when there is less then five years 
difference between the couple. SPAD2 is the spousal age difference that corresponds to 
couples where the husband is five to eight years older than the wife and takes the value of 
1 if this is the case, 0 otherwise. SPAD3 takes the value of 1 if the husband is nine or 
more years older than his wife, 0 otherwise. ALCOFTEN takes the value of 1 if the wife 
reports that her husband drinks alcohol often, 0 otherwise. INTERGENVIO is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the female respondent saw her father beat her 
mother—so as to test for the intergenerational transmission of violence—0 otherwise.17  
2.3.2.3 Model Specification  
I estimate the models using logit regression. Logit regression is appropriate where 
the dependent variable is dichotomous. The logistic model takes the following form: Pr 
(y=1) = exp (α + βxk +δdk)/(1+exp (α + βxk +δdk)); where y = 1 if the outcome occurs— 
if women respond “yes” to the indicators of gender violence in question—x is a vector of 
                                                 
17
 See Table 2.4: Variables and Definitions for all dependent and independent 
variables used in regression analysis.  
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continuous variables, and δ is a vector of dichotomous variables. I interpret the results of 
the logistic model in terms of the changes in the odds. The coefficients, or odds ratios in 
this case, indicate that for a unit change in xk , I expect the logit to change by βk , holding 
all the other independent variables constant. I obtain the odds ratio by taking the 
exponential of both sides of the equation, which considers the odds of observing a 
positive outcome (y=1) versus a negative outcome (y=0):  
Ω = Pr (y=1)/Pr (y=0) = Pr (y=1)/1-Pr (y=1). If the odds ratio of an independent 
variable xk is greater than 1, by saying the odds ratio is βk greater, holding other variables 
constant, this implies an increase in the probability of gender violence. Conversely, if the 
odds ratio is less than 1 this indicates that it is a lower probability (Long and Freese 
2006). I estimate the following three specifications, which differ only in the dependent 
variable measuring gender violence: 
Pr (GVALLVIO =1) =F(ß1WIFEWORKS + ß2WIFEMONEY + ß3 
WIFEMAKESMORE+ ß4HOME + ß5LAND + ß6POOR + ß7RICH + ß8 POLORG + ß9 
WOMORG + ß10 EDUYRS + ß11HEADHOUSE + ß12 URBAN + ß13 SPAD2 + ß14 
SPAD3 + ß15ALOFTEN + ß16INTERGENVIO) 
 
Pr (GVSEXVIO =1) =F(ß1WIFEWORKS + ß2WIFEMONEY + ß3 
WIFEMAKESMORE+ ß4HOME + ß5LAND + ß6POOR + ß7RICH + ß8 POLORG + ß9 
WOMORG + ß10 EDUYRS + ß11HEADHOUSE + ß12 URBAN + ß13 SPAD2 + ß14 
SPAD3 + ß15ALOFTEN + ß16INTERGENVIO) 
 
Pr (GVPHYSVIO =1) =F(ß1WIFEWORKS + ß2WIFEMONEY + ß3 
WIFEMAKESMORE+ ß4HOME + ß5LAND + ß6POOR + ß7RICH + ß8 POLORG + ß9 
WOMORG + ß10 EDUYRS + ß11HEADHOUSE + ß12 URBAN + ß13 SPAD2 + ß14 
SPAD3 + ß15ALOFTEN + ß16INTERGENVIO) 
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2.3.3 Propositions from Contending Models 
In assessing the correlates of gender violence in the Dominican Republic, and 
testing which model—HBM or the MBM—best accounts for gender violence, I advance 
the following propositions which situate the competing models within the context of 
economic, political and social variables.  
The HBM predicts that any potential or actual outside economic opportunities and 
resources improve the woman’s wellbeing in the household. Hence, the HBM suggests 
that any economic resources and income-generating activity will translate into a lower 
odds ratio of women experiencing less domestic violence. Additionally, 
social/demographic factors such as increased years of education, living in an urban area 
where there are more work opportunities, or if the respondent is the household head this 
should also translate into better outcomes as these strengthen a woman’s bargaining 
position; I call this the narrow version of the HBM. I also envision women’s participation 
in the political realm as an extension of outside opportunities and resources, which in turn 
would strengthen her bargaining position; hence in this augmented version of the HBM, 
women’s participation in political organizations and in women’s organizations also 
results in a lower odds ratio of experiencing gender violence.  
In the narrow version of the MBM, it is the relative income positions of the 
couple that matter. Hence a situation where the wife makes more money than her 
husband would imply that the wife is at a higher odds ratio of experiencing violence. I 
can also extend the MBM—that is, a broader version of the MBM—to economic 
variables that strengthen a woman’s exit options or make her a political actor in the 
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public sphere; in this case, it follows variables that provide women resources and 
participation in politics will elicit higher odds of violence from the husband.  
I turn now to an analysis of multivariate logistic results to ascertain the signs and 
statistical significance of the economic, political, social determinants and assess which of 
the two models best describes gender violence in the household in which contexts in the 
Dominican Republic.  
2.4 Analysis of Multivariate Results18 
2.4.1 Model of Aggregate Domestic Violence 
In the model of aggregate violence (ALLVIO), including both sexual and/or 
physical violence, the HBM does the better job of describing domestic violence in the 
Dominican Republic. Two salient independent variables—when the wife has money for 
her own use, and education in years— are associated with a lower odds ratio of 
experiencing gender violence in the household, and both are statistically significant 
(p<.05).19 There is limited support for the MBM as well; in terms of economic variables, 
when the wife makes more money than her husband, she has a higher odds ratio of 
experiencing violence in the household than women who make the same amount or less 
than their husbands, a result that is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. There is 
                                                 
18
 For correlation matrices and tests of correlation significance see Appendix B. 
For discussion of significant correlations, likelihood ratio tests of nested versus full 
models, and justification of model validity see Appendix C.  
19
 P<.01 means that the variable odds ratio is significant at the 1% level, p<.05 
denotes that the odds ratio is significant at the 5% level, and p<.10 significant at the 10 % 
level.  
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additional support for the broader version of the MBM: women who belong to a political 
organization have a higher odds ratio of experiencing gender violence than women who 
do not belong to political organizations (p<.10). Several demographic variables are also 
significant. I find that women who are nine or more years younger than their husbands 
are at a lower odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence in the household than women 
who do not have that age differential (p<.01). Also I find that women whose husbands 
drink alcohol often and women who witnessed their fathers beat their mothers are at a 
higher odds ratio of experiencing gender violence than women whose husbands do not 
drink often and women who did see gender violence in the household respectively 
(p<.01).  
Table 2.5: Logistic Regression of Factors Associated with Gender Violence 
(robust standard errors in parenthesis) 
 Physical 
Violence 
Sexual 
 Violence 
Physical and 
Sexual Violence 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Odds Ratio 
 
Odds Ratio 
 
Odds Ratio 
Economic Variables    
 
Wife works 
.73* 
(.12) 
.83 
(.21) 
.74* 
(.12) 
 
Wife money for own use 
.71** 
(.11) 
.88 
(.20) 
.69** 
(.10) 
 
Wife makes more $ than husband 
1.54** 
(.28) 
1.64* 
(.42) 
1.54** 
(.47) 
Wife owns dwelling where couple 
lives 
.77* 
(.11) 
1.46* 
(.31) 
.82 
(.11) 
 
Wife owns land 
1.22 
(.26) 
1.39 
(.44) 
1.27 
(.26) 
 
Poor  
1.19 
(.22) 
1.19 
(.33) 
1.15 
(.21) 
 
Rich 
.76 
(.15) 
.74 
(.25) 
.74 
(.15) 
    
Political Variables    
 
Belongs to women’s organization 
1.30 
(.36) 
.36 
(.28) 
1.14 
(.30) 
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Belongs to a political organization 
2.01* 
(.76) 
2.03 
(1.60) 
2.92*** 
(1.04) 
    
Social/Demographic Variables    
 
Education in years 
.95** 
(.02) 
.98 
(.02) 
.95** 
(.02) 
 
Female headed household 
.83 
(.14) 
.68 
(.21) 
.86 
(.14) 
 
Urban 
.87 
(.13) 
.44*** 
(.10) 
.77* 
(.11) 
 
Husband 5-8 yrs older than wife 
.79 
(.15) 
1.07 
(.31) 
.82 
(.15) 
 
Husband is 9 yrs older than wife 
.73** 
(.13) 
.89 
(.24) 
.81 
(.14) 
 
Husband drinks alcohol often 
8.72*** 
(1.70) 
7.44*** 
(1.85) 
8.80 
(1.72)*** 
 
Women saw father beat mother 
2.31*** 
(.37) 
1.28 
(.35) 
2.30*** 
(.37) 
    
 
Constant 
0.37*** 
(.11) 
.07*** 
(.03) 
.40*** 
(18) 
N 1820 1818 1820 
McFaddens R2 0.1402 0.1381 0.1403 
 
2.4.2 Model of Sexual Violence 
When I disaggregate gender violence to examine specifically sexual violence, I 
find somewhat different results. Again, women who make more money than their 
husbands are at a higher odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence than women who 
make the same amount of money or less than their husbands. Recall that, according to the 
MBM, when husbands feel relatively disempowered in some measure vis-à-vis their 
wives, the male’s response is to impose his “authority” over the woman by using his 
physical power in the form of violence. In the case of sexual violence, the only 
statistically significant economic variable—women who make more money than husband 
(p<.10)—supports the MBM.  
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However, I also find support for the HBM in the political and social/demographic 
variables: belonging to a women’s organization (p<0.01), increasing education in years 
(p<0.05), and being a female head of household (p<.10) lower the odds ratio of 
experiencing violence. Additionally, women who live in urban areas (p<.05) are at a 
lower odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence than women who live in rural areas. 
This finding about the influence of geographical location is consistent with the HBM, in 
so far as women in urban areas have more potential outside work and educational 
opportunities, which strengthens their bargaining power and provides more potential exit 
options. In the results for sexual violence (SEXVIO), I find that as for aggregate violence 
(ALLVIO), women whose husbands often drink alcohol are at a higher odds ratio of 
experiencing domestic violence (p<.01).  
2.4.3 Model of Physical Violence 
In the model with physical violence as the dependent variable, there is stronger 
support for the HBM. When women have money for their own use, they are at a lower 
odds ratio of experiencing violence in the household than their counterparts who do not 
have money for their own use (p<0.05). Additional support for the HBM is provided by 
the variable education in years, with each additional year of schooling lowering the odds 
ratio of experiencing domestic violence (p<.05). Despite the stronger support for the 
HBM, there is also support, albeit statistically weaker, for the MBM in the categories of 
economic and political variables; when the wife makes more money than her husband, 
she has a higher odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence (p. <10), and when she is a 
member of a political organization, she also faces a higher odds ratio of experiencing 
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domestic violence (p<.10). In the specification of physical violence (PHYSVIO), greater 
spousal age differences, the male partner being five to eight years older than the 
respondent (SPAD2) (p<.10), and the male partner being nine years older (SPAD3) 
(p<.01), put women at a lower odds ratio of experiencing physical violence. Once again, 
women whose husbands drink often (p<.01) and who witnessed gender violence in their 
own homes as children (p<.01) have a higher odds ratio of experiencing gender violence.  
2.5 Class Dimension of Gender Violence 
In previous specifications, I control for economic class through the use of the 
wealth variables. In all three specifications the functional form I expect for class and 
gender violence holds. That is to say, there is a higher odds ratio of poor women 
experiencing gender violence, while there is a lower odds ratio of rich women 
experiencing domestic violence both with respect to middle asset category, the reference 
group. However, neither class status is statistically significant in the three models in 
which all women are analyzed together. In this section I discuss the results that emerge 
when I run each of the three previous models separately for women in the asset-poor 
category and then for women in the asset-rich category. 
2.5.1 Asset-Poor Women and Gender Violence in the Household 
In regression analysis for asset-poor women (N=761), I find that the MBM best 
explains gender violence both at the aggregate level and also when gender violence is 
disaggregated into physical violence and sexual violence.  
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Table 2.6: Logistic Regression of Factors Associated with Domestic Violence for 
Asset-Poor Women 
(robust standard errors in parenthesis) 
 Physical 
Violence 
Sexual 
Violence 
Physical and 
Sexual Violence 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Odds Ratio 
 
Odds Ratio 
 
Odds Ratios 
Economic Variables    
 
Wife works 
.40*** 
(.12) 
1.02 
(.56) 
.44*** 
(.13) 
 
Wife money for own use 
.69 
(.20) 
.52 
(.21) 
.130 
(.19) 
Wife makes more $ than husband 2.47** 
(.94) 
3.135** 
(1.60) 
2.49** 
(.92) 
Wife owns dwelling where couple 
lives 
.84 
(.25) 
1.01 
(.35) 
.88 
(.26) 
 
Wife owns land 
.54 
(.25) 
1.73 
(.96) 
.73 
(.33) 
    
Political Variables    
 
Belongs to women’s organization 
.45 
(.27) 
.33 
(.27) 
.38 
(.23) 
 
Belongs to a political organization 
8.04*** 
(4.94) 
.733 
(1.01) 
10.40*** 
(6.22) 
    
Social/Demographic Variables    
 
Education in years 
.78 
(.22) 
1.00 
(.06) 
.98 
(.03) 
 
Female headed household 
.61 
(.22) 
.4168 
.2776 
.640 
.22879 
 
Urban 
.78 
(.21) 
.47* 
(.19) 
.71 
(.19) 
 
Husband 5-8 yrs older than wife 
.86 
(.34) 
.90 
(.45) 
.87 
(.33) 
 
Husband is 9 yrs older than wife 
.62 
(.21) 
.83 
(.50) 
.65 
(.21) 
 
Husband drinks alcohol often 
11.61*** 
(4.66) 
6.10*** 
(2.56) 
11.02*** 
(4.46) 
 
Women saw father beat mother 
2.92*** 
(1.07) 
1.481 
(.91) 
2.75*** 
(1.00) 
N 761 760 761 
McFaddens R2 0.1377 0.1100 0.1269 
*p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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In the aggregate violence (ALLVIO) specification for poor women, both the wife 
making more money than the husband (p<.05) and the wife being a member of a political 
organization (p<.01) increase the odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence in the 
household; both of these variables speak to the way that women’s outside opportunities—
especially in the case where the husband is relatively disempowered—and women’s 
participation in the public sphere may place poor women in precarious situations within 
the household. In the case of a poor woman who is the main breadwinner in the 
household, it is important to note how the larger economic context, characterized by 
sporadic and insecure employment for both women and men, high levels of 
unemployment, and large informal sector may be contributing to the “perverse 
consequences” of development including detrimental outcomes for women.  
In addition to the strong support for the MBM as an explanation for asset-poor 
women’s experience of gender violence, there is also some support for the HBM. When 
an asset-poor woman works, she is at a lower odds ratio of experiencing violence than 
asset-poor women who does not work, signaling the importance of employment for 
women’s well-being. Both social/demographic variables husband drinks alcohol often 
(p<.01) and witnessing gender violence growing up (p<.01) put asset-poor women at a 
higher odds ratio of experiencing violence. 
In the sexual violence (SEXVIO) specification for asset-poor women, the only 
significant economic predictor is when the wife makes more than her male partner 
(WIFEMAKESMORE) (p<.05); when asset-poor women make more money than their 
husbands, they are at a higher odds ratio of experiencing sexual violence than asset-poor 
women who make the same or less than their partners. However, living in an urban area 
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(p<0.10) puts asset-poor women at a lower odds ratio of experiencing sexual violence 
than asset-poor women in rural areas, which supports the HBM in so far as living in 
urban areas presents women with more potential work, education, and outside 
opportunities.  
In the physical violence (PHYSVIO) specification for asset poor women, there is 
broader support for the MBM. Both when the respondent makes more than her male 
partner (WIFEMAKESMORE) (p<.05) and when the respondent belongs to a political 
organization (POLITICALORG) (p<.01) are associated with a higher odds ratio of 
experiencing violence in the household. In this specification, there is also support for the 
HBM in that the variable WIFEWORKS (p<.01), is associated with a lower odds ratio of 
experiencing domestic violence. 
2.5.2 Asset-Rich Women and Gender Violence in the Household 
 When the same specifications were estimated for women in the asset-rich 
category, the HBM best explained both the aggregate (ALLVIO) and physical violence 
(PHYSVIO) results; whereas the MBM best explained significant variables in the sexual 
violence (SEXVIO) results.  
Table 2.7: Logistic Regression of Factors Associated with Domestic Violence for 
Asset-Rich Women 
(robust standard errors in parenthesis) 
 Physical 
Violence 
Sexual 
Violence 
Physical and 
Sexual Violence 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Odds Ratio 
 
Odds Ratio 
 
Odds Ratios 
Economic Variables    
 
Wife works 
2.41 
(1.44) 
2.75 
(2.35) 
1.96 
(1.08) 
 .35** .59 .35** 
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Wife money for own use (16) (.43) (.16) 
 
Wife makes more $ than husband 
1.21 
(.70) 
.78 
(.63) 
1.23 
(.63) 
Wife owns dwelling where couple 
lives 
.74 
(.17) 
1.11 
(.38) 
.78 
(.17) 
 
Wife owns land 
1.83** 
(.55) 
2.51** 
(1.06) 
1.80** 
(0.53) 
    
Political Variables    
 
 
Belongs to women’s organization 
 
2.33** 
(1.20) 
OMMITTED 
PREDICTS 
FAILURE PER. 
 
1.88 
(1.02) 
 
Belongs to a political organization 
2.99 
(3.33) 
14.66** 
(18.28) 
8.38** 
(7.29) 
    
Social/Demographic Variables    
 
Education in years 
.91* 
(.04) 
.83*** 
(.04) 
.90** 
(.04) 
 
Female headed household 
1.22 
(.51) 
.39 
(.29) 
1.27 
(.52) 
 
Urban 
.83 
(.37) 
.42 
(.27) 
.77 
(.33) 
 
Husband 5-8 yrs older than wife 
.70 
(.38) 
.42 
(.36) 
.69 
(.38) 
 
Husband is 9 yrs older than wife 
.28** 
.14 
.17 
(.15) 
.32 
(.16) 
 
Husband drinks alcohol often 
5.01* 
(3.06) 
2.22 
(2.21) 
4.96** 
(3.08) 
 
Women saw father beat mother 
3.26** 
(1.55) 
.99 
(.74) 
3.51*** 
(1.66) 
N 654 621 654 
McFaddens R2 0.1294 0.1546 0.1390 
*p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
In the aggregate violence (ALLVIO) specification for rich women, the only 
significant economic variable, when the wife has money for her own use 
(WIFEMONEY) (p<.05) is associated with a lower odds ratio of experiencing domestic 
violence; that is to say, women who have money, the most liquid financial asset, at their 
command have a lower odds ratio of experiencing gender violence than women who do 
not have money for their own use. Here it is important to note that when asset-rich 
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women have liquid assets, these assets may serve as an exit option and a deterrent to 
violence in the home; in contrast, this variable was not significant in any of the 
specifications of asset-poor women. This contrast suggests that exit options must be 
substantial to be viable. Asset-rich women who have money at their disposal are likely to 
have more of it than asset-poor women and hence more chance to support themselves and 
their dependents should they decide to exit the marriage. Additionally, belonging to a 
political organization (POLORG) and more years of education (EDUYRS) are also 
associated with a lower odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence in the household 
(both at p<.05 level), providing further support for the HBM.  
In the sexual violence (SEXVIO) specification for asset-rich women, on the other 
hand, there is more support for the MBM; both women who own land (OWNSLAND) 
(p<.10) and women who belong to a political organization (POLORG) (p<.05) are 
associated with a higher odds ratio of experiencing violence. Only one of the social 
variables provides support for the HBM: continuous years of education (EDUYRS) is 
associated with a lower odds ratio of experiencing gender violence for asset-rich women 
(p<.01). 
Turning to the physical violence (PHYSVIO) specification, both variables when 
the wife has money for own use (WIFEMONEY) (p<.05) and continuous years of 
education (EDUYRS) (p<.10) are associated with a lower odds ratio of gender violence 
for asset-rich women, supporting the HBM, while, membership in a women’s 
organization (WOMORG) is associated with a higher odds ratio of experiencing domestic 
violence (p<.10).  
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2.6 Policy Prescriptions & Conclusions 
2.6.1 Discussion of Predicted Probabilities and Policy Implications  
By calculating and reporting predicted probabilities of gender violence, I am able 
to assess the effects of significant variables in the models (Long and Freese 2006). 
TABLES 2.8 and 2.9 present predicted probabilities of gender violence for asset-poor and 
asset-rich women, respectively based on significant variables from TABLES 2.6 and 2.7.  
Table 2.8: Probability of ALLVIO for Asset-Poor* women with mean EDUYRS= 7.1 
 Urban 
[95% CI] 
Rural 
[95% CI] 
 
Unemployed Women 
 
.27 [.14, .40] 
 
.34 [.19, .49] 
Women who make money than their 
husbands 
 
.29 [.09, .49] 
 
.36 [.15, .58] 
 
Members of Political Organizations 
 
.63 [.32, .94] 
 
.70 [.43, .98] 
 
Partner drinks alcohol often 
 
.64 [.42, .86] 
. 
.72 [.53, .90] 
Women who witnessed father beat 
mother 
 
.31 [.14, .48] 
 
.39 [.22, .55] 
*all other variables held at their mode 
In logistic regressions for asset-poor women—where the MBM best accounted for 
spousal abuse among the asset poor— being employed (WIFEWORKS) was associated 
with a lower odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence; hence, for asset-poor women 
employment may serve as an important means to reduce their probability of experiencing 
gender violence. I find that for an unemployed asset-poor woman living in an urban area, 
with the mean 7.1 years of education, the predicted probability of experiencing domestic 
violence is 27 percent, with the 95 percent confidence interval lying between .14 and .40. 
However employed women living in urban areas have fifteen percent predicted 
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probability of experiencing gender violence, which is lower than their unemployed 
counterpart. The predicted probability of rural unemployed asset- poor women 
experiencing gender violence is 34 percent with a 95 % confidence interval of between 
.19 and .49. In contrast, employed women in rural areas have an eighteen percent 
predicted probability of experiencing gender violence. These predicted probabilities point 
to the need for viable employment opportunities for women in the asset-poor category, 
especially in rural areas. Employment—especially employment that pays a living wage—
serves not only the intrinsic purpose of providing a woman with income, but also the 
purposes of providing a potential exit option (if it is enough money for her to support 
herself and her dependents), increasing her level of self-esteem, and the social purposes 
of allowing a woman to provide for her dependents and to contribute to market activity. 
If, however, the woman earns more money than her husband, her predicted 
probability of experiencing domestic violence goes up. Women in urban areas who make 
more money than their husbands have a 29 percent predicted probability of experiencing 
domestic violence; women in urban areas that earn the same or less than their husbands 
have a lower predicted probability of fifteen percent. Women in rural areas who make 
more money than their husbands have a 36 percent predicted probability of experiencing 
the domestic violence; whereas their counterparts who earn the same or less have an 
eighteen percent predicted probability of experiencing domestic violence.  
 This outcome, in which women are at a higher predicted probability of 
experiencing gender violence when they make more money that their husbands, leading 
to relative male disempowerment, is indicative of what Panda and Agarwal (2005) call 
the “perverse effects of development.” Women’s movement from the home to the work 
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place and the polity has challenged gender norms, but at the same time the myth of the 
male breadwinner and traditional gender ideology persist. The resulting tensions may not 
only perpetuate the foundations and normalization of gender violence but even 
exacerbate them. For instance, if the wife assumes the role of primary breadwinner—
particularly if she is in the asset-poor category—instead of improving her well-being, 
unequivocally, her status may lead to her husband using violence to assert himself. This 
male breadwinner myth serves also to justify paying women inferior, supplemental wages 
in the labor market, an ideological support for labor market discrimination which in turn 
is detrimental to women’s wellbeing and economic autonomy. In the context of the 
Dominican Republic’s high unemployment rate, and its shift from a state-led Keynesian 
development strategy to a more market-oriented growth strategy (which decreased men’s 
employment opportunities as government officials and in public works), its falling real 
wages, and its precarious, unstable job market, it is important for the government to 
pursue a job creation strategy that benefits both men and women (Deere at el 1990).  
 Similarly, the MBM receives support in the case of asset-poor women who are 
members of political organizations. In urban areas, women who are members of political 
organizations have 63 percent predicted probability of experiencing domestic violence, 
whereas women not involved in political organizations have a lower predicted probability 
of fifteen percent.20 In rural areas women who are politically active have an alarmingly 
high predicted probability of 70 percent; women who are not members of a political 
organization have fifteen percent chance of experiencing domestic violence. In the case 
                                                 
20
 In this dataset a total of 41 women report belonging to a political organization. Of the 41 
women in political organizations, 16 are in the asset-poor category, 13 are in the middle asset category, and 
12 are in the asset-rich category.  
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of women’s political activism, there is the possibility of reserve causality. It could be that 
husbands want to punish their wives for challenging politics as male only space, thereby 
asserting to themselves and others that they are still in control of their wives. Or it could 
be that women who experience gender violence become politicized as they come to 
understand their experience as both a personal and a political issue. Whatever the relative 
importance of these two causal pathways, there is a significant correlation between 
female political activism and gender violence.  
The political culture in the Dominican Republic helps to perpetuate violence 
against women. Abortion is still illegal; it is almost impossible for an asset-poor woman 
in the Dominican Republic to get access to a safe and affordable abortion. When women 
in the Dominican Republic report gender violence to the police, they are routinely told to 
“give your husband time to calm down” and are advised to go a family member’s home. 
Prominent politicians and political pundits broadcast racist, homophobic, and sexist 
rhetoric. All this reinforces the gender violence, but women are inserting themselves into 
the political conversation—political organizations, the government, and in grassroots 
feminist movements—to reshape politics and advocate for themselves in the Dominican 
Republic. The associated increase in the risk of domestic violence is symptomatic of the 
challenge they confront.  
The group of women in the asset-poor category who have the highest predicted 
probability of experiencing domestic violence—64 percent in urban areas and 72 percent 
in rural areas—are women who report that their husbands drink often. Conversely, 
women whose partners do not drink have a lower predicted probability of experiencing 
violence: fourteen percent in urban areas and seventeen percent in rural areas. A way to 
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alleviate this situation might be national and grassroots-level social and educational 
awareness programs that denounce alcohol abuse as detrimental not only to one’s health 
but also to the mental and physical well-being of others, with the link between alcohol 
abuse and gender violence given particular attention.  
In urban areas women, who have witnessed gender violence in their homes as 
children have a predicted probability of 31 percent of experiencing violence themselves 
but those in urban areas who have not witnessed domestic violence have a lower 
predicted probability of fifteen percent. In rural areas the predicted probability of gender 
violence when a woman witnessed abuse in the childhood home is 39 percent, similarly 
in this case rural women who did not see domestic violence growing up have a lower 
predicted probability of eighteen percent. These percentages point to the need for social 
policy that seeks to disrupt the intergenerational transmission of gender violence, as well 
as for economic policy that disrupts the violence of poverty. Social policies are needed to 
breakdown the normalcy of men using violence against women, to confront the pervasive 
underlying notion in masculinist thought and cultures of machismo that women are 
objects to be controlled.  
 Table 2.9 presents the predicted probabilities of women in the asset-rich category 
experiencing domestic violence. These are lower than thes corresponding probabilities 
for women in the asset-poor category. 
Table 2.9: Probability for Asset-Rich* in Urban Areas with mean EDUYRS= 11.8 
 Urban 
[95% CI] 
Rural 
[95% CI] 
Woman has no money for 
own use 
 
.14 [.02, 0.26] 
 
.18 [.02, 0.34] 
Members of Political 
Organizations 
 
.31 [.02, .65] 
 
.38 [-.03, 0.8] 
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Partner drinks alcohol often 
 
.22 [-.04, .48] 
 
.27 [0.06, .60] 
Women who witnessed father 
beat mother 
 
.16 [ .02, .31] 
 
.21 [.02, 0.40] 
*all other variables held at their mode 
These lower predicted probabilities speak to two different issues documented in 
the literature. One is the possible systematic underreporting of violence of women in the 
upper economic classes, due to the shame and stigma associated with spousal abuse, and 
to the notion that gender violence does not happen in the homes of the wealthy and 
educated. Second, they highlight the way in which the violence of poverty is intertwined 
with gender violence, and add to the case for economic equality/justice as a way to 
reduce violence against women. The women with the highest predicted probabilities in 
the asset-rich category—women who are members of political organizations and women 
whose husbands drink often—share these risk factors with the asset-poor. This significant 
conjunction speaks to the way that gender violence cuts across class lines, and suggests 
that similar social and educational policies would benefit all women, regardless of class. 
It is also important to note that for asset-rich women, having money for their own use is 
associated with a lower odds ratio of gender violence; asset-rich women in urban who 
have money for their own have a five percent predicted probability of experiencing 
domestic violence and those in rural areas have a seven percent predicted probability. 
Whereas asset-rich women with no money for their own use have a higher predicted 
probability of spousal abuse: fourteen percent in urban areas and eighteen percent in rural 
areas. Here, campaigns, interventions, and banks, such as El Banco de La Mujer 
Dominicana, can play a role in educating women and providing them with incentives to 
save money that is for their own use. The higher predicted probabilities of asset-rich 
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women who do not have money for their own use lends support to the HBM; asset-rich 
women need to have economic autonomy to have an exit option or to deter spousal abuse.  
2.6.2 Conclusions and Further Research 
 In this chapter, I have tested which theoretical perspective—HBM or MBM—
provides the most accurate description of how gender violence and women’s participation 
in the economic sphere intersect in Dominican Republic. I also explored the association 
of various other economic, social, and political determinants with women’s experience of 
domestic violence. My results—from the three aggregated models (TABLE 2.5) —
suggest that in the Dominican Republic the HBM is better able to explain physical 
violence, but the MBM is more predictive of women being sexually assaulted by their 
partners.  
Table 2.10: Summary of Significant Variables’ Support for Contending Models 
 Physical Violence Sexual Violence Aggregate Violence 
WIFEWORKS    
WIFEMONEY HBM  HBM 
WIFEMAKESMORE MBM MBM MBM 
OWNSLAND    
WOMENORG  HBM  
POLTICALORG MBM  MBM 
EDUYRS HBM HBM HBM 
HEADHOUSE  HBM  
URBAN  HBM  
BEST MODEL HBM MBM HBM 
 
Table 2.11: Summary of Significant Variables’ Support for Asset-Poor Women 
Specifications 
 
 Physical Violence Sexual Violence Aggregate Violence 
WIFEWORKS HBM  HBM 
WIFEMONEY    
WIFEMAKESMORE MBM MBM MBM 
 76
OWNSLAND  MBM  
WOMENORG    
POLITICALORG MBM  MBM 
EDUYRS    
HEADHOUSE    
URBAN  HBM  
BEST MODEL MBM MBM MBM 
 
Table 2.12: Summary of Significant Variables’ Support for Asset-Rich Women 
Specifications 
 
 Physical Violence Sexual Violence Aggregate Violence 
WIFEWORKS    
WIFEMONEY HBM  HBM 
WIFEMAKESMORE    
OWNSLAND MBM MBM MBM 
WOMENORG MBM   
POLITICALORG  MBM MBM 
EDUYRS HBM HBM HBM 
HEADHOUSE    
URBAN    
BEST MODEL HBM MBM HBM 
 
When I disaggregate between low-income and upper-income women, I find an 
important socioeconomic element of gender violence. For asset-poor women in the 
sample, the relationship between the economic, political, and social/demographic 
variables provide more support for the MBM; that is to say, asset-poor women may be 
more vulnerable to their husbands’ using violence in response to their wives’ 
participation in the market. For asset-rich women in this sample, the HBM holds more 
firmly; when asset-rich women have economic resources at their command, they tend to 
experience less violence in the household.21  
                                                 
21
 The DHS collects data at the household and individual level for respondents. 
Asset wealth data--assessed by household items, type of house, and other items owned—
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The evidence from both subsamples points to the conclusion that if we are to 
reduce women’s chances of experiencing violence in the household, women must have 
viable exit options. They must have jobs that pay a living wage. The current average 
wage for women, is roughly 87 percent of male’s wages, despite higher female than male 
levels of educational attainment (Lambert 2007).22 Compounding the damage caused by 
the gender wage gap, women’s unemployment rate is consistently higher than that of 
men. In 2007, 67 percent of women were unemployed, twice the unemployment level of 
men (Lambert 2007). Additionally, women are more likely to be employed in the 
informal sector, which tends to include the lowest-paying, most labor-intensive work, 
work that does not offer benefits, pension, healthcare, or job security (Lambert 2007, 
Safa 1995). These larger, macroeconomic structural issues severely limit women’s, 
particularly asset-poor women’s, exit options from violent relationships. Apart from these 
structural economic issues, the results of this study show that gender norms may be 
learned and reproduced. Women who saw gender violence in the home as children are 
more likely to experience gender violence as adults. Policy makers and feminist 
organizations must continue to tackle gendered beliefs and institutions to eradicate 
                                                                                                                                                 
however, is at the household level and in this study partners who live in the same home 
are designated the same wealth asset status.  
22
 According to a report by the Dominican National Statistical Office (Oficina 
Nacional de Estadística) entitled, “Situación laboral de las mujeres en la República 
Dominicana”, the median monthly wage for women in 2010 was $305 USD and $361 
USD for men (p. 78). In 2010, the monthly average food basket for a family of four 
(termed la canasta básica) in the Dominican Republic was $668.57 USD. La canasta 
básica not include avaerage housing, transportation, educational, or health-related 
expenses (Banco Central de la República Dominicana 2011, 
http://www.bancentral.gov.do/notas_del_bc.asp?a=bc2011-02-02, accessed 9/13/2013). 
A household with two people earning the median wage, therefore, is unable to cover the 
basic nutrition necessities for a family of four.  
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gender violence. In addition, social and education policies are necessary to enhance 
awareness of the implications of alcohol abuse for violence in the home. 
 What emerges from this study, then, are some insights into the way in which both 
the HBM and the MBM are operating in a mid-level income, developing nation where 
women are highly mobile, independent, and challenging the very gender norms that 
perpetuate violence against them. The finding that both of these contending models prove 
relevant to women’s experience of domestic violence in the Dominican Republic 
suggests that economic factors interact with gender norms. Both are at play when there is 
gender violence in the household. To eradicate domestic violence, therefore, new policies 
must use both economic strategies (such as providing both men and women with 
remunerative employment) and cultural strategies that challenge the male bias inherent in 
institutions, markets, and cultural norms. This dual strategy is already at the heart of the 
feminist movement in the Dominican Republic. 
 In the majority of the models, excessive alcohol drinking by husbands and the 
intergenerational transmission of violence are associated with a higher odds ratio of 
experiencing domestic violence in the household. Interestingly, feminist studies written 
during the Dominican financial crisis in 1980’s reported that at the height of the crisis—
when unemployment rates among men dramatically increased—the majority of women’s 
concerns as reported by women to NGOs involved the heightened level of sexual and 
physical violence they were experiencing (Sikoska 2000).  
These results suggest that policies and campaigns that provide both men and 
women with viable economic opportunities, together with policies and campaigns that 
challenge gender norms and hierarchy could have the effect of lowering the incidence of 
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gender violence in the household in the Dominican Republic. Implementing such 
economic policy would likely be difficult at this time as the Dominican government 
pursues a neoliberal, market-oriented growth strategy, which thus far has led to economic 
growth accompanied by increasing income inequality. Many academic and grassroots 
feminists argue that Law 24-97, the law that makes domestic violence illegal, is not 
enforced by the current government and that women’s right to safety in their homes is 
therefore violated. 
The finding that the rival hypotheses, MBM and HBM, are both relevant to the 
Dominican Republic, each one offering a more congruent explanation for a differing type 
of violence—physical, sexual, and aggregate gender violence—or a differing 
socioeconomic class—asset poor or asset rich—suggests several avenues for further 
research on the factors, preferences, economic constraints, and cultural values that 
underlay gender violence and in turn affect women’s well-being in the Dominican 
Republic. Economists have provided critiques of the assumption of exogenous 
preferences in people’s decision-making and behavior (Bowles 1998, McCrate 1988). 
These critiques can be applied to the study of gender violence. The impact of both 
economic variables and gender norms on domestic violence in the Dominican Republic 
then poses the question, what is the role of endogenous preferences in this case? The 
following and last chapter of this dissertation further examines the relationship between 
the justifications for gender violence and women’s and men’s gendered beliefs and 
endogenous preferences. 
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CHAPTER 3  
GENDERED BELIEFS, ENDOGENOUS PREFERENCES, AND GENDER 
VIOLENCE 
3.1 Introduction 
On September 30, 2012, Jonathan Minaya Torres stabbed his wife, Miguelina 
Altagracia Martinez, fifty-two times in a beauty salon in Santiago, Dominican Republic 
in front of one of their children and other members of the community. Miguelina 
Martinez went to the district attorney’s office eighteen times in the two weeks prior to her 
murder to report that because of her husband’s violent threats she left had her home and 
feared for her life. He killed her because she no longer wanted to be with him; the knife 
he used to stab her was hidden in a bouquet of roses. As Jonathan Minaya left the beauty 
salon, news of his heinous crime spread through the neighborhood. A mob of men caught 
and proceeded to beat him. Local police saved Jonthan Minaya’s life and escorted him to 
the nearest hospital for treatment of head trauma and broken bones. The irony of this 
situation—a local state institution saving the life of the violent former partner of Ms. 
Martinez, but failing to help her protect herself—provides insight into the gendered logic 
and norms that operate in the country. 
Ms. Martinez’s avoidable and tragic murder is but one example of the state of 
gender violence in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic has a Ministry of 
Gender Affairs, and the country is party to the Convention to End All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Law 24-97 criminalizes gender violence in 
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the household. Law 88-03, enacted in 2003, established shelters and halfway houses for 
women fleeing violent partners. The country has local mechanisms such as police stations 
(in some cases with all women officers) and district public prosecutors, all with the 
intention of helping women to protect themselves against violence. In addition to these 
official institutions, grassroots feminist organizations and various sectors of civil society 
are active in the struggle to bring awareness and an end to gender violence. Despite the 
public outcry against gender violence, despite the laws, and despite the institutions, 
gender violence remains a grave issue in the Dominican Republic. According to the 
General Attorney’s office, 1383 women were killed between the years of 2005 and 2011, 
over fifty percent of them by their intimate partners (Amnesty International 2012).  
The case of Ms. Martinez is not unusual. Women are turned away from local 
police stations. Local prosecutors and judges, who operate on the basis of gender norms 
and gender hierarchies rooted in the underlying cultural tropes of machismos and 
marianismo, dismiss domestic violence cases.23 Moreover many officials privately fail to 
recognize the severity of gender violence in the Dominican Republic.24 According to 
Roxanna Reyes, the Prosecutor for Women’s Affairs and Deputy Attorney General in the 
Dominican Republic, because of this underlying gender bias among judges, although 
62,000 women reported experiencing some sort of sexual or physical violence in 2011, 
only four percent of these cases went to trial.25 
                                                 
23
 See chapter 2 of this dissertation for a discussion of machismo and marianismo 
24
 http://womennewsnetwork.net/2012/07/19/dominican-republic-domestic-
violence/2/ accessed Mar 28, 2013  
25
 http://womennewsnetwork.net/2012/07/19/dominican-republic-domestic-
violence/ accessed Mar 28, 2013 
 82
 Studies (Rani et al. 2004, Uthman et al. 2009, Nayak et al. 2003) situated in 
developing countries find that there is a positive relationship between the incidence of 
gender violence and the phenomena of placing the blame for gender violence on women, 
not the perpetrators. In the DR, the high rate of reported feminicide, the inability of laws 
and institutions to help women protect themselves against gender violence, and the 
prevailing gender norms that promote the myth of male superiority and normalized 
violence as a way to control and discipline women all raise the question, what are the 
gendered beliefs and endogenous preferences that contribute to these conditions and may 
even cause both men and women alike to blame the victim?  
The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) administers a standard set of 
questions to both male and female respondents regarding the status of women. In this 
chapter, I assess views on gender violence in the household, by analyzing respondents’ 
answers to the questions of whether intimate partner violence is “justified” in any of 
following situations:26 
 1. if she goes out without telling him 
 2. if she argues with him 
 3. if she burns the food  
4. if she neglects the children 
 5. if she refuses to have sex with him 
Questions 1, 2, and 5 specifically address respondents views on the control 
husband’s may exercise over his partner, and questions 3 and 4 refer to a women’s 
                                                 
26
 “Justification for wife beating ” is the exact term used by the DHS administered 
in developing countries. In this study, I use the phrase justification for intimate partner 
violence in place of “justification for wife beating.” 
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fulfillment of her gender-ascribed domestic responsibilities of cooking and taking care of 
children (Yount and Li 2009).  
 For the 3,200 women who participated in the gender violence module of the DR 
DHS 2007, I find discrepancies between women’s and men’s views on whether gender 
violence can be justified in the household and the actual incidence of reported intimate 
partner violence among married and cohabitating couples. As can be seen in TABLE 3.2 
(and using TABLE 3.1 as a key), over 90 % of women who reported experiencing 
emotional, physical, and sexual violence had husbands who did not agree with any of the 
fives motives for gender violence that featured in the survey. Similarly among the women 
themselves (over 90%) did not agree with any of the motives for gender violence.  
Table 3.1: Key for Dependent Variables and Tables 3.2 and 3.3 
Variable Definition 
 
WGV = 0 
Female respondent does not agree with any of the five 
justifications intimate partner violence 
 
WGV = 1 
Female respondent agrees with at least one of the five 
justifications intimate partner violence 
 
MGV = 0  
Male respondent does not agree with any of the five 
justifications intimate partner violence 
 
MGV = 1 
Male respondent agrees with at least one of the five 
justifications intimate partner violence 
 
Table 3.2: The Incidence of Gender Violence and Individual Responses to 
Justifications for Intimate Partner Violence 
 
 (MGV=0) (MGV=1)  (WGV=0) (WGV=1) 
Women 
experiencing the 
following forms of 
gender violence  
    
 
 
Emotional Violence 
(N=810) 
92.5 
(749) 
7.5 
(61) 
 92.6 
(750) 
7.4 
(60) 
      
Less Severe  
Physical Violence 
(N=478) 
 
90.6 
(433) 
 
9.4 
(45) 
  
90.4 
(432) 
 
9.6 
(46) 
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More Severe 
Physical Violence 
(N=160) 
 
91.3 
(146) 
 
8.8 
(14) 
  
91.9 
(147) 
 
8.1 
(13) 
      
Sexual Violence 
(N=143) 
92.3 
(132) 
7.7 
(11) 
 92.3 
(132) 
7.7 
(11) 
 
Table 3.3: The Incidence of Gender Violence and Responses to Justifications of 
Intimate Partner Violence at the Household Level  
 
 
 
Emotional 
Violence 
 
Less Severe 
Physical Violence 
 
More Severe 
Physical Violence 
 
Sexual 
Violence 
 N=810 N=478 N=160 N=143 
     
WGV=0 
MGV=0 
86.2 
(698) 
82.0 
(392) 
84.4 
(135) 
85.3 
(122) 
     
WGV=0 
MGV=1 
6.4 
(52) 
8.4 
(40) 
7.5 
(12) 
7.0 
(10) 
     
WGV=1 
MGV=0 
6.3 
(51) 
8.6 
(41) 
6.9 
(11) 
7.0 
(10) 
     
WGV=1 
MGV=1 
1.1 
(9) 
1.1 
(11) 
1.3 
(2) 
0.7 
(1) 
 
 These responses suggest that men and women both understand that gender 
violence is not acceptable but men still use gender violence against women in the 
household. In more than 80% of the households experiencing gender violence both 
partners indicate that they found gender violence unacceptable (see TABLE 3.3). These 
data seem to suggest that women’s rights, human rights, religious and political campaigns 
in the Dominican Republic have convinced most people that gender violence is not 
justifiable in principle, but that in practice male partners still commit acts of gender 
violence in the household based on the gender norms including the myth of the male 
breadwinner, gender hierarchy, and hyper masculinity. It is also possible that other 
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factors may be motivating gender violence in the Dominican Republic, and hence that 
surveys may need to provide more context-specific questions to elicit better information.  
The principal aims of this chapter are to 1) assess the correlates among men and 
women’s justifications for gender violence and socio-demographic characteristics of the 
respondents, and 2) provide an analysis of partnered men’s and women’s underlying 
gendered attitudes, gendered beliefs, and behaviors that are associated with the 
justification of gender violence using the DHS 2007 Couples Recode survey. To my 
knowledge no prior work has explored men’s and women’s gendered beliefs and 
endogenous preferences regarding the justification of intimate partner violence in married 
couples in the DR. 
3.2 Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
Endogenous preferences, according to Bowles (1998, p. 78), “are reasons for 
behavior, that is, attributes of individuals that (along with their beliefs and capacities) 
account for the actions they take in a given situation.” Central to the concept of 
endogenous preferences is that laws, norms, and social/market institutions influence and 
shaped human behavior and beliefs. Of utmost importance to this study is the institution 
of marriage. Although marriage is a legal contractual agreement, sanctioned and 
governed by the church and state (and in some instances both), the noncontractual aspects 
(the day-to-day interactions of spouses) of marriage are governed by prevailing gender 
norms and power relations among men and women in society. Bowles defines norms as 
conventions that people adhere to, that are in their own interest as long as others are 
doing the same. Norms are influenced by institutional structure—the “population level 
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laws, informal rules, and conventions that give durable structure to social interaction” so 
men’s behavior, including gender violence, is context-dependent and reflects preferences 
(Bowles 1998).  
McCrate (1988) argues that both men and women invest heavily in their gender 
identities, because there are significant gains to behaving in the manner that is assigned to 
one’s biological sex, and losses are incurred when one deviates from ascribed gender 
roles. I argue here that men’s preference is to maintain a gender hierarchy that places men 
at the top and subordinates women, because this is the structure that benefits them and is 
seemingly in their best interest. Their actions and beliefs are geared toward maintaining 
and reproducing this hierarchy (Bowles 1998, McCrate 1988). Women, however, may 
also accept and reproduce gender norms because there are significant costs to challenging 
the norm of male superiority and transgressing gender identity lines. Indeed, some studies 
find that more women justify intimate partner violence than men (Rani et al. 2004, 
Uthman et al. 2009). The myriad actions and beliefs of men and women contribute to the 
glaring gender inequalities that constitute Dominican society.  
I use the following variables to assess men’s endogenous preferences: men’s 
household decision-making ability index, an index of men’s reactions to partner’s refusal 
of sex, men’s belief that married women should be allowed to work outside of the 
household, and attributes such as education, marital status, occupational status, and age. 
Similarly, I use the following variables to assess women’s endogenous preferences and 
justifications for intimate partner violence: women’s household decision-making ability 
index, women’s views on gender equality, women’s ability to refuse sex, women’s age, 
women’s educational attainment, and occupational status.  
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Gender norms in a society provide the social context for understanding the 
incidence of gender violence, power relations between men and woman, and the 
underlying beliefs that govern these relationships (Krug et al. 2002). Women’s and men’s 
responses to justifications for intimate partner violence may highlight the myriad ways 
that both men and women internalize gender bias, and the normalization of gender 
violence against women placing some women in a precarious situation in her home, in 
the community, and in the workplace.27  
For example, Heise et al. (1999) find that in Latin America, anywhere from 8% to 
32% of women and men report that intimate partner violence is justified if the husband 
thinks his wife is being unfaithful. In Sub-Saharan Africa, a study of attitudes towards 
intimate partner violence among male and female nurses found that most respondents 
believed the incidence gender violence was a normal occurrence among married couples 
(Kim and Motsei 2002). Data thus suggest that in developing countries there is a 
normalization of intimate partner violence. Studies that aim to provide an analysis of 
women’s and men’s attitudes towards gender violence do so with the intent of finding the 
salient variables associated with the justifications for intimate partner violence (Hindin 
2003, Lawoko 2006, Lawoko 2008, Yount 2005, Yount and Li 2009, Yount and Carrera 
2006, Uthman et al. 2009, Fawole et al. 2005, Khawaja et al. 2008, Rani et al. 2004, 
Oyediran and Isugo-Abanihe 2005). Structural factors, such as place of residence, wealth, 
                                                 
27As stated in the introduction the DHS administers a standard set of questions to 
both male and female respondents regarding the status of women. To assess the 
“justifications for wife beating”, interviewers asked respondents if wife beating is 
justified in any of following situations: 1) if she goes out without telling him 2) if she 
argues with him 3) if she burns the food 4) if she neglects the children 5) if she refuses to 
have sex with him.  
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GDP per capita and gender equality have been found to affect women’s and men’s 
attitudes towards intimate partner violence. Several studies (Hindin 2003, Oyediran and 
Isugo-Abanihe 2005, García-Moreno et al. 2005, Yount 2005, Yount and Li 2009) find 
that poor, rural women are more likely to agree with justifications for intimate partner 
violence than richer women living in urban areas. In her study of women’s attitudes 
towards intimate partner violence in Zimbabwe, Hindin (2003) finds that women living in 
rural areas have a higher odds ratio of agreeing with any five justifications for intimate 
partner violence than women living in urban areas, and that there is a negative 
relationship (an odds ratio less than 1) between household wealth and women agreeing 
with any of the justifications for intimate partner violence. In their study of 17 Sub-
Saharan countries, Uthman et al. (2009) also find that increased wealth and urbanization 
are associated with lower odds ratios for justifying gender violence among both men and 
women.  
These empirical findings lend support to Kabeer’s (1999, p.149) argument that 
poor women, because of their socioeconomic context, tend to be more exposed to 
violence, as well as less likely to escape from a potentially violent partner because of lack 
of sufficient resources (see also chapter 2). Uthman et. al (2010) find that higher levels of 
GDP per capita and greater equality among men and women (measured by the Gender 
Development Index) are associated with smaller gender gaps in finding gender violence 
against wives acceptable.  
Studies have also found that demographic variables—age, education, occupational 
status, and media exposure—are also salient to understanding women’s and men’s 
attitudes towards justifying intimate partner violence (Rani et al. 2004, Fawole et al. 
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2005, Khawaja et al. 2008). For example in a study of pooled DHS data from seven 
African countries—Benin, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe—
older women and men are less likely to think that intimate partner violence is acceptable 
(Rani et al. 2004). In this same study, authors found that having secondary or higher 
education and higher levels of wealth for women were the most significant and consistent 
predictors of non-acceptance of intimate partner violence among the seven African 
countries (Rani et al. 2004). Among women and men in a Palestinian refugee camp, 
younger unemployed men were more likely to agree with justifications for intimate 
partner violence, whereas among women only a previous experience with gender 
violence is positively associated with agreeing to justifications for intimate partner 
violence (Khawaja et al. 2008).  
In Zimbabwe, women who worked in professional, clerical, or sales capacity had 
lower odds ratios of justifying intimate partner violence than women in manual, 
domestic, or agriculture employment. In a study of attitudes towards intimate partner 
violence among civil servants in Ibadan, Nigeria, younger people tended to accept more 
justifications for intimate partner violence than older respondents: 71.4 % of respondents 
under the age of 36 agreed that a husband was justified in beating his wife if she “does 
not do what she is told”, while only 28.6 % of respondents older than 36 responded the 
same way; in addition, both female and male respondents with more education among 
civil servants in Nigeria had a lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence 
(Fawole et al. 2005). In a study of domestic violence in Eygpt, Yount and Li (2009) find 
that women who marry at older ages have a lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner 
 90
violence than women who marry young, possibly because women who get married at 
older ages tend to have more education and choose their spouse.  
In addition to the role of structural and demographic factors women’s and men’s 
justifications for intimate partner violence, gendered norms, gendered beliefs, and 
gendered practices impact people’s views on domestic violence (García-Moreno 2002). 
For example, Pallito and O’Campo (2004) find that living in municipalities with high 
rates of patriarchal control increased women’s odds on an unintended pregnancy by over 
three times, compared to women who lived in places with low rates of patriarchal control; 
similarly, they found that in municipalities with high rates of intimate partner violence 
women had a higher odds ratio of unintended pregnancy.  
In the Dominican Republic, as is documented in chapter 2, women who earn more 
money than their spouses have a higher odds ratio of experiencing sexual violence than 
women who earn the same amount or less than their husbands. Studies elsewhere have 
found that women are at an increase risk of violence when husbands are unemployed and 
wives are employed (Roldan 1988, Hindin and Adair 2002). These findings provide 
empirical support for Jewkes’s (2002) argument that women are at increased risk of 
gender violence if they are relatively empowered vis-à-vis men in a society that places 
men at the top of gender hierarchy and/or if men have conservative beliefs about women 
and women’s role in society. In addition to income and employment status, relative 
decision-making ability in the household also impacts people’s views on gender violence. 
In the Philippines, for example, in households that reported joint decision making 
between partners, women reported lower levels of gender violence, whereas in 
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households where either spouse (female or male) reported making more decisions, 
women were at an increased risk of gender violence (Hindin and Adair 2002).  
In Zimbabwe, women were more likely to justify intimate partner violence if male 
partners made more decisions in the household than did the female respondent (Hindin 
2003). However, the same study also finds that women who report more decision-making 
power in the household believed intimate partner violence to be justified if the wife 
argues with the husband, refuses to have sex, and/or neglects the children. In addition to 
relative power in the household, studies show find that women who report low levels of 
individual autonomy are more likely to agree with justifications for intimate partner 
violence (Lawoko 2006, González-Brenes 2004). In a study of men’s attitudes towards 
intimate partner violence in Zambia and Kenya, Lawoko (2008) finds that men who 
believed that decisions in the household should be made equally by women and men also 
have a lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence than men who believed 
husbands alone should have the final say in household decision making. In addition to 
gendered beliefs and practices, it is important to look at both women’s and men’s support 
for gender equality to understand the incidence and acceptance of gender violence in the 
household. In a study of currently partnered Palestinian couples living in refugee camps, 
male partners who were unsupportive of women’s autonomy had 3.54 higher odds ratio 
of justifying intimate partner violence than male partners who reported being supportive 
of women’s rights (Khawaja et al. 2008).  
Understanding the relationship between intimate partner violence and structural 
factors, demographic variables, and gender values, beliefs, and practices may provide 
insight to social context that produces and reproduces violence against women. It is 
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especially important to understand these complex relationships, as findings show that in 
many developing countries women tended to agree with justifications for intimate partner 
violence in higher percentages than men (Rani et al. 2004, Uthman et al. 2009).28 In a 
cross-national study of the United States, India, Japan and Kuwait, Nayak et al. (2003) 
found that participants in the non-US sample were more likely to blame the female 
partner for incidences of gender violence, although in all samples male partners were 
likely to blame the female partner for gender violence. Studies find that women who are 
more accepting of gender violence are at a higher risk of being abused by their partners 
(Lawoko 2006, Lawoko 2008, Faramarzi et al. 2005).  
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Description of the Data Set 
This study seeks to understand the determinants of women’s and men’s 
acceptance of gender violence against women in the Dominican Republic, to provide 
policy prescriptions that will promote women’s wellbeing, and challenge the gender bias 
and discrimination that reinforce violence against women. The data used in this study 
come from the Demographic and Health Survey administered in the Dominican Republic 
in 2007 (DR DHS 2007). The DHS—funded by USAID, Macro International, and host 
country governments—is administered in countries in the developing world and focuses 
                                                 
28
 Studies (Smith 1980, Bryant and Spencer 2003, Locke and Richman 1999, 
Saunders et al. 1987) find that men tend to blame the female victim more often than 
women. Perez et al. (2006) find the same result—men blaming the abused women more 
than women—in Spain.  
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on collecting qualitative and quantitative data in the areas of population, health, fertility, 
nutrition, and AIDS/HIV. In addition to standard social and demographic data, the DHS 
has begun in recent years to collect data on the incidence of gender violence and on 
women’s and men’s attitudes towards gender violence and gender equity. The DHS 
collects data primarily from women respondents, but it also includes interviews of a 
subsample of women respondents’ male partners. Data from the subsample of women 
respondents and their partners—the Couple’s Recode—provides information on the 
couple’s asset wealth status, occupations, education, household characteristics, as well as 
both the husbands’ and wives’ views on gender violence, gender equity, and gender 
hierarchy.  
Table 3.4: Women’s and Men’s Characteristics from the 2007 DR DHS 
Percentages provided (with frequency in parenthesis).  
 
 Women 
(N=7780 ) 
Men 
(N=7780) 
Characteristics   
Age   
Mean Age in years 33.2 
(std. dev. 8.5) 
38.6 
(std. dev. 9.5) 
 
Age Group 1: 15-24 
18.4 
(1,432) 
6.6 
(511) 
 
Age Group 2: 25-34 
37.1 
(2,878) 
29.6 
(2,298) 
 
Age Group 3: 35-44 
33.2 
(2577) 
34.8 
(2,699) 
 
Age Group 4: 45-59 
11.3 
(879) 
24.5 
(1,904) 
Age Group 5: 55-59 
(men only) 
 4.6 
(354) 
Education   
 
Mean years of Education 
7.8 
(std dev. 4.60) 
7.2 
(std. dev. 4.57) 
 
No Education 
6.1 
(474) 
6.4 
(500) 
 
Primary Education 
49.5 
(3,841) 
54.7 
(4,295) 
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Secondary Education 
29.7 
(2,309) 
27.5 
(2,136) 
 
Higher Education 
14.7 
(1,142) 
11.4 
(882) 
Labor Market Sector   
 
Not working 
51.6 
(4003) 
0.4 
(27) 
 
Professional 
10.2 
(788) 
12.9 
(1008) 
 
Self-employed Agricultural 
2.0 
(156) 
26.0 
(2,015) 
Manual Labor 
(skilled & unskilled) 
10.0 
(788) 
44.2 
(3,436) 
 
Clerical 
4.8 
(374) 
2.6 
(198) 
 
Sales & Services  
14.0 
(1088) 
13.8 
(1,074) 
 
Domestic  
7.4 
(573) 
.1 
(8) 
 
Table 3.5: Married or Cohabiting Couple’s Characteristics from the 2007 DR DHS  
Percentages provided (with frequency in parenthesis) 
 Couples 
(N=7870) 
Wealth Class  
 
Poor 
53.5 
(4,154) 
 
Middle 
19.9 
(1,542) 
 
Rich 
26.7 
(2,070) 
Residence Type  
 
Rural 
46.1 
(3,584) 
 
Urban 
53.9 
(4,196) 
Head of Household  
 
Women 
14.5 
(1,127) 
 
Men 
85.5 
(6,639) 
Percentage of Couples with 
Children Living at Home 
 
 
Daughters at home 
66.2 
(5,141) 
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Sons at home 
70.8 
(5,500) 
Marital Status Women Men 
 
Consensual union 
76.5 
(5,938) 
76.7 
(5960) 
 
Married 
23.5 
(1,828) 
23.3 
(1,806) 
Marital Duration Women Men 
 
9 years or less 
29.9 
(2,325) 
32.9 
(2,557) 
 
10 – 19 years 
39.4 
(3,063) 
36.0 
(2,796) 
 
20 – 29 years 
25.6 
(1,990) 
24.1 
(1,872) 
 
30 years or more 
5.0 
(388) 
7.0 
(541) 
Percentage of Those 
Accessing Media Once a 
Week or More 
 
Women 
 
Men 
 
Newspaper 
39.3 
(3,054) 
41.6 
(3,232) 
 
Radio 
75.3 
(5,846) 
85.2 
(6,616) 
 
TV 
85.4 
(6,630) 
87.5 
(6,796) 
 
The sample used in this study comprises 7,766 couples (that is to say 7,766 
women and 7,766 men). On average, the men tend to be older than their wives; the mean 
age for women is 33.2 and for men it’s 38.7. Representative of trends in educational 
attainment in the Dominican Republic, where women are surpassing men in years of 
education, we see that the mean years of education for women is 7.8 for women and 7.2 
for men. In this sample, almost 52 percent of Dominican women reported that they were 
currently unemployed, whereas only 0.2 percent of men were reported as unemployed (as 
reported by their female partners). The largest sector of employment for women in this 
subsample is service & sales, followed by manual labor and the 
professional/management/technical sector (both a little over ten percent). Roughly seven 
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percent of women are in the domestic service category. Women in clerical positions are 
4.8 percent of the sample, and self-employed agricultural workers are a little over two 
percent of the sample. Over 44 percent of men in this sample are employed as manual 
laborers; followed by 26 percent of men who are self-employed agricultural workers. 
Over thirteen percent of men in the sample work in the sales and services sector and 
another thirteen percent are in the professional sector.  
Almost 54 percent of the couples live in urban areas; while a little over 46 percent 
live in rural areas. In this survey 85.5 percent of men are reported as heads of households, 
whereas 14.5 percent of women are reported as heads of households. The DHS does not 
collect data on income or expenditures, but it does collect data on assets, appliances, and 
housing material/quality, and these are used to create a wealth index using principal 
components analysis, on the basis of which it classifies households into wealth quintiles: 
poorest, poorer, middle, richer, and richest. For the purposes of this study, poorest and 
poor are combined to create the asset-poor category; richer and richest are combined to 
create the asset-rich category. The middle asset category, remains the same, and is 20.0 
percent of the sample. Sixty-six percent of households have daughters living at home, and 
just over 70 percent have sons in the household. In terms of marital duration, between 29 
percent of women and 32 percent of men have been married nine years or less, 35 percent 
of the couples have been married between ten and nineteen years, and roughly 27 percent 
have been married 20 to 29 years. Both male and female respondents in this subsample 
are exposed to media news and coverage, with the vast majority of women and men 
watching television once or more times a week.  
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The descriptive data on household-decision making, gender equity, gender 
hierarchy, and justifications for intimate partner violence provide insights into Dominican 
gender norms. The DHS collects data on household-decision making ability and behavior 
among both men and women, by asking who (husband, wife, or the couple jointly) has 
the “final say” in certain household decisions. In some cases, the answers given by a 
couple are different. For instance, on deciding how many children to have, nineteen 
percent of women responded that they decide alone, but only ten percent of husbands 
responded that their wives decide alone. In three of the “final say” questions—large 
household purchases, deciding what to do with partner’s earnings, and number of 
children to have—women tended to respond that decisions were made as joint decisions 
in more egalitarian fashion, whereas husbands tended to respond themselves making 
more decisions than women reported.  
Table 3.6: Summary of Women’s and Men’s Responses to Justifications for Intimate 
Partner Violence 
Percentage of respondents that agree with the statement (with frequency in percentages). 
 All Women 
(N=7766) 
All Men 
(N=7766) 
Wife beating is justified if:   
 
Wife goes out without telling him 
1.6 
(126) 
2.9 
(224) 
 
Wife neglects the children 
4.2 
(328) 
3.4 
(266) 
 
Wife argues with husband 
0.9 
(67) 
1.4 
(108) 
 
Wife refuses to have sex with husband 
0.7 
(52) 
.9 
(68) 
 
Wife burns the food 
1.3 
(101) 
1.2 
(93) 
Women agreeing to at least one justification for intimate 
partner violence 
5.4 
(422) 
 
n/a 
Men agreeing to at least one justification for intimate 
partner violence 
 
n/a 
5.3 
(412) 
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Table 3.7: Summary of Women’s Justification of Intimate Partner Violence by 
Wealth-Asset Class 
Percentage of respondents that agree with the statement (with frequency in percentages) 
 
Table 3.8: Summary of Men’s Justification of Intimate Partner Violence by Wealth-
Asset Class 
Percentage of respondents that agree with the statement (with frequency in percentages) 
 Asset Poor 
(N=4154) 
Middle 
(N=1542) 
Asset Rich 
N=2070 
Wife beating is justified if:    
 
Wife goes out without telling him 
3.9 
(160) 
2.4 
(37) 
1.3 
(27) 
 
Wife neglects the children 
4.7 
(195) 
2.9 
(45) 
1.3 
(26) 
 
Wife argues with husband 
2.1 
(85) 
0.8 
(13) 
0.5 
(10) 
 
Wife refuses to have sex with husband 
1.3 
(52) 
0.6 
(9) 
0.3 
(6) 
 
Wife burns the food 
1.7 
(71) 
0.7 
(11) 
0.5 
(11) 
 
Men agreeing with at least one justification 
7.2 
(301) 
4.2 
(65) 
2.2 
(46) 
 
The survey presents the five quotidian scenarios cited above to both the husband 
and wife and asks them to agree or disagree that intimate partner violence is justified. The 
 Asset Poor 
(N=4154) 
Middle 
(N=1542) 
Asset Rich 
(N=2070) 
Wife beating is justified if:    
 
Wife goes out without telling him 
2.6 
(106) 
0.8 
(12) 
0.4 
( 8) 
 
Wife neglects the children 
5.5 
(230) 
3.6 
(56) 
2.0 
(42) 
 
Wife argues with husband 
1.4 
(58) 
0.3 
(5) 
0.2 
(4) 
 
Wife refuses to have sex with 
husband 
 
1.0 
(42) 
 
0.4 
(6) 
 
0.2 
(4) 
 
Wife burns the food 
1.8 
(75) 
1.0 
(15) 
0.5 
(11) 
 
WGV 
7.2 
(301) 
4.5 
(70) 
2.5 
(51) 
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justification for intimate partner violence to which the most women (4.2 percent) and 
men (3.4 percent) agreed is that intimate partner violence is justified if the wife neglects 
the children. It is interesting to note that a somewhat larger percentage of women agreed 
with the statement than men, which speaks to the ways that women internalize 
responsibility for child care. Similarly, 1.3 percent of women and 1.2 percent of men 
agreed to the justification for gender violence when the wife burns the food. Overall, 5.4 
percent of women agreed with at least one of the five scenarios presented for intimate 
partner violence, whereas 5.3 percent of men agreed with at least one statement. In 
addition we see from TABLES 3.7 and 3.8 that those in the asset-poor category agreed 
with all five statements in larger percentages than those in the middle and rich-asset 
categories. 
Table 3.9: Summary of Men’s Attitudes towards Violent Reactions to Partner’s 
refusal of Sex 
Percentage of respondents that agree with the statement (with frequency in percentages) 
 
 
Asset 
Poor 
Asset 
Middle 
Asset 
Rich 
All 
Men 
 (N=4154) (N=1542) (N=2070) (N=7766) 
A husband has the right to do the 
following if his wife refuses to have 
sex with him: 
    
Get angry 
(percentage answering yes) 
22.7 
(941) 
22.1 
(340) 
18.6 
(384) 
21.4 
(1,665) 
Refuse financial support 
(percentage answering yes) 
4.7 
(194) 
2.7 
(42) 
1.9 
(39) 
3.5 
(275) 
Use Force 
(percentage answering yes) 
.9 
(38) 
0.3 
(5) 
0.5 
(11) 
0.7 
(54) 
 
Table 3.9 provides men’s responses to three different potential reactions to wives’ 
refusal of sex: get angry, refuse financial support, or use force to obtain sex. Over 21 
percent of men answer that husbands have a right to get angry when their wives refuse 
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sex; 3.5 percent say husbands have a right to withhold financial support when a wife 
refuses sex, and less than one percent agreed that husbands have a right to use force.  
Table 3.10: Summary of Women’s Responses to Gendered Statements  
Percentage of respondents that agree with the statement (with frequency in percentages) 
 
  
Asset 
Poor 
 
Asset 
Middle 
 
Asset 
Rich 
Aggregate 
Women’s 
Reponses 
 (N=4154) (N=1542) (N=2070) (N=7766) 
Family decisions 
 should be made by men 
39.7 
(1,651) 
29.2 
(450) 
19.2 
(398) 
32.2 
(2,499) 
     
Husband should not help with 
chores 
4.0 
(164) 
2.9 
(44) 
1.8 
(37) 
3.2 
(245) 
     
Married women should not be 
allowed to work 
25.2 
(1,048) 
23.2 
(357) 
22.9 
(473) 
24.2 
(1,878) 
     
The wife does not have the 
right to express her opinion 
7.8 
(324) 
4.0 
(61) 
2.8 
(58) 
5.7 
(443) 
     
A wife should tolerate 
beatings to keep the family 
together 
2.8 
(116) 
0.9 
(14) 
1.4 
(29) 
2.1 
(159) 
     
It is better to educate a son 
than a daughter 
12.9 
(534) 
11.7 
(181) 
8.2 
(170) 
11.4 
(885) 
 
 Women in the survey are presented with five statements that support gender 
inequality and asked to agree or disagree. Over 32 percent of women agree that men 
should make family decisions. Close to four percent agree that husbands should not help 
with chores. Twenty-four percent agree that married women should not work. Close to 
six percent agree that the wife does not have the right to express her opinion. Roughly 
eleven percent agree that it is better to educate a son than a daughter. However, only two 
percent agreed that a wife should tolerate beatings to keep the family together; this is the 
statement that had the least approval by women. As is visible in the data, class 
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differences exist, with women in the asset-poor category agreeing in larger percentages 
than those in both middle and asset-rich categories, and the women in the rich-asset 
category agreeing the least with these statements.  
Table 3.11: Women’s and Men’s Responses to Household Decision Making 
Percentages provided (with frequency in parenthesis) 
 
 
 
Women 
(N=7766) 
Men 
(N=7766) 
Final say on the following situations:   
Large household purchases   
 
woman 
11.4 
(886) 
8.5 
(657) 
 
man 
24.9 
(1,908) 
30.8 
(2,395) 
 
joint decision 
63.7 
(4,945) 
60.7 
(4,714) 
Visits to family & friends   
 
woman 
28.4 
(2,203) 
7.2 
(558) 
 
man 
12.6 
(978) 
30.9 
(2,397) 
 
joint decision 
59.0 
(4,585) 
62.0 
(4,811) 
Deciding what to do with partner’s earnings   
 
woman 
8.8 
(685) 
44.1 
(3,425) 
 
man 
22.1 
(1,716) 
12.7 
(987) 
 
joint 
67.9 
(5,273) 
43.2 
(3,425) 
Number of children   
 
woman 
19.2 
(1,497) 
10.3 
(797) 
 
man 
6.8 
(528) 
19.0 
(1,477) 
 
joint 
74.0 
(5,755) 
70.7 
(5,492) 
 
Lastly, I turn to women’s and men’s responses on house decision-making ability. 
The majority of couples report joint decision making for large household purchases, visits 
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to family and friends, how partner’s earning is spent, and number of children to have. In 
the case of large household purchases, 24.9 percent women and 30.8 percent men report 
that the male partner has the final say. Twenty-two percent of women report their 
partners have the final say over their earnings, and 30.9 percent of men say that they 
alone decide visits to family and friends.  
3.3.2 Description of the Variables 
Table 3.12: Variables Dictionary 
WOMEN’S  
VARIABLES 
 
TYPE 
 
DEFINITION  
   
DEPENDENT   
 
WGV 
 
Binary 
Equals 1 if women answer yes to at least one 
motive intimate partner violence; 0 otherwise 
   
INDEPENDENT    
EDUCATION   
WNOEDUC Binary 1 if a woman has no formal education; 0 
otherwise 
WPRIM Binary 1 if the woman attended primary school; 0 
otherwise 
WSEC Binary 1 if the woman attended high school; 0 
otherwise 
WHIGHER Binary 1 if the woman attended college; 0 otherwise 
WEDUYRS Continuous Years of education 
   
AGE   
AGEW1 Binary 1 if woman is 15 to 24; 0 otherwise 
AGEW2 Binary 1 if woman is 25-34; 0 otherwise 
AGEW3 Binary 1 if woman is 35-44; 0 otherwise 
AGEW4 Binary 1 if woman is 45-54; 0 otherwise 
AGEW5 Binary 1 if woman is55-59; 0 otherwise 
AGEYRSW Continuous Age in years 
   
OCCUPATION   
 
MPROF 
 
Binary 
1 if woman is in a professional, technical, or 
management position; 0 otherwise 
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WMANUAL Binary 1 if woman is a manual worker; 0 otherwise 
WAGRICUL Binary 1 if woman is in agricultural; 0 otherwise 
WSERVICES Binary 1 if woman is in sales or services; 0 otherwise 
WCLERICAL Binary 1 if woman is in clerical position; 0 otherwise 
WDOM Binary 1 if woman is a domestic worker; 0 otherwise 
WNOWORK Binary 1 if woman is unemployed; 0 otherwise 
   
MARITAL  
as reported by women 
  
 
WMARITALSTAT 
 
Binary 
1 if couple is legally married;  
0 if it’s a consensual union  
WMARITAL1 Binary 1 if couple is married 9 yrs or less; 0 
otherwise 
WMARITAL2 Binary 1 if couple married 10-19 yrs; 0 otherwise 
WMARITAL3 Binary 1 if couple married 20-29 yrs; 0 otherwise 
WMARITAL4 Binary 1 if couple married 30 yrs or more; 0 
otherwise 
   
MEDIA USAGE   
WTV Binary 1 if woman watches TV 1 or more times a 
week; 0 otherwise 
WRADIO Binary 1 if woman listens to the radio 1 or more 
times a week; 0 otherwise 
WNEWS Binary 1 if woman reads a newspaper 1 or more 
times a week; 0 otherwise 
   
INDICES   
WHHDM Continuous  Index measuring woman’s household decision 
making ability 
GENDEREQ Continuous Index measuring woman’s views on gender 
equity 
MEN’S  
VARIABLES 
 
TYPE 
 
DEFINITION  
   
DEPENDENT   
 
MGV 
 
Binary 
Equals 1 if men answer yes to at least one 
motive intimate partner violence; 0 otherwise 
   
INDEPENDENT    
EDUCATION   
MNOEDUC Binary 1 if a man has no formal education; 0 
otherwise 
MPRIM Binary 1 if the man attended primary school; 0 
otherwise 
MSEC Binary 1 if the man attended high school; 0 otherwise 
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MHIGHER Binary 1 if the man attended college; 0 otherwise 
MEDUYRS Continuous Years of education 
   
AGE   
AGEM1 Binary 1 if man is 15 to 24; 0 otherwise 
AGEM2 Binary 1 if man is 25-34; 0 otherwise 
AGEM3 Binary 1 if man is 35-44; 0 otherwise 
AGEM4 Binary 1 if man is 45-54; 0 otherwise 
AGEM5 Binary 1 if man is 55-59; 0 otherwise 
AGEYRSMEN Continuous Age in years 
   
OCCUPATION   
 
MPROF 
 
Binary 
1 if man is in a professional, technical, or 
management position;  
0 otherwise 
MMANUAL Binary 1 if man is a manual worker; 0 otherwise 
MAGRICUL Binary 1 if man is in agricultural; 0 otherwise 
MSERVICES Binary 1 if man is in sales or services; 0 otherwise 
MCLERICAL Binary 1 if man is in clerical position; 0 otherwise 
MDOM Binary 1 if man is a domestic worker; 0 otherwise 
MNOWORK Binary 1 if man is unemployed; 0 otherwise 
   
MARITAL  
as reported by men 
  
MMARITALSTAT Binary 1 if couple is legally married; 0 if it’s a 
consensual union 
MMARITAL1 Binary 1 if couple is married 9 yrs or less; 0 
otherwise 
MMARITAL2 Binary 1 if couple married 10-19 yrs; 0 otherwise 
MMARITAL3 Binary 1 if couple married 20-29 yrs; 0 otherwise 
MMARITAL4 Binary 1 if couple married 30 yrs or more; 0 
otherwise 
   
MEDIA USAGE   
MTV Binary 1 if man watches TV 1 or more times a week; 
0 otherwise 
MRADIO Binary 1 if man listens to the radio 1 or more times a 
week; 0 otherwise 
MNEWS Binary 1 if man reads a newspaper 1 or more times a 
week; 0 otherwise 
   
INDICES   
MHHDM Continuous  Index measuring man’s household decision 
making ability 
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MREFSEX Continuous Index measuring man’s violent responses to 
partners refusal of sex 
HOUSEHOLD 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 
TYPE 
 
DEFINITION 
 
SOCIAL/DEMOGRAPHIC 
 
 
 
 
URBAN Binary 1 if household in an urban area;0 otherwise  
HEAD Binary 1if the head of household is the male partner; 
0 otherwise 
SONS Binary 1 if there is at least one son in the home; 0 
otherwise 
DAUGHTERS Binary 1 if there is at least one daughter in the home; 
0 otherwise 
   
WEALTH CATERGORIES   
 
POOR 
 
Binary 
1 if the household is in the poor or poorest 
wealth asset category; 0 otherwise  
 
MIDDLE 
 
Binary 
1 if the household is in the middle asset 
category; 
 0 otherwise 
 
RICH 
 
Binary 
1 if the household is in the rich or richest asset 
category; 
 0 otherwise 
WEALTH  Continuous   Asset wealth index  
3.3.2.1 Men’s variables 
 The dependent variable in men’s specification, MGV, is binary variable that takes 
the value one if men answer yes to at least one motive for intimate partner violence; zero 
otherwise. The independent variables measure the characteristics, attitudes, and behavior 
of men. The education variables in the male specification are a series of dummies that 
measure the highest level of educational attainment: MNOEDU takes the value one if a 
man has no formal education; zero otherwise. MPRIM takes the value one if the man 
attended primary school, zero otherwise. The value of MSEC is one if the man attended 
high school, zero otherwise. Lastly, MHIGHER takes the value one if the man attended 
an institution of higher learning; zero otherwise. Similarly, the age variables are also a 
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series of dummies: AGEM1 takes the value 1 if men are between the ages of fifteen to 
twenty-four; zero otherwise. AGEM2, consists of men 25 to 34 and takes a value of 1 for 
this age group; zero otherwise. AGEM3 takes the value one if men are between the ages 
of 35 to 44; zero otherwise. AGEM4 takes the value one for men between the ages of 45 
and 54; zero otherwise. The final age dummy is AGEM5, which takes the value of 1 for 
men 55 to 59 years old. 
To control for occupational level (which is reported by the husband’s partners in 
this survey) there are seven occupation dummies: MPROF takes the value one if the man 
in the professional, technical, or management position (zero otherwise); MMANUAL 
takes the value one if a man is employed as a skilled or unskilled manual worker (zero 
otherwise); MAGRICUL is coded as one if the man is a self-employed agricultural worker 
(zero otherwise); MSERVICES takes the value one if men work in the sales or service 
sector (zero otherwise); MCLERICAL is coded as one if the man works in a clerical 
position (zero otherwise). MDOM takes the value one if men work in a domestic capacity 
(zero otherwise). Finally MNOWORK is coded 1 for men who are not employed; zero 
otherwise. 
MMARITALSTAT is coded as one if the couple is married and zero if they are in a 
consensual union. To control for marital duration there are four dummies: MMARITAL1 
is coded as 1 when husbands reported being married for nine years or less (zero 
otherwise); MMARITAL2 takes the value one if the husband reports that he has been 
married for ten to nineteen years (zero otherwise); MMARITAL3 is coded as one if men 
reported being married 20 to 29 years (zero otherwise); MMARITAL4 takes the value one 
if husbands report that they have been married to their partner for 30 years or more.  
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Since the implementation of Law 24-97, which makes domestic violence illegal, 
the media has been widely used to bring awareness to domestic violence as a problem, in 
an effort to dissuade men from using gender violence against their partners. However, 
despite these campaigns, there is a considerable amount of media that promotes gender 
hierarchy and reinforces the idea that women are supplemental income earners. Hence, I 
control for the role of the media by the use of three dummies: MTV takes the value one if 
a man watches television once or more times a week on average, zero if he watches less 
than once or never at all; MRADIO is coded as 1 if he listens to the radio at least once or 
more times a week, zero if he listens less than once or never; MNEWS takes the value one 
if the man reads a newspaper or magazine once or more times in the week, zero if he 
reads less than once or never at all.  
 Two variables in the men’s specification were created using principal component 
analysis (PCA). The first index, MHHDM, is an index composed of responses to the 
following questions: (1) who has the final say on large household purchases? (2) who has 
the final say on visits to family members, friends, or relatives? (3) who has the final say 
on what to do with your wife’s earned income? (4) who has the final say on having 
another child? If the man responded that he had the final say the response was coded 3; if 
he responded him and his wife equally then the response was coded 2; if he responded the 
wife alone then the response was coded 1. So the higher the index, the more household 
decision-making ability the husband has, and the lower the index the more decision-
making ability the wife has. The second variable created using PCA is MREFSEX, based 
on the following questions: (1) if your wife refuses to have sex with you, you have the 
right to get angry? (2) if your wife refuses to have sex with you, you have the right to 
 108
refuse financial support? (3) if your wife refuses sex with you, you have the right to use 
force to have sex with her? Each male response yes was coded as a one, and no was 
coded as zero. Hence, the higher the index, the more likely a husband would react 
violently when his wife refused sex.  
3.3.2.2 Social/Demographic Variables 
The social/demographic variables are the same in both the men’s specification 
and the women’s specification, since these refer to the couples’ sharing a household. The 
URBAN variable controls for type of place of residence, and takes the value one if the 
couple lives in an urban area; zero otherwise. HEAD takes the value one if the husband is 
the head of household; zero otherwise. POOR—created by combining the bottom two 
wealth quintiles poorest and poorer—takes the value one if respondent is in the poorest or 
poorer quintiles. MIDDLE takes the value one is the respondents are in the middle wealth 
quintile; zero otherwise. RICH, takes the value one if the respondents are in the two top 
wealth quintiles—richer and richest—zero otherwise. In the disaggregated samples—
where I analyze asset-poor and asset-rich households separately—I include the wealth 
index, WEALTH, to examine the relationship between relative wealth and justifications 
for intimate partner violence. To account for the presence of children in the household 
there are two dummy variables: SONS, which takes the value 1 if there is at least one son 
in the house (zero otherwise), and DAUGHTERS, which is coded as one if there is at least 
one daughter in the household (zero otherwise).  
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3.3.2.3 Women’s variables 
WGV is the binary dependent variable in the women’s specification. It takes the 
value one if women respond yes to at least one motive for intimate partner violence, zero 
otherwise. Education again is measured using dummy variables: WNOEDU takes the 
value one if the women has no formal education (zero otherwise); WPRIM is coded as 
one if the woman attended primary school (zero otherwise); WSEC is one if woman 
attended high school (zero otherwise); WHIGHER takes the value one if the woman 
attended an institution of higher education (zero otherwise). Because the DHS only 
surveys women between the ages of 15-54, there are only four age groups for women. 
AGEW1 takes the value one if the woman is between the ages of fifteen to twenty-four 
(zero otherwise); AGEW2 is coded as one if a woman is between the ages of 25 to 34 
(zero otherwise); AGEW3 takes the value one if a woman is between the ages of 35 and 
44 (zero otherwise); lastly AGEW4 is coded one if a woman is between the ages of 45 
and 54 (zero otherwise). There are seven occupational dummies for women respondents: 
WNOWORK is one for women who reported currently not working (zero otherwise); 
WPROF is coded as one for women who are in professional, technical, or management 
positions, zero otherwise; women who are self-employed agricultural workers in the 
WAGRICUL category and coded one (zero otherwise); WDOM is coded one for women 
who are domestic workers, zero otherwise; WMANUAL is one for women who reported 
being unskilled or skilled manual workers, zero otherwise; lastly, WCLERICAL is one for 
women who are employed in the clerical field, zero otherwise. WSERVICES is coded 1 
for women in the service and sales sector, zero otherwise. 
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Couples in this survey frequently reported having different marital status and/or 
different years of marital duration. Hence, the same variables were created for marital 
status and marital duration, but in this case based on the female respondent’s answers: 
hence WMARITALSTAT, WMARITAL1, WMARITAL2, WMARITAL3, and WMARITAL4 
are defined based on the same criteria as men’s responses. Similarly, WNEWSPAPER, 
WRADIO, WTV are dummy variables taking the value one if women access the specific 
form of media at least once or more a week, zero otherwise.  
 There are two variables in the women’s specification created using PCA. The 
first index, WHHDM, measures women’s household decision-making ability. It is based 
on the following questions: (1) who has the final say on large household purchases? (2) 
who has the final say on visits to family members, friends, or relatives? (3) who has the 
final say on what to do with your wife’s earned income? (4) who has the final say on 
having another child? In this case woman could respond four ways: (a) that their husband 
made the decision alone, or someone else made the decision, which was coded as 3, (b) 
the decision was made jointly by the female respondent and her husband, which was 
coded as 2, or (c) the female respondent made the decision alone, coded as 1. So in this 
specification, the lower the index the more household decision-making ability the wife 
has. The second index created, GENDEREQ, measures women’s belief in gender equity. 
The following statements, in which she responded agree or disagree, were used to create 
the GENDEREQ index: (1) family decisions should be made by the man, (2) men should 
not help with household chores, (3) married woman should not work, (4) a wife does not 
have the right to express her opinions, (5) a wife should tolerate beatings to keep her 
family together, and (6) it is better to educate a son than a daughter. The answer was 
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coded one when women agreed with the statement, zero if the women disagreed. Thus, 
the higher the index, the more supportive a women is of gender hierarchy based on male 
dominance; the lower the index, the more the woman supports equity between men and 
women.  
I now turn to logistic regression analysis to ascertain the relationship between 
these characteristics, beliefs and behaviors and agreement with at least one justification 
for intimate partner violence in the Dominican Republic.  
3.4 Methods 
3.4.1 Logistic Regression Analysis using odds ratios 
The logistic model takes the following form:  
Pr (y=1) = exp (α + βxk +δdk)/(1+exp (α + βxk +δdk)) 
 where y = 1 if the outcome occurs—in our case if the individual responds yes to 
at least one justification for intimate partner violence ; xk is a vector of continuous 
variables;δ
 k is a vector of dichotomous variables. For the logistic model, the probability 
of MGV or WGV (respectively the outcome variables in the men’s and women’s 
specifications) is the cumulative density function of the random error term ε evaluated at 
the given values of the independent variables: Pr (y=1|x) = F (xβ).  
I interpret the effect of the logistic model in terms of the changes in the odds. The 
log odds are a linear combination of the xk’s and βks. The coefficients, or odds ratios in 
this case, indicate that for a unit change in xk , a vector of independent variables, I expect 
the logit to change by βk , holding all the other independent variables constant. I obtain 
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the odds ratio by taking the exponential of both sides of the equation, which measures the 
odds of observing a positive outcome (y=1) versus a negative outcome (y=0):  
Ω = Pr (y=1)/Pr (y=0) = Pr (y=1)/1-Pr (y=1).  
3.4.2 Principal component analysis (PCA) 
I use PCA to create the following indices: MGV and MREFSEX for the men’s 
specification, WGV and GENDEREQ for the women’s specification. PCA is a method 
for creating a single variable from a set of variables, one that circumvents the issue of 
arbitrarily assigning weights to create an index. Methodologically, PCA identifies 
patterns in data by re-expressing the set of variables (each a basis vector) as a linear 
combination of the data; this linear combination of the data is an extraction of the most 
meaningful data from the variables and the most important vector (Shlens 2003; Filmer 
and Prichett 2001). Basically, PCA extracts the most important information from the set 
of variables by using orthogonal linear combinations of the data; the first principal 
component of the variables is the linear combination that contains the most information.  
 I estimate the following equations in this chapter: 
Pr (MGV
 
=1)
 
=F (MNOEDUCδ1 + MPRIMδ2 + MHIGERδ3 + AGEM1δ4 + 
AGEM3δ5 + AGEM4δ6 + MNOWORKδ7 + MPROFδ8+ MAGRICULδ 9+ 
MMANUALδ10 + POORδ11 + RICHδ12 + URBANδ13 + HEADδ14 + SONSδ15 + 
DAUGHTERδ16 + MMARITALSTATδ17 + MMARITAL1δ18 + MMARITAL3δ19 + 
MMARITAL4δ20 + MNEWSδ21 + MRADIOδ22 + MTVδ23 + MHHDMß24 + MREFSEX 
ß25) 
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Pr (WGV
 
=1)
 
=F (WNOEDUCδ1 + WSECδ2 + WHIGERδ3 + AGEW1δ4 + 
AGEW3δ5 + AGEW4δ6 + WNOWORKδ7 + WPROFδ8+ WAGRICULδ9+ 
WMANUALδ10 + WSERVICESδ11 + WDOMδ12 + POORδ13 + RICHδ14 + URBANδ15 + 
HEADδ16 + SONSδ17 + DAUGHTERδ18 + WMARITALSTATδ19 + WMARITAL1δ20 + 
WMARITAL3δ21 + WMARITAL4δ22 + WNEWSδ23 + WRADIOδ24 + WTVδ25 + 
WHHDMß26 + GENDEREQ ß27) 
 
3.5 Results29  
3.5.1 Women’s Specification 
Table 3.13: Odds Ratios for the Correlates of Women’s Justification of Intimate 
Partner Violence  
(robust standard errors reported; ***1%, **5% *10 % Level significance)  
 All 
Women  
(N=7766) 
Asset Poor-
Women  
(N=4154) 
Asset Rich-
Women  
(N=2070) 
Education 
(rc: primary education) 
   
 
No education 
.99 
(.26) 
1.05 
(.20) 
1.10 
(1.23) 
 
Secondary education 
.61** 
(.12) 
.58** 
(.11) 
0.83 
(.30) 
 
Higher education  
1.33 
(.58) 
.50 
(.23) 
1.19 
(.56) 
    
Age 
(rc: Ages 25-34) 
   
 
Age group 1: 15-24 
1.32 
(.40) 
1.27 
(.27) 
1.96 
(1.01) 
                                                 
29
 For correlation matrices and correlation significance at the 5% level see 
appendix D. For discussion of correlations and model test statistics see appendix E.  
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Age group 3: 35-44 
.87 
(.20) 
.95 
(.21) 
.71 
(.31) 
 
Age group 4: 45-54 
.69 
(.25) 
.83 
(.30) 
.14** 
(.14) 
    
Occupation 
(rc for women: clerical & 
agriculture for asset-rich 
women) 
   
 
Not working 
2.24* 
(1.05) 
1.15 
(.55) 
2.26 
(1.71) 
Professional, 
Management, Technical 
1.57 
(.96) 
1.30 
(.86) 
1.21 
(1.04) 
 
Service & Sales 
2.94 
(1.40) 
1.28 
(.65) 
3.08 
(2.42) 
 
Domestic  
2.41* 
(1.23) 
1.26 
(.64) 
1.90 
(2.41) 
 
Skilled and Unskilled Manual  
2.91** 
(1.42) 
1.73 
(.87) 
3.71 
(3.10) 
 
Self-employed Agriculture 
3.87** 
(2.17) 
1.66 
(.90) 
 
    
Wealth Asset Class 
(rc: Asset Middle) 
   
 
Asset Poor 
1.34 
(.27) 
  
 
Asset Rich  
.93 
(.25) 
  
 
Wealth Index  
 .78* 
(.11) 
1.01 
(.32) 
  
All 
Women 
(N=7870) 
 
Asset-Poor 
Women 
(N=4154) 
 
Asset-Rich 
Women 
(N=2070) 
Social/Demographic     
 
Urban  
1.05 
(.16) 
1.00 
(.14) 
.82 
(.28) 
 
Head of household 
.94 
(.18) 
.98 
(.17) 
.89 
(.32) 
Marital status 
(married=1, consensual 
union=0) 
.42*** 
(.11) 
.70 
(.17) 
.68 
(.23) 
Marital duration 
(rc: Marital duration 10-19 
years) 
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Marital duration 1:0-9 years 
.94 
(.28) 
1.17 
(.25) 
.71 
(.33) 
 
Marital duration 3: 20-29 
years 
1.09 
(.26) 
.95 
(.22) 
1.40 
(.64) 
 
Marital Duration 4: 30 years 
and above 
.93 
(.38) 
1.29 
(.51) 
2.20 
(2.90) 
 
Sons living at home 
.80 
(.12) 
.73** 
(.10) 
.89 
(.30) 
 
Daughters living at home 
1.01 
(.15) 
.80* 
(.09) 
1.23 
(.41) 
 
Newspaper 
.68** 
(.12) 
1.01 
(.16) 
.57* 
(.18) 
 
Radio 
.83 
(.15) 
1.05 
(.14) 
.86 
(.33) 
 
Television 
.88 
(.17) 
.90 
(.13) 
1.68 
(1.74) 
    
Household Decision Making 
 and Gender Attitudes 
   
Household Decision Making 
Index 
(men=3, couple=2, wife=1) 
1.15** 
(.07) 
1.16*** 
(.06) 
.88 
(.11) 
    
Questions for Women    
Women’s opinions on Gender 
Issues Index 
(1=agree with gender bias in 
favor of men, 0= disagree) 
 
1.38*** 
(.06) 
 
1.35*** 
(.05) 
 
1.30** 
(.15) 
 
McFadden’s R2 
 
0.0872 
 
0.063 
 
0.0710 
   
Tables 3.13 and 3.14 report odds ratios for women and men, respectively. There 
are fewer statistically significant variables in the women’s specifications than in the 
men’s specifications. First I turn to the analysis of statistically significant variables in the 
women’s specification. For the education dummies, WSEC is associated with a 0.61 
lower odds ratio than the reference category WPRIM (p<0.05) for the pooled women’s 
specification. Similarly, women in the asset-poor category with a secondary education 
have a lower odds ratio of agreeing to at least one motive of gender than women in the 
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asset-poor category with only a primary education (p<0.05). This finding supports the 
argument that for women in general, and asset-poor women in particular, education is a 
means to challenging gender violence and internalizing gendered norms that condone 
violence (Rani et al. 2004). Several of the occupation categories are statistically 
significant and positively related to the justification of intimate partner violence for 
women. Women who are self-employed agricultural workers (p<0.05), domestic workers 
(p<0.10), manual workers (p<0.05), and women who are not working outside of the home 
(p<0.05) have a higher odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence than the 
reference category, which is women in the clerical field. None of the occupational 
dummies are statistically significant in the disaggregated specifications, however.  
In the asset-rich sample, women who were between the ages of 45 to 54 had a 
lower odds ratio of agreeing to the justifications for intimate partner violence than 
women between the ages of 25 and 34, consistent with findings that older women and 
men are less likely to agree with justifications for intimate partner violence (Rani et al. 
2004, Fawole et al. 2005, Yount and Li 2009, Khawaja et al. 2008).  
In their study of seventeen sub-Saharan countries, Uthman et al (2009) find that 
increased wealth is associated with a lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner 
violence. I find that only in the asset-poor specification do relatively less asset- poor 
women have lower odds ratio for the justification for intimate partner violence than 
women who are more asset-poor (p<0.10); as with the asset-poor men’s specification, 
discussed below, I see that relative deprivation amongst the respondents in the asset-poor 
category may be an important factor for understanding the relationship between poverty 
and the justification of intimate partner violence.  
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Marital status—significant only for asset-poor women—is associated with a .42 
lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence in the pooled sample, which 
suggests that women who are married by the church, the state, or both, have a lower odds 
ratio of justifying intimate partner violence as opposed to women cohabitating or in 
consensual unions (p<.01). In the specification consisting of asset-poor women only, both 
sons (p<0.05) and daughters (p<0.10) living at home are associated with a lower odds 
ratio of asset-poor women agreeing to at least one justification for gender violence, 
compared to those that do not have children living at home (see also Oldenburg 1992, 
Mahalingam et al. 2007, Bunch 1997, Khosla et al 2005, Caprioli et al. 2009, Engle 
Merry 2009, Bhat 1998).  
In the pooled specification, women who read the newspaper once or more a week 
on average have a 0.68 lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence than 
women who do not read the newspaper at all (p<0.05), and women in the asset-rich 
category who read the newspaper also have a lower odds ratio of justifying intimate 
partner violence. Lastly, the results show that in the pooled sample, both WHHINDEX 
and WGENDEREQ are statistically significant: women’s decision-making ability in the 
household and their notions of gender equity matter for women’s justification of intimate 
partner violence. Women with less decision-making ability in the household (higher 
index score) have a 1.15 higher odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence than 
women who report making more decisions in the household (p<0.01). This finding 
persists in the asset-poor subsample, but not in the asset-rich subsample. In the pooled 
sample, women who are less gender progressive, as measured WGENDEREQ score, have 
a 1.38 higher odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence than women who are more 
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gender progressive as indicated by the score (p<0.01). This result holds for both asset-
rich (p<0.05) and asset-poor women (p<0.01). This result is consistent with other studies 
(Hindin 2003, Hindin and Adair 2002, González-Brenes 2004, Lawoko 2006) that find 
that less decision-making ability in the household is associated with a higher odds ratio of 
justification for intimate partner violence and/or a higher incidence of gender violence 
against women. 
3.5.2 Men’s Specifications 
Table 3.14: Odds Ratios for the Correlates of Male Partners Justification of 
Intimate Partner Violence 
(robust standard errors reported; ***1%, **5% *10 % Level significance)  
 All Men 
(N=7766) 
Asset-Poor 
Men 
(N=4152) 
Asset-Rich 
Men 
(N=2070) 
Education 
(rc men: secondary education) 
 
 
  
 
No education 
1.34 
(.43) 
1.70* 
(.48) 
.78 
(1.4) 
 
Primary Education  
1.40* 
(.29) 
1.69*** 
(.32) 
1.60 
(.57) 
 
Higher education  
.43* 
(.21) 
0.17* 
(.17) 
.42 
(.27) 
    
Age 
(rc: Men 25-34 & 55-59) 
   
 
Age group 1: 15-24 
1.73** 
(.46) 
1.34 
(.28) 
.81 
(.55) 
 
Age group 3: 35-44 
.86 
(.17) 
.80 
(.14) 
.83 
(.35) 
 
Age group 4: 45-54 
.75 
(.20) 
.77 
(18) 
.54 
(.32) 
    
Occupation 
(rc: services/sales, clerical and not working 
for Asset-Rich sample) 
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Not working 
2.82 
(2.32) 
2.83 
(2.38) 
 
 
Professional, Management, Technical .70 
(.26) 
.87 
(.36) 
.24* 
(.19) 
 
Self-employed Agriculture 
1.67** 
(.40) 
.92 
(.20) 
1.47 
(.95) 
 
Skilled and Unskilled Manual  
1.14 
(.24) 
.73 
(.15) 
1.32 
(.51) 
    
Wealth Asset Class 
(rc: Asset Middle) 
   
 
Asset Poor 
.86 
(.17) 
  
 
Asset Rich  
.42*** 
(.13) 
  
Wealth Index for 
Class Sub-samples 
 .73** 
(.11) 
1.08 
(.38) 
  
All 
Men 
(N=7766) 
 
Asset-Poor 
Men 
(N=4152) 
 
Asset-Rich 
Men 
(N=2070 
Social/Demographic     
 
Urban  
1.40** 
(.23) 
1.70*** 
(.24) 
1.27 
(.54) 
Head of household 
(husband=1, wife=0) 
.86 
(.18) 
.94 
(.17) 
.86 
(.34) 
Marital status 
(married=1, consensual union=0) 
.97 
(.29) 
.62* 
(.16) 
.52 
(.21) 
Marital duration 
(rc: Marital duration 2: 10-19 years) 
   
 
Marital duration 1:0-9 years 
1.42* 
(.28) 
1.25 
(.22) 
2.73** 
(1.18) 
 
Marital duration 3: 20-29 years 
.81 
(.20) 
.82 
(.18) 
1.1 
(.59) 
 
Marital Duration 4: 30 years and above 
.62 
(.22) 
.72 
(.22) 
1.01 
(.87) 
 
Sons living at home 
.70** 
(.11) 
.76** 
(.10) 
.91 
(.32) 
 
Daughters living at home 
.86 
(.14) 
.89 
(.12) 
1.03 
(.36) 
 
Newspaper 
.78 
(.147) 
1.16 
(.18) 
.96 
(.32) 
 
Radio 
1.45* 
(.31) 
1.10 
(.19) 
2.80 
(1.91) 
 
Television 
.55*** 
(.11) 
.76* 
(.12) 
.30* 
(.21) 
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Household Decision Making 
 and Gender Attitudes 
   
Household Decision Making Index 
(men=3, couple=2, wife=1) 
1.16** 
(.08) 
1.23*** 
(.06) 
.87 
(.13) 
Husband’s responses 
 to sex refusal from wife Index 
1.50*** 
(.07) 
1.50*** 
(.05) 
1.48*** 
(.11) 
Husband’s support for  
women’s economic autonomy 
(yes=1, no=0) 
 
.89 
(.14) 
 
.83 
(.12) 
 
1.10 
(.36) 
McFadden’s R2 0.1530 0.1410 .1958 
 
 In the men’s specifications, there are several statistically significant variables that 
shed light on the correlates of the husband’s propensity to accept a justification for 
intimate partner violence. In terms of education dummies, MHIGHER is associated with a 
.43 lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence. This is consistent with 
literature from elsewhere (Rani et al. 2004, Fawole et al. 2005, Khawaja et al. 2008) that 
shows lower levels of reported gender violence among the highly educated. When I 
disaggregate the sample into asset-poor and asset-rich men, all of the education dummies 
are significant for asset-poor men, but none are significant for asset-rich men. Asset-poor 
men with no education have a 1.70 higher odds ratio than asset-poor men with a 
secondary education of agreeing with at least one motive for intimate partner violence 
(p<0.10). Asset-poor men with a primary education have 1.69 higher odds ratio than 
asset-poor men with a secondary education of agreeing with one of the motives for 
intimate partner violence (p<0.05). However, asset-poor men with higher education have 
a lower odds ratio (.17) of agreeing with intimate partner than men with a secondary 
degree (p<0.10).  
I find that men between the ages of fifteen to twenty-four have a 1.73 higher odds 
ratio of agreeing to at least one of the motives for intimate partner violence compared to 
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the reference category, men ages 25 to 34 (p<0.05). Many studies (Rani et al. 2004, 
Fawole et al. 2005, Yount and Li 2009, Khawaja et al. 2008) have also found that 
younger people—both women and men—are more likely to agree with justifications for 
intimate partner violence, whereas older women and men are less tolerant of intimate 
partner violence.  
Men who are self-employed in the agricultural sector have a 1.67 higher odds 
ratio of justifying domestic violence than men in the reference groups, clerical field and 
service/sales sector (p<0.05). Although none of the occupational variables are significant 
for men in the asset-poor category, asset-rich men in the professional or technical 
positions have a .24 lower odds ratio of agreeing to least one of the justifications for 
intimate partner violence ((p<0.10). In the general specification for all men, I find that 
men in the asset-rich category have a .42 lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner 
violence when compared to the middle asset group (p<0.01); this is consistent with 
Uthman et al.’s (2009) findings that increased wealth with associated with less tolerance 
for gender violence across seventeen sub-Saharan African countries. In the samples 
disaggregated according to wealth, I use a continuous wealth index to test if relative 
wealth within the asset category is significant in men’s views on intimate partner 
violence. Relative wealth is significant in the asset-poor category; relatively less poor 
men in the asset-poor category are less likely to agree with the justifications for intimate 
partner violence (p<0.05).  
However, in this data set I find that men living in an urban setting (URBAN) have 
a 1.40 higher odds ratio for justifying intimate partner violence that men living in rural 
areas (p<0.05). This appears to be inconsistent with the data showing that rural areas tend 
 122
to be associated with higher levels of domestic violence, including data cited in Chapter 1 
of this dissertation. Note, however, that this expresses the effect of urban versus rural 
location controlling for all other variables such as wealth and education. The higher 
levels of violence found in simple rural-urban comparisons appear to be an attribute to 
these other variables, rather than to location per se. Asset-poor men in urban areas also 
have a 1.70 higher odds of justifying intimate partner violence than asset-poor men in 
rural areas (p<.01).  
 Although marital status is not significant in the all-men’s specification, in the 
disaggregated sample it is statistically significant for men in the asset-poor category. 
Asset-poor men who reported being married to their partners have a .62 lower odds ratio 
of agreeing to the justifications of intimate partner violence than asset-poor men in a 
consensual union (p<.10). Men who report being married for nine years or less have a 
1.42 higher odds ratio of justifying domestic violence than men who reported being 
married ten to nineteen years (p<0.10).  
Consistent with previous findings (Oldenburg 1992, Mahalingam 2007, Bunch 
1997, Khosla et al 2005, Caprioli et al. 2009, Engle Merry 2009, Bhat 1998) I find a 
protective effect, when there are sons in the household: the variable SONS is associated 
with a .70 lower odds ratio of husbands justifying intimate partner violence than 
households without sons (p<0.05), an effect that is strongest among and asset-poor men. 
The presence of daughters has a weaker effect.  
With respect to the media variables, only MTV is statistically significant. Men 
who watch television—once or more a week on average—have a .57 lower odds ratio of 
justifying intimate partner violence than those who watch less than once a week or not at 
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all (p<0.01). Both asset-poor and asset-rich men who watch television once or more a 
week also have lower odds ratios of justifying gender violence in the household.  
Both indices created using PCA—MHHDM and MREFSEX—are significant, and 
both are positively related with men justifying intimate partner violence. Men who report 
more decision-making power in the household, and hence a higher score for MHHDM, 
have a 1.15 higher odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence than men who have a 
lower decision-making score (p<0.05). Asset-poor men who report making more 
decisions in the household likewise have a higher odds ratio of justifying gender violence 
than those who make less decisions (p<0.05). Similarly, the MREFSEX index that 
provides a score for men’s belief that emotional, financial, or physically violent behavior 
is valid response to wife’s refusal of intimate relations, shows that men with a higher 
index (condoning violent responses to wife’s refusal of sex) have a higher odds ratio of 
justifying intimate partner violence than those who do not condone violent responses to 
wife’s refusal of sex, in all three specifications (p<0.01). This is consistent with findings 
that men’s gendered attitudes and biases against women are positively correlated with 
both the incidence of gender violence in the household and agreeing with the 
justifications for intimate partner violence (García-Moreno 2002, Hindin 2003, Lawoko 
2006, González-Brenes 2004, Khawaja et al 2008).  
The differences between the men’s specification and the women’s specification 
(in terms of significant variables) highlight the ways that different variables may matter 
for men’s and women’s perceptions and beliefs about gender equity and the use of 
violence to maintain gender hierarchy in society, and it also points to the need to target 
men and women in different ways to promote gender equity in society. For example, in 
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the all-men’s specification primary and higher education, urban residence asset-wealth 
class, marital duration, and media usage were significant variables, but not in the all-
women’s specification. However, in the majority of the women’s specifications and in the 
the majority of the men’s specifications gendered beliefs and behaviors proved 
statistically significant predictors for the justification of intimate partner violence.  
3.5 Policy Implications and Conclusions 
Despite having one of the highest rates of feminicide in the world and in the 
Caribbean/Latin American region, the percentage of Dominican women and men 
agreeing to at least one instance where intimate partner violence is justified is relatively 
low when compared to other developing nations.30 Moreover, the vast majority of women 
who experienced intimate partner violence came from households where neither party 
agreed with any of the “justifications for wife-beating”. This creates a conundrum for 
understanding gender violence and endogenous preferences in the Dominican Republic. 
First, it may be the case that although men use gender violence as a way to maintain 
gender hierarchy, both men and women know it is not socially acceptable to justify 
gender violence. Second, it may also be the case that the justifications provided do not 
accurately capture the motives for gender violence against women in the Dominican 
Republic.  
                                                 
30
 For example, in this study less than 6 % of women and 6% of men agreed to 
least one justification for “wife-beating”. Other studies, also using data from the DHS in 
other developing countries, find that the percentage of women and men agreeing with at 
least one of the justifications ranges from 8% to 91% (Heise et al. 1999, Rani et al. 2004, 
Uthman et al. 2009, Kim and Motsei 2002, Hindin 2003).  
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Despite institutions created to help women protect themselves from gender 
violence, deep-rooted gendered norms and conventions that govern people’s behavior and 
attitudes have limited the ability of laws and institutions to promote women’s well-being. 
Respondent’s attributes and ideology are significantly correlated with both men’s and 
women’s justification of gender violence against women. Based on this study, I propose 
several policies that could promote women’s well-being and development in the 
Dominican Republic.  
First, the government must invest more heavily in education, in general and in 
particular education that disrupts gender norms that are detrimental to freedom from 
gender violence. In both the women’s and men’s specifications, more education is 
associated with a lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence. In both the 
pooled women’s sample and for women in the asset-poor category, having at least a 
primary education made women less likely to agree to agree with any statement that 
justified intimate partner violence. For men, having higher education was associated with 
a lower odds ratio of justifying violence. The Dominican Republic has one of the lowest 
levels of spending on public education in Latin America but my results suggest that 
investing in public education at the primary and secondary level and providing low-
income students with access to higher education, is a long-term solution to the eradication 
of gender violence.  
In the short run feminist, political, and international campaigns can direct gender 
violence awareness programs and interventions to women and men in under-resourced 
areas, drawing the link between gender bias ideology and gender violence. Gender 
violence awareness programs and interventions should be directed to both young men and 
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young women, in particular, both of whom were more likely to agree with at least 
justification than their older counterparts.  
The results suggest that wealth and relative wealth also matter for people’s beliefs 
about gender violence. First, men in the asset-rich category are less likely to justify 
intimate partner violence. Second, in regressions for both women and men in the asset-
poor categories, I find that the relatively more asset-poor respondents (or the poorest) are 
more likely to agree with at least with one of the justifications for intimate partner 
violence. In addition to targeting gender violence campaigns to underserved and under-
resourced communities, findings on wealth and relative wealth lend support to arguments 
for a more equitable distribution of income as a means to curtail violence against women. 
To create a more equitable distribution of wealth, workers in vulnerable employment 
(informal sector employment) and others must earn a living wage. Although there has 
been economic growth in the last 20 years, there has also been increasing inequality 
(Hammill 2005, World Bank et al. 2006). Hence the government must devise methods to 
promote economic growth that benefit the lower quintiles of the wealth and income 
distribution.  
I also find that the type of marriage matters for women, and that marital duration 
matters for men. Women in consensual unions were more likely to agree with at least one 
justification for intimate partner violence, suggesting that for women the type of marriage 
contract matters. The vast majority of couples (over 76%) in this sample reported being 
in consensual unions. Hence it seems important to target gender violence campaigns to 
this demographic, and to challenge the potential stigma associated with consensual 
unions. Additionally, in the pooled men’s sample I find that men in the earlier years of 
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marriage are also more likely to justify gender violence than men in longer marriages. 
Some scholars explain this as a learning curve for husbands, whereby they learn over 
time that communication and compromise can lead to better outcomes in the household 
than using violence against their partners.  
In terms of household structure, homes without children should be targeted for 
gender awareness campaigns, as both women and men in childless homes are more likely 
to agree with gender violence against women. The results also point to the importance of 
the media; in the pooled sample and wealth-disaggregated samples, men who watched 
television at least once a week were less likely to agree with the justifications for intimate 
partner violence. This suggests that gender violence awareness campaigns and news 
shows, which have recently highlighted violent crimes against women, might be making 
an impact on men’s views on gender violence.  
Lastly, and most importantly, the indices that measure household decision-making 
ability and gendered beliefs point to a crucial link in understanding gender violence. Both 
women and men who engage in heterosexist gendered practices—such as men making 
more decisions in the household—are more likely to agree with gender violence against 
women. I measured gendered beliefs by creating an index that measured men’s approval 
of aggressive responses to women’s refusal of sex with her husband, which proxies men’s 
belief that are entitled to control over their partner’s body. Men with a higher index 
numberwere more likely to justify intimate partner violence. Similarly, women who 
agreed with gender bias statements that placed men at the top of the gender hierarchy and 
women at the bottom were also more likely to agree with at least one justification for 
intimate partner violence.  
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The statistically significant correlations between women’s and men’s gendered 
beliefs and the acceptance of gender violence against women suggests that the struggle 
against gender violence should challenge gender norms and ideology that reinforce and 
maintain gender hierarchy more generally. It is these gender norms and gendered 
behaviors that serve as a basis for the acceptance of gender violence. Hence to challenge 
intimate partner violence, the message that women are in control of their bodies and their 
lives in the household and beyond is paramount. The widespread belief that woman 
should not work outside of the household severely limits their freedom and independence 
in a market economy (where income is based on employment). Despite the facts that 
Dominican women are educated at higher rates than men and are a large part of the labor 
force, in the Dominican society’s collective imagination women are relegated to the 
household. This lends strong support to Helen Safa’s (1995) argument that the myth of 
the male breadwinner continues to undermine women’s autonomy, even when they are at 
the primary income earners.  
Women’s household decision-making ability has been linked to positive outcomes 
in the household and to desirable social/demographic outcomes. In this study it also 
linked to women being less likely to think intimate partner violence is acceptable. In 
households where men make more decisions, both men and women are more likely to 
find intimate partner violence acceptable. In other words, my results suggest that 
gendered practices, such male partners making household decisions, are implicated and 
correlated with the justification of intimate partner violence. These findings also suggest 
that efforts to shift people’s beliefs about gender hierarchy should be pursued widely, for 
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example by inclusion in Civic Education and Moral/Ethics classes which are standard 
courses in both public and private schools at all levels in the Dominican Republic.  
The conundrum of a relatively high rate of feminicide in the DR, despite 
relatively low percentages of people agreeing with the justifications of intimate partner 
violence and reporting gender violence, also suggests a need to examine of the 
construction of the DHS questions and their applicability in different contexts. It may be 
the case in the Dominican context, where women are highly mobile and it is publicly not 
acceptable to espouse violence against women, different questions are needed to better 
understand gender violence in the household. For example, statements such as: “wife 
beating is justified if a wife has sexual relations with another man”, “wife beating is 
justified if a woman refuses to return with her husband in the case of a prior separation”, 
“wife beating is justified is a woman refuses her husband sex for a prolonged period of 
time”, “wife beating is justified if a wife leaves her husband for another man”, would be 
more culturally-context and relevant to the Dominican Republic.  
Although development based on a neoliberal market strategy has increased GDP 
in the Dominican Republic, it has not been translated into women and men challenging 
gender roles and ideology. Better and more country-specific data, based on fieldwork, 
focus groups, and empirical data are necessary to address gender violence against women 
in the Dominican Republic. Future research should focus on how social, political, and 
economic policies can change people’s preferences so as to promote more gender 
equitable and sustainable development practices that disrupt the norms that reproduce 
gender violence. 
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APPENDIX A 
EDUCATION AND HEALTH EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN 
COUNTRIES IN 2007 
 Education Health 
Dominican Republic 2.2 5.4 
Argentina  4.9 8.4 
Brazil 5.1 4.7 
Chile  3.2 6.9 
Colombia  4.1 7.2 
Costa Rica  4.7 8.4 
Ecuador 3.1 7.0 
El Salvador 3.0 6.2 
Guatemala 4.8 7.0 
Paraguay 4.0 6.1 
Peru 2.5 5.1 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  3.6 5.8 
(Data compiled from the Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean, 
CEPALSTAT) 
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APPENDIX B 
 CHAPTER 2 CORRELATION MATRICES AND TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE 
Table B.1: Physicial Violence Specification 
(N=1820, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level) 
  
phyvio 
wife 
works 
wife 
money 
wife 
makesmore 
owns 
dwelling 
 
land 
 
rich 
 
poor 
women 
org 
political 
org 
 
eduyrs 
head 
house 
 
urban 
 
spad2 
 
spad3 
 
aloften 
 
intergenvio 
phyvio 1                 
wifeworks -.09* 1                
wifemoney -.09* 0.19* 1               
wifemakesmore .06* .02 .04 1              
ownsdwelling -.03 0.06* -.06 .08* 1             
land .01 -.02 .03 .02 0.09* 1            
rich -.13* 0.14* .22 -.01 .00 .07* 1           
poor .13* -.16* -.23* -.03 0.01 -.03 -.63* 1          
womenorg .02 .01 -.02 .01 .11* .08* -.03 .02 1         
politicalorg .02 -.01 .06* .01 .05* -.01 -.01 -.01 .07* 1        
eduyrs -.14* .13* .22* .05* -.08* .02 .41* -.40* .02 .01 1       
headhouse -.02 -.06 0.2 .00 -.07* -.04 .07* -.07* -.03 .03 .03 1      
urban -0.5* .04 .07 .00 -.17* -.03 .26* -.32* -.11 -0.01 .15* 0.04 1     
spad2 -.02 .01 -.01 .01 .05* .03 -.01 -.02 -.01 .02 -.01 -.05* .03 1    
spad3 -.03 .00 .02 -.05* .00 .03 .01 .05* .00 -.03 -.04 .01 -.06* -.25* 1   
aloften .34* -.04 -.03 .03 -.02 .00 -.09* .08* -.03 -.04 -.11* .01 -.01 .00 0.01 1  
intergenvio 0.12* -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -.02 .00 -0.00 .00 -.01 -.00 .00 .01 -.01 .00 -.03 .02 1 
 
Table B.2: Sexual Violence Specification 
(N=1820, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level) 
  
sexvio 
wife 
works 
wife 
money 
wife 
makesmore 
owns 
dwelling 
 
land 
 
rich 
 
poor 
women 
org 
political 
org 
 
eduyrs 
head 
house 
 
urban 
 
spad2 
 
spad3 
 
aloften 
 
intergenvio 
sexvio 1                 
wifeworks -.04 1                
wifemoney -.04 .19* 1               
wifemakesmore .06* .02 .04 1              
ownsdwelling .06* .06* -.06* .08* 1             
land .01 -.02 .03 .02 .09* 1            
rich -.09* .14* .22* -.01 .00 .07* 1           
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poor .09* -.17* -.23* -.02 .01 -.02 -.6 1          
womenorg -.03 .01 -.02 .01 .11* .08* -0.03 .02 1         
politicalorg .01 -.01 .06* .01 .05* -.01 -0.01 -.01 .07* 1        
eduyrs -.08* .13* .22* .05* -.08* .01 .42* -.40* .02 0.01 1       
headhouse -.04 -.07* .02 .00 -.07* -.04 .07* -.07 -.03 .03 .03 1      
urban -.11* .03 .07* -0.0005 -0.17* -0.03 .26* -.32* -.11* -.01 .15* .04 1     
spad2 .01 .02 -.02 .01 .05* .03 -.01 -.02 -.01 .02 -.01 -.05* .03 1    
spad3 -.01 .00 .02 -.05* .00 .02 .01 .05* .00 -.02 -.04 .01 -.06* -.25* 1   
aloften .24* -.04 -.03 .03 -.02 -.002 -.09 .08* -.02 -.04 -.11* .01 -0.01 .00 0.01 1  
intergenvio .03 -0.01 -0.01 -.002 -.02 .00 -.0002 .00 -.01 -.004 .00 .01 -.01 .00 -0.03 0.02 1 
 
Table B.3: Aggregate Violence Specification 
(N=1820, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level) 
  
allvio 
wife 
works 
wife 
money 
wife 
makesmore 
owns 
dwelling 
 
land 
 
rich 
 
poor 
women 
org 
political 
org 
 
eduyrs 
head 
house 
 
urban 
 
spad2 
 
spad3 
 
aloften 
 
intergenvio 
allvio 1                 
wifeworks -.09* 1                
wifemoney -.1* .19* 1               
wifemakesmore .06* .02 .04 1              
ownsdwelling -.01 .06* -.06* .08 1             
land .02 -.02 .03 .02 .09 1            
rich -.14 .14* .22* -.01 .00 .07* 1           
poor .13* -.16* -.23* -.03 .01 -.03 -.63* 1          
womenorg .01 .01 -.02 .01 .11* .08* -0.03 .02 1         
politicalorg .04 -.01 .06* .01 .05* -.01 -.01 -.01 .08* 1        
eduyrs -.14* .13* .22* .05* -.07* .01 0.42* -.40* .02 .01 1       
headhouse -.02 -.02 -.06* .02 .00 -.07* .02 -.07* -.03 .03 .03 1      
urban -.07* .04 .07* -.0005 -.17* -.03 .26* -.32* -.11* -.01 .15* .04 1     
spad2 -.02 .02 -.02 .00 .05* .03 -.01 -.02 -.01 .02 -.01 -.05 .03 1    
spad3 -.02 .00 .02 -.05* .00 .03 .01 .05* .00 -.02 -.04 .01 -.06* -.25* 1   
aloften .32* -.04 -.03 .03 -.01 -.002 -.09* .08* -.03 -.04 -.11* .01 -.01 .00 .01 1  
intergenvio .12* -.01 -.01 -.002 -.02 .00 -.0002 .00 -.01 -.004 .00 .01 -.01 .00 -.03 .02 1 
 
Table B.4: Asset-Poor Physical Violence Specification 
(N= 761, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level) 
  
phyvio 
wife 
works 
wife 
money 
wife 
makesmore 
owns 
dwelling 
 
land 
women 
org 
political 
org 
 
eduyrs 
head 
house 
 
urban 
 
spad2 
 
spad3 
 
aloften 
 
intergenvio 
phyvio 1               
wifeworks -.13* 1              
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wifemoney -.04 .20* 1             
wifemakesmore .10* -.01 .03 1            
ownsdwelling -.04 .05 -.06 .00 1           
land -.04 .01 .05 -.01 .08* 1          
womenorg -.03 .06 .04 .02 .11* .10* 1         
politicalorg .05 .00 .03 .04 .07* .03 .08* 1        
eduyrs -.07 .03 .14* .02 -.11* -.02 .07* .00 1       
headhouse -.02 -.10* .01 -.003 -.08* -.03 -.05 .03 .04 1      
urban .02 -.06 -.03 .05 -.18* -.06 -.13* .01 -.0006 .03 1     
spad2 -.04 .06 -.03 -.03 .03 .01 -.04 .04 -.03 -.04 .08* 1    
spad3 -.04 .04 .02 -.04 -.01 .05 -.04 -.05 -.03 -.03 -.08* -.26* 1   
aloften .33* -.04 .01 .02 -.001 -.03 -.04 -.05 -.08* .00 .06 .01 -.02 1  
intergenvio .13* -.05 -.03 -.04 -.07 -.03 .05 -.01 .03 -.02 .02 .03 -.05 .03 1 
 
Table B.5: Asset-Poor Sexual Violence Specification 
(N=761, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level) 
  
sexvio 
wife 
works 
wife 
money 
wife 
makesmore 
owns 
dwelling 
 
land 
women 
org 
political 
org 
 
eduyrs 
head 
house 
 
urban 
 
spad2 
 
spad3 
 
aloften 
 
intergenvio 
sexvio 1               
wifeworks -.01 1              
wifemoney -.03 .20* 1             
wifemakesmore .05 -.01 .03 1            
ownsdwelling .05 .05 -.06 .00 1           
land .01 .01 .05 -.01 .08* 1          
womenorg -.02 .06 .04 .02 .12* .10* 1         
politicalorg -.01 .00 .03 .04 .08* .03 .08* 1        
eduyrs -.0001 .03 .14* .02 -.11* -.02 .08* .00 1       
headhouse -.04 .10* .01 -.003 -.08* -.03 -.05 .03 .04 1      
urban -.08 .06 -.03 .05 -.18* -.06 -.13* .00 -.001 .03 1     
spad2 .00 .06 -.03 -.03 .03 .01 -.04 .04 -.03 -.04 .08* 1    
spad3 -.02 .04 .02 -.04 -.01 .05 -.04 -.05 -.03 -.03 -.08* -.26* 1   
aloften .24* -.04 .01 .02 -.001 -.03 -.04 -.05 -.08* .00 .06 .01 -.03 1  
intergenvio .02 -.05 -.03 -.04 -.07 -.03 .05 -.01 .03 -.02 .02 .03 -.05 .03 1 
 
Table B.6: Asset-Poor Aggregate Violence Specification 
(N=761, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level) 
  
allvio 
wife 
works 
wife 
money 
wife 
makesmore 
owns 
dwelling 
 
land 
women 
org 
political 
org 
 
eduyrs 
head 
house 
 
urban 
 
spad2 
 
spad3 
 
aloften 
 
intergenvio 
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allvio 1               
wifeworks -.11* 1              
wifemoney -.04 .20* 1             
wifemakesmore .11* -.01 .03 1            
ownsdwelling -.02 .05 -.06 .00 1           
land -.03 .01 .05 -.01 .08* 1          
womenorg -.03 .06 .04 .03 .11* .10* 1         
politicalorg .07 .00 .03 .04 -.07* .04 .08* 1        
eduyrs -.06 .03 .14* .03 -.11* -.02 .07* .00 1       
headhouse -.02 -.10* .01 -.003 -.08* -.03 -.05 .02 .04 1      
urban -.00 -.06 -.03 .05 -.01 -.06 -.13* .01 -.0006 .03 1     
spad2 -.03 .06 -.03 -.03 -.03 .01 -.04 .04 -.03 -.04 .08* 1    
spad3 -.02 .04 .02 -.04 -0.01 .05 -.04 -.04 -.03 -.03 -.08*  1   
aloften .33* -.04 .01 .02 -0.001 -.03 -.04 -.05 -.08* .00 .06 .01 -.02 1  
intergenvio .12* -.05 -.03 -.04 -.07 -.03 .05 -.01 .03 -.02 .02 .03 -.05 .03 1 
 
Table B.7: Asset-Rich Physical Violence Specification 
(N=654, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level) 
  
phyvio 
wife 
works 
wife 
money 
wife 
makesmore 
owns 
dwelling 
 
land 
women 
org 
political 
org 
 
eduyrs 
head 
house 
 
urban 
 
spad2 
 
spad3 
 
aloften 
 
intergenvio 
phyvio 1               
wifeworks .02 1              
wifemoney -.11* .13* 1             
wifemakesmore .03 .05 .00 1            
ownsdwelling -.02 .06 -.05 .11* 1           
land .10* -.03 -.01 .03 .09* 1          
womenorg .04 -.03 -.07 .02 .14* .03 1         
politicalorg .02 -.02 .06 -.002 .07 -.02 .12* 1        
eduyrs -.09* .13* .12* .12* -.02 .00 -.01 .01 1       
headhouse .02 -.06 .03 .03 -.06 -.06 -.02 .02 -.001 1      
urban -.08* -.01 .02 -.02 -12* -.07 -.10* -.07* .04 .02 1     
spad2 .01 -.01 -.001 -.02 .01 .06 .02 -.002 .03 .00 -.004 1    
spad3 -.01 -.03 .05 -.08 .01 -.002 .05 0.02 -.05 .04 .04 -.25* 1   
aloften .25* .01 -.02 .06 -.02 .03 .02 -.03 -.03 .00 -.03 .00 .04 1  
intergenvio .13* .07 -.01 -.002 -.01 .01 -.04 -.03 .02 .06 -.03 .01 -.03 .02 1 
 
Table B.8: Asset-Rich Sexual Violence Specification 
(N=653, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level) 
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sexvio 
wife 
works 
wife 
money 
wife 
makesmore 
owns 
dwelling 
 
land 
women 
org 
political 
org 
 
eduyrs 
head 
house 
 
urban 
 
spad2 
 
spad3 
 
aloften 
 
intergenvio 
sexvio 1               
wifeworks .03 1              
wifemoney -.02 .13* 1             
wifemakesmore .04 .05 .00 1            
ownsdwelling .08 .06 -.05 .11* 1           
land .01 -.03 -.01 .03 .09* 1          
womenorg -.04 -.03 -.07 .02 .14* .03 1         
politicalorg .10* -.01 .07 -.002 .07 -.02 .12* 1        
eduyrs -.10* .13* .12* .12* -.02 .00 -.01 .01 1       
headhouse -.02 -.06 .03 .03 -.06 -.06 -.02 .02 -.001 1      
urban -.10* -.01 .02 -.02 -.12* -.07 -.10* -.08* -.04 .02 1     
spad2 -.01 -.005 -.002 -.02 .01 .06 .02 -.003 .03 .00 -.004 1    
spad3 -.04 -.03 .05 -.08 .01 -.002 .05 .02 -.05 .04 .04 -.25* 1   
aloften .13* .01 -.02 .06 -.02 .03 .02 -.03 -.03 .00 -.03 .00 .03 1  
intergenvio .02 .07 -.01 -.002 -.01 .01 -.04 -.03 .02 .06 -.03 .01 -.03 .02 1 
 
Table B.9: Asset-Rich Aggregate Violence Specification 
(N=654, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level) 
  
allvio 
wife 
works 
wife 
money 
wife 
makesmore 
owns 
dwelling 
 
land 
women 
org 
political 
org 
 
eduyrs 
head 
house 
 
urban 
 
spad2 
 
spad3 
 
aloften 
 
intergenvio 
allvio 1               
wifeworks .01 1              
wifemoney -.10* .13* 1             
wifemakesmore .02 .05 .00 1            
ownsdwelling -.01 .06 -.05 .11* 1           
land .09* -.03 -.01 .03 .09* 1          
womenorg .03 -.03 -.07 .02 .14* .03 1         
politicalorg .09* -.02 .07 -.002 .07 -.02 .12* 1        
eduyrs -.11* .13* .12* .12* -.02 .00 -.01 .01 1       
headhouse .02 -.06 .03 -.03 -.07 -.06 -.02 .02 -.001 1      
urban -.08* -.01 .02 -.02 -.12* -.07 -.10* -.08* .04 .02 1     
spad2 .01 -.01 -.002 -.02 .01 .06 .02 -.003 .03 .00 -.004 1    
spad3 -.01 -.03 .05 -.08 .01 -.002 .05 .02 -.05 .04 .03 -.25* 1   
aloften .25* .01 -.02 .06 -.02 .03 .02 -.03 -.03 .00 -.03 .00 .04 1  
intergenvio .13* .07 -.01 -.002 -.01 -.01 -.04 -.03 .02 .05 -.03 .01 -.03 .02 1 
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APPENDIX C 
DISCUSSION OF SIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONS AND RESULTS OF 
STEPWISE REGRESSIONS (LIKELIHOOD RATIO TESTS) 
C1. Discussion of Correlations31   
In the (PHYVIO) specification, where the dependent variable is the incidence of 
physical violence, with the complete sample (N=1820) all three variables that provide 
insight into women’s economic autonomy—the woman works (WIFEWORKS), the 
woman has money for her own use (WIFEMONEY), and the woman makes more money 
than her husband (WIFEMAKESMORE) have significant correlation coefficients at the 
5% level with incidence of physical violence.32 Corr (WIFEWORKS, PHYVIO) = -.09*, 
lending support to the HBM, as does corr (WIFEMONEY, PHYVIO) = -.09*.  However, 
the corr (WIFEMAKESMORE, PHYVIO) = .06*, this positive relationship between the 
woman making more money and the incidence of experiencing gender violence supports 
the MBM.  Of utmost importance to the robustness and validity of regression results is 
the possible correlation between these three independent economic variables.33  
However, the only significant correlation between WIFEMONEY, WIFEWORKS, and 
WIFEMAKESMORE is corr (WIFEMONEY, WIFEWORKS)= .19*, denoting a positive 
relationship between a woman working and having money for her own use. Both 
independent variables husband’s frequent alcohol consumption (ALOFTEN) and the 
                                                 
31
 See appendix B for correlation matrices and significance at the 5% level 
32
 * for correlations denotes significance at the 5% level 
33
 In order to provide tests of robustness, I later present tests of the full model (all 
three variables included) and various nested models to support the chosen model 
specification and support results. 
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woman witnessing her father physically harm her mother (INTERGENVIO) have 
positive and significant relationships with the incidence of gender violence, however 
education in years and physical violence have a negative corr (EDUYRS, PHYVIO) = -
.14*.  The class variables rich and poor are also significantly correlated with physical 
violence, corr (POOR, PHYVIO) = .13* and corr (RICH, PHYVIO) =-.13*, lending 
support to the hypothesis that class is related with the incidence of gender violence.   
In the (SEXVIO) specification, where the dependent variable is the incidence of 
forced sex or sexual acts, with the complete sample (N=1820) the only variable of 
economic independence that is significantly correlated with sexual is when the woman 
makes more money than her husband, corr(WIFEMAKESMORE, SEXVIO)=.06*, 
lending support to the MBM.  In the sexual violence specification, the woman working 
and having money for her own use are also positively correlated, corr (WIFEWORKS, 
WIFEMONEY)=.19*. Similar to the physical violence specification, corr (POOR, 
SEXVIO) = .09* and corr (RICH, SEXVIO) =-.09*, which provides an empirical basis 
for later regressions which use only asset-poor woman (N= 761) and then the same 
regressions for asset-rich woman (N= 654).   
In the (ALLVIO) specification, where the dependent variable is the incidence of 
physical and/or forced sex or sexual acts, with the complete sample (N=1820) all three 
variables of economic independence are significantly related to the incidence of 
aggregate violence.  Both WIFEWORKS and WIFEMONEY are negatively correlated 
with ALLVIO, corr (WIFEWORKS, ALLVIO)= -.09* and corr (WIFEMONEY, 
ALLVIO)= -.1*, both lending support to HBM.  However, corr (WIFEMAKESMORE, 
ALLVIO) = .06*, lending support to the MBM.  As in the previous specifications, I find 
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a positive and significant correlation between WIFEMONEY and WIFEWORKS, corr 
(WIFEMONEY, WIFEWORKS) = .19*.   
In sub-sample of two bottom asset quintiles (POOR), N=761, corr 
(WIFEWORKS, PHYVIO)=-.13* and corr (WIFEMAKESMORE, PHYVIO) =.1*, the 
former supporting the HBM and the latter the MBM.  The only other variables that are 
significantly and positively related to physical violence for asset-poor women is 
husband’s frequent alcohol consumption (ALOFTEN) and witnessing domestic violence 
as a child (INTERGENVIO), corr (ALOFTEN, PHYVIO) =.33* and corr 
(INTERGENVIO, PHYVIO) =.13*.  WIFEWORKS and WIFEMONEY are also 
positively correlated in this sub-sample, corr (WIFEWORKS, WIFEMONEY) = .20*.  
For asset-poor women and the incidence of sexual violence (SEXVIO), only ALOFTEN 
is significantly correlated with sexvio, corr (ALOFTEN, SEXVIO)= .24*. For the 
variables of women’s economic autonomy in the SEXVIO specification, corr 
(WIFEWORKS, WIFEMONEY) = .20*.  Lastly, for asset-poor women and the incidence 
of aggregate violence (ALLVIO), corr (WIFEWORKS, PHYVIO)=-.11* and corr 
(WIFEMAKESMORE, PHYVIO) =.11*, and corr (WIFEWORKS, WIFEMONEY) = 
.20*.   
In the sub-sample of the two top quintiles (RICH), in physical violence 
specification where N=654, the only women’s economic autonomy variable that is 
significant is wife has money for own use (WIFEMONEY), corr (WIFEMONY, 
PHYVIO) = .-11*.  As in previous tests of correlation, corr (WIFEMONEY, 
WIFEWORKS) = .13*, denoting a positive relationship between working for income and 
women having money for their own use.  Unlike the POOR sub-sample, both education 
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in years (EDUYRS) and urban residence (URBAN) are negatively and significantly 
correlated to the incidence of physical violence, suggesting that there are differences 
between the asset-poor and asset-rich subsamples and the incidence of domestic violence. 
In specification where the dependent variable is the incidence of sexual violence 
(SEXVIO), none of the variables of women’s economic independence are significantly 
correlated with SEXVIO, however corr (WIFEMONEY, WIFEWORKS) = .13*.  Urban 
residence and education in years are negatively correlated with the incidence of sexual 
violence, corr (URBAN, SEXVIO) = -.10* and corr (EDUYRS, SEXVIO) = -.10*, 
providing support to the HBM, as both urban residence and more years of formal 
schooling should improve a woman’s bargaining power in the household.  Lastly, for the 
asset-rich sub-sample, only WIFEWORKS is significantly correlated with aggregate 
violence (ALLVIO), corr (WIFEMONY, ALLVIO) = .-10*.  Additionally, two variables 
of economic autonomy are correlated; corr (WIFEMONEY, WIFEWORKS) = .13*.  The 
reoccurring positively and statistically significant correlation between a woman working 
and having money for her own use may pose estimation concerns, mainly the robustness 
and validity of results.  In the following section, I address these concerns using stepwise 
regressions and likelihood-ratio tests to provide support for the models as specified in my 
analysis.  
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C2. Discussion of Full Model (regressions as specified in results provided) versus 
Nested Models 
Full Model of Physical Violence:  
Pr (DVPHYSVIO =1) =F(ß1WIFEWORKS + ß2WIFEMONEY + ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE+  
ß4HOME + ß5LAND + ß6POOR + ß7RICH + ß8 POLORG + ß9 WOMORG + ß10 EDUYRS + 
ß11HEADHOUSE + ß12 URBAN + ß13 SPAD2 + ß14 SPAD3 + ß15ALOFTEN + 
ß16INTERGENVIO) 
 
Nested Model 1 of Physical Violence: 
Ho: ß2WIFEMONEY = ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE = 0 
Ha: ß2WIFEMONEYand ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE do not equal 0 
 
LR chi2 (2) = 11.04 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0040 
 
At the 1% level, I reject the null hypothesis that ß2 WIFEMONEY and ß3 
WIFEMAKESMORE are equal to zero, and the full model provides a better specification 
than nested model 1.  
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Nested Model 2 of Physical Violence: 
Ho: ß1WIFEWORKS = ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE = 0 
Ha: ß1WIFEWORKS and ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE do not equal 0 
 
LR chi2 (2) = 9.41 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0090 
 
At the 1% level, I reject the null hypothesis that ß1WIFEWORKS and  
ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE are equal to zero, and the full model provides a better 
specification than nested model 2.  
Nested Model 3 of Physical Violence: 
Ho: ß1WIFEWORKS = ß2 WIFEMONEY= 0 
Ha: ß1WIFEWORKS and ß2 WIFEMONEY do not equal 0 
 
LR chi2 (2) = 10.61 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0050 
 
At the 1% level, I reject the null hypothesis that ß1WIFEWORKS and  
ß2 WIFEMONEY are equal to zero, and the full model provides a better 
specification than nested model 3.  
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Nested Model 4 of Physical Violence: 
Ho: ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE = 0 
Ha: ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE does not equal 0 
 
LR chi2 (2) = 6.02 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0141 
 
At the 5% level, I reject the null hypothesis that ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE is equal 
to zero, and the full model provides a better specification than nested model 4.  
 
Nested Model 5 of Physical Violence: 
Ho: ß2 WIFEMONEY= 0 
Ha: ß2 WIFEMONEY does not equal 0 
 
LR chi2 (2) = 5.54 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0186 
 
At the 5% level, I reject the null hypothesis that ß2 WIFEMONEY is equal to 
zero, and the full model provides a better specification than nested model 5.  
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Nested Model 6 of Physical Violence: 
Ho: ß1 WIFEWORKS= 0 
Ha: ß1WIFEWORKS does not equal 0 
 
LR chi2 (2) = 5.54 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0186 
 
At the 10% level, I reject the null hypothesis that ß1 WIFEWORKS is equal to 
zero, and the full model provides a better specification than nested model 5. By rejecting 
at the 10% level I avoid the mistake of a Type II error, that is, failing to reject the null 
hypothesis when the null hypothesis is in fact false.  
Justification of Validity for Physical Violence Full Model  
Using likelihood-ratio tests, I find that when the dependent variable is physical 
violence including all three variables of women’s economic independence provides a 
better model specification.  Additionally in all of the nested models, all three variables of 
women’s economic independence remained statistically significant, despite the omission 
of variables and combination tested.  
Full Model of Sexual Violence  
Pr (DVSEXVIO =1) =F(ß1WIFEWORKS + ß2WIFEMONEY + ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE+  
ß4HOME + ß5LAND + ß6POOR + ß7RICH + ß8 POLORG + ß9 WOMORG + ß10 EDUYRS + 
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ß11HEADHOUSE + ß12 URBAN + ß13 SPAD2 + ß14 SPAD3 + ß15ALOFTEN + 
ß16INTERGENVIO) 
Nested Model 1 of Sexual Violence: 
Ho: ß2WIFEMONEY = ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE = 0 
Ha: ß2WIFEMONEYand ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE do not equal 0 
 
LR chi2 (2) = 3.88 
Prob>chi2 = 0.1435 
 
In this nested model, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that ß2WIFEMONEY = ß3 
WIFEMAKESMORE = 0. However, it is the case in the results for the sexual violence 
specification that the only economic variable that is significant is ß3 
WIFEMAKESMORE.  Additionally, in this specification with only ß1 WIFEWORKS, 
the results indicate that ß1 WIFEWORKS is insignificant, which is the same result as the 
full model. 
Nested Model 2 of Sexual Violence: 
Ho: ß1WIFEWORKS = ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE = 0 
Ha: ß1WIFEWORKS and ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE do not equal 0 
 
LR chi2 (2) = 4.17 
Prob>chi2 = 0.1243 
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In this nested model, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that ß1WIFEWORKS = ß3 
WIFEMAKESMORE = 0.  In nested model 2 of sexual violence, ß2WIFEMONEY 
remains insignificant as it does in the full model of sexual violence.  
Nested Model 3 of Sexual Violence: 
Ho: ß1WIFEWORKS = ß2 WIFEMONEY= 0 
Ha: ß1WIFEWORKS and ß2 WIFEMONEY do not equal 0 
 
LR chi2 (2) = 0.93 
Prob>chi2 = 0.6274 
 
In this nested model, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that ß1WIFEWORKS = ß2 
WIFEMONEY= 0. In nested model 3 of sexual violence, ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE 
remains significant as it does in the full model of sexual violence.  
Nested Model 4 of Sexual Violence: 
Ho: ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE = 0 
Ha: ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE does not equal 0 
 
LR chi2 (2) = 3.62 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0570 
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At the 10% level, I reject the null hypothesis that ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE is 
equal to zero, and the full model provides a better specification than nested model 4. By 
rejecting at the 10% level I avoid the mistake of a Type II error, that is, failing to reject 
the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is in fact false. ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE is 
the only variable of economic autonomy that is significant in the sexual violence 
specification, and in nest model ß1WIFEWORKS and ß2 WIFEMONEY remain 
insignificant, corroborating the results of the full model.  
Nested Model 5 of Sexual Violence: 
Ho: ß2 WIFEMONEY= 0 
Ha: ß2 WIFEMONEY does not equal 0 
 
LR chi2 (2) = 0.31 
Prob>chi2 = 0.5802 
 
I fail to reject the null hypothesis that ß2 WIFEMONEY equals zero. In this nested 
model however, ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE remains significant and ß1WIFEWORKS 
remains insignificant, corroborating the results of the full model.  
Nested Model 6 of Sexual Violence: 
Ho: ß1 WIFEWORKS= 0 
Ha: ß1WIFEWORKS does not equal 0 
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LR chi2 (2) = 0.49 
Prob>chi2 = 0.4843 
 
I fail to reject the null hypothesis that ß1 WIFEWORKS equal zero. In this nested 
model however, ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE remains significant and ß2WIFEMONEY 
remains insignificant, corroborating the results of the full model.  
Justification of Validity for Sexual Violence Full Model 
In estimation I use the full model for several reasons.  First and foremost, though I 
only rejected one of the null hypothesis (nested model 4) and failed to reject the rest 
using the likelihood-ratio tests, the nested models confirmed the results of the full model 
for sexual violence—mainly that ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE is statistically significant and 
different from zero, providing support for the MBM. Moreover the nested models, as 
stepwise regressions, demonstrate that the three economic autonomy variables are not 
providing confounding results as results in the nested model remain consistent with the 
full model. Lastly, I include all three economic variables in order to obtain results that 
can speak to the hypothesis I am testing and since results are consistent across the distinct 
models tested, the full model for sexual violence remains robust and a better 
specification.  
Full Model of Aggregate Violence  
Pr (DVALLVIO =1) =F(ß1WIFEWORKS + ß2WIFEMONEY + ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE+  
ß4HOME + ß5LAND + ß6POOR + ß7RICH + ß8 POLORG + ß9 WOMORG + ß10 EDUYRS + 
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ß11HEADHOUSE + ß12 URBAN + ß13 SPAD2 + ß14 SPAD3 + ß15ALOFTEN + 
ß16INTERGENVIO) 
Nested Model 1 of Aggregate Violence: 
Ho: ß2WIFEMONEY = ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE = 0 
Ha: ß2WIFEMONEYand ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE do not equal 0 
 
LR chi2 (2) = 12.45 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0020 
 
At the 1% level, I reject the null hypothesis that ß2WIFEMONEY and  
ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE are equal to zero, in favor of the alternative hypothesis 
that ß2WIFEMONEYand ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE do not equal 0 and the full model 
provides a better specification than nested model 1.  
Nested Model 2 of Aggregate Violence: 
Ho: ß1WIFEWORKS = ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE = 0 
Ha: ß1WIFEWORKS and ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE do not equal 0 
 
LR chi2 (2) = 9.51 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0086 
 
At the 1% level, I reject the null hypothesis that ß1WIFEWORKS and  
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ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE are equal to zero, in favor of the alternative hypothesis 
that ß1WIFEWORKS and ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE do not equal 0 and the full model 
provides a better specification than nested model 2.  
Nested Model 3 of Aggregate Violence: 
Ho: ß1WIFEWORKS = ß2 WIFEMONEY= 0 
Ha: ß1WIFEWORKS and ß2 WIFEMONEY do not equal 0 
 
LR chi2 (2) = 11.71 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0029 
 
At the 1% level, I reject the null hypothesis that ß1WIFEWORKS and  
ß2 WIFEMONEY are equal to zero in favor of the alternative hypothesis that 
ß1WIFEWORKS and ß2 WIFEMONEY do not equal 0 and the full model provides a 
better specification than nested model 3.  
Nested Model 4 of Aggregate Violence: 
Ho: ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE = 0 
Ha: ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE does not equal 0 
 
LR chi2 (2) = 6.31 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0120 
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At the 5% level, I reject the null hypothesis that ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE equals 
zero in favor of the alternative hypothesis that ß3 WIFEMAKESMORE does not equal 0.  
The full model provides a better specification than nested model number 4 of aggregate 
violence. 
Nested Model 5 of Aggregate Violence: 
Ho: ß2 WIFEMONEY= 0 
Ha: ß2 WIFEMONEY does not equal 0 
 
LR chi2 (2) = 6.71 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0096 
 
At the 1% level, I reject the null hypothesis that ß2 WIFEMONEY is equal to zero 
in favor of the alternative hypothesis that ß2 WIFEMONEY does not equal 0 and the full 
model provides a better specification than nested model 5.  
Nested Model 6 of Aggregate Violence: 
Ho: ß1 WIFEWORKS= 0 
Ha: ß1WIFEWORKS does not equal 0 
 
LR chi2 (2) = 3.26 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0708 
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At the 10% level, to avoid a Type II error, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
ß1 WIFEWORKS= 0 in favor of the alternative hypothesis that ß1WIFEWORKS does not 
equal 0.   
Justification of Validity for Aggregate Violence Full Model 
Using the likelihood-ratio tests, the full model of aggregate violence as specified 
provides a better specification than the six nested models tested. Furthermore all of the 
nested models corroborated the results of the full model used to provide analysis.   
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APPENDIX D 
CHAPTER 3 CORRELATION MATRICES AND TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE 
Table D.1: Women’s Specification On The Justifications Of Intimate Partner Violence 
(N=7766, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level) 
 wgv wnoedu wsec whigher agew1 agew3 agew4 wagricul wmanual wprof wservices wdom wnowork poor rich urban head 
wgv 1                 
wnoedu .04* 1                
wsec -.06* -.06* 1               
whigher -.06* -.06* -.17* 1              
agew1 .05* .05* -.10* -.08 1             
agew3 -.02* -.02* -.06* .03* -.33* 1            
agew4 -.01 -.01 .04* -.04* -.17* -0.25* 1           
wagricul .04* .04* .06* -.06* -.04* .03* .01 1          
wmanual .02 .02 .10* -.09* -.06* .04* .02 -.05* 1         
wprof -.05* -.05* .00 .48* -.12* .11* .04* -.05* -.11* 1        
wservices -.01 -.01 -.08* -.05* -.08* .02 .03* -.06* -.13* -.13* 1       
wdom .01 .01 -.03* -.09* -.02 .03* -.01 -.04* .09* -.09* -.11* 1      
wnowork .02 .02 .03* -.20* .17* -.12* -.03 -.15* -.34* -.35* -.41* -.29* 1     
poor .08* .09* .05* -.29* .13* -.09* -.06* .12* -.0001 -.24* -.09* .11* .16* 1    
rich -.08* -.08* .17* .32* -.11* .09* .06* -.08* -.04* .26* .04* -.12* -.12* -.65* 1   
urban -.05* -.04 -.13* .16* -.03* .02 -.01 -.11* .03* .12* .05* -.01 -.12* -.38* .31* 1  
head  -.01 -.01 -.09* .02* -.09* .04 .01 .02 .00 .03* -.03* -.05* .03* .03* -.03* -.02 1 
wmaritalstat -0.7* -.07* .01 .32* -.18* .14* .10* -.04* -.03* .30* -.001 -.08* -.13* -.30* .33* .12* .07* 
wmarital1 .03* .03 -.08* .08* .67* -.41* -.23* -.05* -.07* -.04* -.08 -.06* .14* .05* -.03* .02 -0.9* 
wmarital3 -.01 -.01 -.08* -.09* -.28* .48* .24* .04* .06* .03* .02 .03* -.08* -.03* .02* -.02* .03* 
wmarital4 -0.0002 .09* -.11* -.08* -.11* -.11* .56* .02 .00 -.03* .03* .01 .00 .03* -.03* -.04* -.004 
sons -.03* .02 -.01 .01 -.12* .08* -.06* .02* -.006 .02 -.02* -.02 .02 .00 .00 .01 .06* 
daughters -.02 .01 -.01 .01 -.08* .08* -.12* .00 .03* -.003 -.01 -.01 .01 -.01 .03* .01 .04 
wnewspaper -.05* -.19* .15* .24* -.04* .00 -.03* -.07* -.03* .20* .03* -.04* -.12* -.25* .25* .15* .00 
wradio -.01 -.09* .05* .06 -.04* .01 -.01 -.02 .01 .06* .02* -.02 -.06* -.15* .13* .05* -.02 
wtv -.06* -.20* .13* .10* -.05* .00 -.002 .15* .03* .08* .04* -.01 -.07* -.28* .20* .18* -.02 
whhdm .05* .04* -.01 -.07* .07* -.05* -.03* .02 -.02 -.09* -.04* -.04* .13* -.06* -.06* -.09* .05* 
gendereq .14* .11* -.07 -.16* .06* -0.03* -.01 .08* -.001 -.12* -.01 .02* .07* .16* -.15* -.09* .02 
 
 wmaritalstat wmarital1 wmarital3 wmarital4 sons daughters wnewspaper wradio wtv whhdm gendereq 
wmaritalstat 1           
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wmarital1 -.09* 1          
wmarital3 .08* -.38* 1         
wmarital4 .00 -.15* -.13* 1        
sons .05 -.12* -.002 -.07* 1       
daughters .05 -.08* -.03* -.12* -.08* 1      
wnewspaper .17* .02 -.05* -.06* -.006 .01 1     
wradio .05* -.03* .00 -.02* -.02 .01 .17* 1    
wtv .08* -0.01 -.02 -.05* -.02 .11 .17* .23* 1   
whhdm -.03* .06* -.04 -.03* -.001 .00 -.06* -.04* -.06* 1  
gendereq -.11* .01 .00 .01 .01 -.03* -.10* -.04* -.11* .09* 1 
 
Table D.2: Asset-Poor Women’s Specification On The Justifications Of Intimate Partner Violence 
(N=4154, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level) 
 wgv wnoedu wsec whigher agew1 agew3 agew4 wagricul wmanual wprof wservices wdom wnowork wealth urban head 
wgv 1                
wnoedu .03* 1               
wsec -.06* -.17* 1              
whigher -.04 -.08* -.12* 1             
agew1 .05* -.10* .12* -.02 1            
agew3 -.02 .07* -.09* -.02 -.35* 1           
agew4 -.01 .09* -.11* -.05* -.18* -.21* 1          
wagricul .04* .08* -.08* -.04* -.07* .05* .02 1         
wmanual .02 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.07* .07* .01 -.06* 1        
wprof -.03 -.06* .06* .30* -.06* .07 -.01 -.04* -.06 1       
wservices -.01 -.03* .04* -.01 -.07* .01 .04* -.07* -.12* -.07* 1      
wdom .00 .01 -.05* -.04* -.05* .04* .00 -.07* -.11* -.07* -.12* 1     
wnowork -.06* .03 -.01 -.08* .16* -.11* .02 -.23* -.40* -.22* -.43* -.41* 1    
wealth -.01 -.15* .18* .11* -.07* .02 .02 -.11* .07* .07* .09* .01 -.11* 1   
urban -.004 -.04* .08* .04* .03* -.03 -.04* -.09* .05* .02 .05* .06* -.07* .26* 1  
head  -.04* .00 -.01 .01 -.07* .02 .01 .02 .00 .02 -.02 -.06* .06* .00 -.01 1 
wmaritalstat .04 -.04 .03 .17* .03 .07* -.06* -.02 .01 .14* .02 -.05* -.04* .09* -.002 .06* 
wmarital1 .04* -.12* .19* .08* -.07* .42* -.22* -.08* -.09* -.04* -.07* -.06* .15* -.04* .04* -.08* 
wmarital3 -.02 .10* -.14* -.08* -.11* .60* .18* .07* .07* .02 .04* .04* -.11* .01 -.04* .01 
wmarital4 .01 .10* -.11* -.05 .73* -.07* .62* .02 -.01 -.02 .02 .01 -.002 .01 -.03 -.01 
sons -.04* .03* -.02 .11 -.31* .06* -.10* .03 -.001 .04* -.02 -.02 .01 -.02 .01 .07* 
daughters -.02 .03* -.03* -.005 -.13* .05* -.12* .01 .04* -.01 -.02 -.02 .01 -.03* .002 .02 
wnewspaper -.03 -.20* .19* .15* -.12* -.02 -.06* -.06* .01 .11* .04* .01 -.08* .14* .06* -.01 
wradio -.01 -.08* .03* .02 -.07* -.01 -.01 -.005 .03* .02 .03 .00 -.05* .10* .00 -.01 
wtv -.04* -.18* .12* .04* -.001 -.03 -.02 -.14* .05* .02 .05* .03* -.05* .28* .12* -.03 
whhdm .07* .04* -.03 -.03* -.02 -.04* .04* .01 .04* -.05* -.07* -.07* .13* -.08* -.06* .05* 
gendereq .15* .11* -.09* -.12* .03 .01 -.03 .08* -.001 -.09* -.02 -.01 .03 -.12* -.03 .01 
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 wmaritalstat wmarital1 wmarital3 wmarital4 sons daughters wnewspaper wradio wtv whhdm gendereq 
wmaritalstat 1           
wmarital1 -.08* 1          
wmarital3 .04* -.40* 1         
wmarital4 .05* -.17* -.13* 1        
sons .05* -.12* -.001 -.09* 1       
daughters .02 -.09* -.04* -.12* -.04* 1      
wnewspaper .08* -.04* -.05* -.05* .00 -.01 1     
wradio .01 -.02 .00 -.02 -.02 -.01 .12* 1    
wtv -.01 .00 -.02 -.05* .02 -.001 .13* .22* 1   
whhdm .00 .05* -.05* -.05* .02 .01 -.05* -.04* -.06* 1  
gendereq -.04* .01 -.003 .00 .02 -.01 -.06* -.02 -.09* .10* 1 
 
Table D.3: Asset-Rich Women’s Specification On The Justifications Of Intimate Partner Violence 
(N=2068, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level) 
 wgv wnoedu wsec whigher agew1 agew3 agew4 wagricul wmanual wprof wservices wdom wnowork wealth urban head 
wgv 1                
wnoedu .02 1               
wsec -.001 -.08* 1              
whigher -.03 -.07* -.60* 1             
agew1 .04* .00 .12* -.08* 1            
agew3 -.003 .05* -.06* .02 -.29* 1           
agew4 -.05* .00 -.08* -.07* -.14* -.34* 1          
wagricul -.005 -.002 .00 -.02 .04 -.02 .03 1         
wmanual .03 .05* .03 -.15* -.02 -.005 .04* -.01 1        
wprof -.05* -.05* -.22* .48* -.12* .11* .05* -.02 -.16* 1       
wservices .03 .00 .06* -.12* -.10* .02 .01 -.01 -.13* -.24* 1      
wdom -.002 -.01 -.02 -.09* -.01 .04 -.004 -.004 -.04* -.08* -.07* 1     
wnowork .02 .03 .13* -.27* .17* -.11* -.03 -.03 -.25* -.46* -.37* -.12* 1    
wealth -.02 -.04* -.03 .19* -.05* .04 .07* .03 -.09* -.17* -.01 -.08* -.12* 1   
urban -.01 -.02 -.06* .07* .01 -.02 .01 -.02 .02 .05* -.03 -.02 -.08* -.08* 1  
head  -.02 -.01 -.06* .05* -.18* .09* .03 .01 .03 .06* -.06* -.02 -.03 .03 -.04 1 
wmaritalstat -.05* -.05* -.10* .28* -.21* .17* .12* .00 -.06* .27* -.06* -.05* -.14* .23* -.01 .14* 
wmarital1 -.01 -.03 .06* .12* .54* -.41* -.24* .01 -.07* -.03 -.11* -.05* .12* -.01 .03 -.13* 
wmarital3 -.01 .07* -.06* -.12* -.22* .30* .35* -.02 .05* .03 .04 -.001 -.03 .02 -.04 .09* 
wmarital4 -.02 .01 -.08* -.11* -.07* -.14* .45* .07* .03 -.03 .04 .00 .00 .00 -.005 -.02 
sons -.01 -.03 .01 .01 -.13* .08* -.01 .02 .02 .01 -.02 .01 .01 .01 -.002 .04 
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daughters .01 -.003 -.01 .01 -.08* .11* -.10* -.05* .02 -.01 .02 .04 .01 .02 -.01 .04* 
wnewspaper -.05* -.10* -.02 .18* .01 -.02 -.03 -.01 -.09* .15* -.01 -.02 -.10* .09* .03 .01 
wradio -.02 -.02 .00 -.001 -.01 .00 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.0003 .03 .00 -.01 .02 -.01 -.03 
wtv .01 -.01 .02 .01 .02 .00 -.05* -.09* -.02 -.02 -.02 .00 .05* -.03 -.004 -.02 
whhdm -.01 .01 .05* -.10* .07* -.02 -.03 .04 .04 -.10* -.04 .03 .11* .00 -.09* .10* 
gendereq .06* -.01 .04 -.13* .06* -.03 .01 -.0003 .02 -.10* .01 .00 .09* -.06* -.02 -.005 
 
 wmaritalstat wmarital1 wmarital3 wmarital4 sons daughters wnewspaper wradio wtv whhdm gendereq 
wmaritalstat 1           
wmarital1 -.12* 1          
wmarital3 .11* -.38* 1         
wmarital4 -.005 -0.12* -0.12* 1        
sons .08* -.15* -.004 -.04 1       
daughters .07* -.07* -.04 -.09* -.15* 1      
wnewspaper .07* .02 -.07* -.04 -.02 .04 1     
wradio -.01 -.004 -.02 -.02 -.02 .03 .16* 1    
wtv -.01 .02 -.04 -.04 .02 .04 .09* .17* 1   
whhdm -.02 .04* -.04 -.01 -.01 .01 -.04 -.0001 -.01 1  
gendereq -.08* .01 .02 .00 -.003 -.03 -.06 -.03 -.01 .04 1 
 
Table D.4: All Men Specification On The Justifications Of Intimate Partner Violence 
 (N=7766, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level) 
 mgv mnoedu mprim mhigher agem1 agem3 agem4 mnowork mprof magricul mmanual poor rich urban head 
mgv 1               
mnoedu .02 1              
mprim .06* -.28* 1             
mhigher -.07* -.09* -.40* 1            
agem1 .07 -.03* -.04* -.05* 1           
agem3 -.03* -.01 -.03* .02 -.19* 1          
agem4 -.04* .06* .06* .01 -.15* -.41* 1         
mnowork .00 .00 -.04 .02 .03* -.01 -.003 1        
mprof -.07* -.08* -.28* .45* -.03* .01 .05* -.02* 1       
magricul .05* .21* .19* -.17* -.02* -.04* .09* -.03* -.23* 1      
mmanual .00 -.08* .08* -.16* .03* .02 -.09* -.05* -.34* -.52* 1     
poor .09* .16* .27* -.27* .09* -.06* -.04* .01 -.27* .35* -.04* 1    
rich -.08* -.13* -.27* .32* -.07 .06* .06* .02* .32* -.27* -.04* -.65* 1   
urban -.02 -.10* -.17* .17* -.01 .04* -.03* .01 .15* -.36* .17* -.38* .31* 1  
head  -.02 -.01 .04* .01 -.14* .05* .06* -.04 .02 .03* -.05* .03* -.03* -.02 1 
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mmaritalstat -.08* -.08* -.16* .28* -.11* .04* .13* .00 .25* -.12* -.09* -.30* .33* .12* .08* 
mmarital1 .07* -.05* -.10* .04* .38* -.26* -.35* .01 -.01 -.07* .05* .07* -.06* .01 -.13* 
mmarital3 -.05* .06* .07* -.04* -.15* -.01 .46* .01 .01 .07* -.04* -.05* .05* -.02 .08* 
mmarital4 -.02 .03* .10* -.05* -.07* -.19* .22* -.01 -.02 .10* -.07* .03* -.03* -.05* .04* 
sons -.02* .01 .02 -.003 -.11* .08* .02 -.005 -.002 .02* -.02 .00 .00 .01 .06* 
daughters -.02 -.001 .00 .02* -.07* .11* -.03* .00 .02 .01 .00 -.01 .03* .01 .04* 
mnewspaper -.04* -.21* -.24* .25* -.01 .03* -.03* .02 .23* .27* .01 -.29* .26* .22* -.001 
mradio -.01 -.09* -.05* .06* .02 .01 -.03* -.01 .06* -.09* .03* -.10* 08* .05* -.01 
mtv -.07* -.17* -.11* .11* -.01 .01 -.02 .02* .10* -.26* .12* -.25* .17* .19* -.01 
mhhdm .08* .03* .10* -.11* .03* -.02 -.03* -.001 -.09* .08* -.004 .13* -.12* -.08* .01 
mrefsex .28* .00 .05* -.06* .04* -.02 -.003 -.002 -.07* .04* .01 .06* -.05* -.04* -.001 
acceptablework -.04* -.02 -.11* .14* -.05* .04* .03* .02 .11* -.04* -.05* -.12* .14* .06* .00 
 
 mmaritalstat mmarital1 mmarital3 mmarital4 sons daughters mnewspaper mradio mtv mhhdm mrefsex acceptablework 
mmaritalstat 1            
mmarital1 -.11* 1           
mmarital3 .09* -.39* 1          
mmarital4 .01 -.19* -.15* 1         
sons .05* -.12* .04* -.03* 1        
daughters .05* -.07* -.01 -.04* -.08* 1       
mnewspaper .15* .02 -.04* -.06* -.02 -.001 1      
mradio .03* .02 -.01 -.05* -.01 -.01 .18* 1     
mtv .08* .02 -.005 -.06* -.02 .00 .21* .25* 1    
mhhdm -.09* .03* -.00 -.0003 -.0003 -.003 -.10* -.04* -.09* 1   
mrefsex -.05* .02* -.01 .00 .01 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.05* .08* 1  
acceptablework .10* -.02* .03* -.01 .01 -.003 .04* .01 .04* -.08* -.02* 1 
 
Table D.5: Asset-Poor Men Specification On The Justifications Of Intimate Partner Violence 
(N=4154, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level) 
 mgv mnoedu mprim mhigher agem1 agem3 agem4 mnowork mprof magricul mmanual wealth urban head 
mgv 1              
mnoedu .01 1             
mprim .04* -.48* 1            
mhigher -.05* -.06* -.27* 1           
agem1 .07* -.06* -.07* .01 1          
agem3 -.03* -.0002 .00 -.02 -.21* 1         
agem4 -.04* .07* .07* -.03 -.17* -.37* 1        
mnowork -.04* .01 -.05* .01 .01 -.01 -.01 1       
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mprof -.02 -.03* -.17* .28* .01 .03 -.02 -.01 1      
magricul .02 .18* .09* -.10* -.08* -.01 .13* -.05* -.18* 1     
mmanual -.01 -.12* .02 -.06* .06* -.003 -.09* -.05* -.18* -.07* 1    
wealth -.06* -.13* -.09* .12* -.05* .03* -.003 .01 .10* -.31* .20* 1   
urban .03* -.05* -.06* .04* .04* .02 -.07* .02 .04* -.32* .26* .26* 1  
head  -.02 -.02 .05* -.01 -.12* .05* .06* -.05* .02 .03* -.03* .00 -.01 1 
mmaritalstat -.05* -.03 -.03 .09* -.08* .02 .10* .01 .05* .01 -.04* .09* -.01 .07* 
mmarital1 .07* -.07* -.11* .06* .41* -.29* -.36* .02 -.01 -.11* .07* -.05* .03 -.13* 
mmarital3 -.04* .08* .03* -.03* -.16* .04* .44* -.01 .01 .10* -.08* -.01 -.04* -.06* 
mmarital4 -.02 .03 .08* -.04* -.09* -.19* .25* .00 -.02 .10* -.09* .00 .01 .04* 
sons -.03* .02 .03 .02 -.14* .09* .02 -.02 -.01 .04* -.03 -.02 .00 .07* 
daughters -.02 .01 .02 -.004 -.07* .10* -.03* .01 -.004 .03* -.01 -.03 .13* .02 
mnewspaper -.004 -.20* -.13* .15* .05* -.00 -.06* .03* .13* -.23* .09* .16* .03* -.002 
mradio -.03 -.10* -.01 .04* .04* .00 -.03* .00 .02 -.08* .05* .07* .15* -.02 
mtv -.05* -.15* -.05 .07* .01 -.01 -.04* .03 .07* -.23* .17* .27* -.03* -.02 
mhhdm .09* .01 .04* -.06* .02 -.02 -.01 -.01 -.02 .04* -.03* -.08* -.01 -.004 
mrefsex .30* -.01 .03* -.03 .04* -.02 .01 -.005 -.02 .02 -.01 -.04* -.01 -.005 
acceptablework -.02 .00 -.05* -.06* -.03 .04* .02 .01 .04* .01 -.03 -.01 .00 -.02 
 
 mmaritalstat mmarital1 mmarital3 mmarital4 sons daughters mnewspaper mradio mtv mhhdm mrefsex acceptablework 
mmaritalstat 1            
mmarital1 -.11* 1           
mmarital3 .07* -.40* 1          
mmarital4 .05* -.21* -.15* 1         
sons .05* -.14* .05* -.02 1        
daughters .02 -.07* -.01 -.05* -.04* 1       
mnewspaper .02 .05* -.05* -.06* -.03* -.03* 1      
mradio .01 .04* -.02 -.05* .02 -.03 .15* 1     
mtv .01 .04* -.02 -.06* -.02 .00 .17* .25* 1    
mhhdm -.03* .03* .01 -.01 .00 -.01 -.06* -.02 -.07* 1   
mrefsex -.02 .02 .00 .01 .00 -.03* -.004 -.01 -.04* .06* 1  
acceptablework .03 -.02 .02 .00 .02 -.01 -.02 -.004 -.01 -.05* -.001 1 
 
Table D.6: Asset-Rich Men Specification On The Justifications Of Intimate Partner Violence 
(N=2070, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level) 
 mgv mnoedu mprim mhigher agem1 agem3 agem4 mprof magricul mmanual wealth urban head 
mgv 1             
mnoedu .02 1            
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mprim .05* -.07* 1           
mhigher -.07* -.06* -.43* 1          
agem1 .02 -.02 -.05* -.06* 1         
agem3 -.03 .01 -.06* .01 -.16* 1        
agem4 -.04 .04 .11* .01 -.12* -.51* 1       
mprof -.09 -.05* -.28* .44* -.02 -.02 .08* 1      
magricul .03 -.05* .12* -.09* .00 -.05* .06* -.17* 1     
mmanual .07* .02 .19* -.29* -.01 .03 -.06* -.55* -.21* 1    
wealth -.03* -.06* -.17* .21* -.05 .03 .04 .20* -.02 -.16* 1   
urban .01 -.01 -.06* .08* -..01 .01 -.03 .08* -.11* .01 .11* 1  
head  -.04* -.05* .01 .03 -.21* .07* .08* .05* -.003 -.05* .03* -.04 1 
mmaritalstat .08* -.05* -.12* .25* -.12* .04 .15* .24* -.03 -.15* .23* -.01 .12* 
mmarital1 .08* -.05* -.14* .07* .31* -.18* -.35* .03 -.08* -.004 -.04* .02 -.15* 
mmarital3 -.03* .03 .13* -.07* -.12* -.12* .47* -.004 .08* .00 .02 -.05 .10* 
mmarital4 -.01 .06* .10* -.06* -.05* -.19* .19* -.02 .10* -.02 -.001 .00 .03 
sons -.01 -.04 .03 -.02 -.05* .09* .01 .01 .00 -.01 .01 -.002 .04* 
daughters .00 -.03 -.02 .04* -.06* .12* -.02 .04* -.03 .02 .02 -.01 .04* 
mnewspaper -.03 -.12* -.22* .23* -.04 .02 -.03 .19* -.10* -.13* .10* .10* .01 
mradio .01 -.04* .05* .06* -.02 .01 -.04 .05* -.04 -.04 .05* .01 .01 
mtv -.05* -.07 -,04 .03 -.01 -.01 .03 .01 -.01 -.001 .06* -.02 .04* 
mhhdm -.002 -.002 .10* -.10* .04 .03 -.04 .09* .00 .05* -.07* -.03 .03 
mrefsex .25* .05* .05* -.07* .01 -.01 -.001 -.11* .04 .08 -.03 -.01 -.02 
acceptablework -.01* -.01 -.12* .15* -.06* ,03 .02 .11* .01 -.07 .10* .03 .06* 
 
 mmaritalstat mmarital1 mmarital3 mmarital4 sons daughters mnewspaper mradio mtv mhhdm mrefsex acceptablework 
mmaritalstat 1            
mmarital1 -.11* 1           
mmarital3 .11* -.39* 1          
mmarital4 -.03 -.15* -.15* 1         
sons .08* -.10* .06* -.05* 1        
daughters .07* -.07* -.02 -.01 -.15* 1       
mnewspaper .08* .00 -.04 -.02 .02 .03* 1      
mradio -.02 .02 -.01 -.04 -.003 -.01 .17* 1     
mtv -.02 .00 .00 -.01 -.02 -.01 .12*  1    
mhhdm -.08* .01 -.002 .02 -.001 -.01 -.06* -.05 -.03 1   
mrefsex -.06* .04 -.03 .01 .02 .02 .00 -.04* -.06* .06* 1  
acceptablework .09* -.002 .03 -.03 .01 -.02 .05* -.01 .06* -.09* -.06* 1 
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APPENDEX E 
DISSCUSSION OF CORRELATIONS AND MODEL TEST STATISTICS 
Discussion of Correlations34   
In the pooled specification of women’s justification of intimate partner violence 
(WGV), N=7766, correlations emerge that provide preliminary insight into the role of 
gendered beliefs, endogenous preferences, and the justification of gender violence at the 
household level.  A woman’s household decision-making ability index score (a higher 
score for women means less household decision-making ability) is positively and 
significantly correlated with woman agreeing to at least one of the justifications for 
intimate partner violence, with corr (WHHDM, WGV)= .05*.  Similarly, women who 
agree with more traditional gender roles (as measured by the index GENDEREQ) are 
also more likely to agree with at least one justification for intimate partner violence; corr 
(GENDEREQ, WGV)= .14*.  In this pooled sample women between the ages of 15 to 24 
(AGEW1) there is a positive correlation with agreeing to at least one justification, corr 
(AGEW1, WGV)= .05*, while women between the ages of 35-44 (AGEW3) have a 
negative correlation with agreeing to least one justification, (AGEW3, WGV)= -.02* 
suggesting that younger women may adopted more traditional gender roles and adhere to 
gender hierarchy than older women.  
In the pooled sample women in the asset-poor category (POOR) are positively 
and significantly correlated with agreeing to at least one justification, corr (POOR, 
                                                 
34
 See appendix C for correlation matrices and significance at the 5% level 
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WGV)=.08*. However women in the asset-rich category (RICH), have a negative 
correlation with agreeing to at least one of the justifications, with corr (RICH, WGV)= -
.08*. The respective correlations of POOR and RICH to the dependent variable WGV 
suggest that disaggregating the pooled specification into class sub-samples may provide 
further information and in this chapter I estimate the specification of women’s 
justification of intimate partner violence first on a sub-sample of only women in the 
asset-poor category and then on a sub-sample of those in the asset-rich category. In the 
specification of women in the asset-poor category (N= 4154), both women’s household 
decision-making index score (WHHDM) and adhering to more traditional gender roles 
(GENDEREQ) are positively and significantly correlated with WGV, respectively corr 
(WHHDM, WGV)= .07* and corr (GENDEREQ, WGV)= .15*. Whereas, for women in 
the asset-rich category (N=2068), only GENDEREQ is positively and significantly 
correlated with WGV, corr (GENDEREQ, WGV)= .06*, but lower than the same 
variables correlation coefficient for women in the asset-poor category.  
In the specification of pooled sample of men’s justification of intimate partner 
violence, N=7766, correlation coefficients suggest that men’s gendered beliefs and 
attitudes also matter for the justification of intimate partner violence (MGV).  The 
variable that measures men’s household decision-making ability (the index score 
MHHDM) is positively and significantly correlated with MGV, corr (MHHDM, MGV) = 
.08*.  Men who agree with using violence or withholding money from their partners 
should they refuse sex (measured by the index score MREFSEX) have a positive and 
significant correlation coefficient with MGV, corr (MREFSEX, MGV) = .28*.  However, 
the variable ACCEPTABLEWORK, men agreeing that it is acceptable for women to 
 161
work outside the home, is negatively correlated with agreeing to at least one justification 
for intimate partner violence with a corr (ACCEPTABLEWORK, MGV) = -.04*.  As in 
the pooled women’s specification, for men corr (POOR, MGV)=.09* and corr (RICH, 
MGV) = -.08*.  I disaggregate the pooled sample into two categories: asset-poor 
(N=5154) and asset-rich (N=2070).  In the sub-sample of asset-poor men, corr 
(MHHDM, MGV) =.09* and corr (MREFSEX, MGV)=.30*, whereas for asset-rich men 
MHHDM is not significantly correlated with MGV and corr (MREFSEX, MGV)=.25*, a 
lower correlation coefficient than that of asset-poor men.   
Discussion of Model Test Statistics using McFadden’s R2 
The model test statistic presented in Tables 3.13 and 3.14 is McFadden’s R2, also 
know as the pseudo- R2, which is characterized by the following equation:  
 
   
MFull is the model with the predictors, so in this case the numerator of the ratio 
represents the estimated log likelihood of the model as specified with predictors. The 
denominator, MIntercept is the estimated log likelihood of the model of the model without 
predictors.  The ratio of these provides the level of improvement of the full model over 
the model with only an intercept.  Because McFadden’s R2 use the ratio of estimated log 
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likelihood of the full model over the model without predictors, a small ratio denotes that 
the full model is a much better fit.35   
                                                 
35
 FAQ: What are pseudo R-squareds? UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group from 
www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/Psuedo_RSquareds.htm (accessed August 3, 
2013) 
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